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Abstract 
This thesis examines the cognitive and neural bases of expertise. In so 
doing, several psychological phenomena were investigated-imagery. memory and 
thinking-using different tasks, and a variety of techniques of data gathering, 
including standard behavioural experiments, questionnaires, eye-movement 
recording, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
Chess players participated in all the studies, and chess tasks were used. The 
data confirmed the versatility and power of chess as a task environment, since the 
results provided fruitful information for the understanding of different human 
cognitive processes. 
The role of practice in this domain of expertise was examined. The strong 
view that extended deliberate practice is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
acquisition of expert performance, did not receive support in this thesis. 
Alternatively, a less extreme position was adopted: extended practice is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the acquisition of expert performance. 
A search for individual differences in factors unrelated to chess practice 
was carried out. The sources of these individual differences, as \vell as the 
cognitive abilities in which individual differences may exist, were considered. One 
of the sources-the age at which serious practice starts-was a good predictor of 
chess skill. Handedness, which is supposed to be determined by environmental 
factors in utero, slightly differentiated chess players from non-players, but no 
differences in this variable were found bet\veen strong and the weak players. 
Regarding the cognitive abilities, chess players performed slightly better than the 
non-chess players in a spatial task. 
IX 
Individual differences were also considered within a single leyel of 
expertise-master level. Differences in forgetting rate in long-term memory and 
reaction time were observed for one of the masters. These results contributed to the 
improvement of an extant theory of expertise-template/CHREST [CHunks and 
REtrieval STructures] theory-by estimating values for some of its parameters 
based on the empirical data obtained, and by proposing the addition of a spatial 
short-term memory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Almost every human adult is an expert in several domains; for instance, 
recognition of human faces and speaking one's mother tongue. Howeyer, no-one 
would think to call everyone else' an expert' just because they have mastered their 
own language. We generally refer to experts when speaking of a small percentage 
of individuals who are at the pinnacle of any domain that is considered socially 
important and that requires skills that go beyond the normal skills of the 
popUlation. There are several domains in which society considers that there are 
experts: music, painting, sculpture, literature, science, sports, chess and others. 
There are some questions about expertise that attract the attention of 
scientists. How is the expert performance acquired? Can anyone become an expert 
in any domain by spending thousands of hours of dedicated practice? Or, do those 
who excel in a domain have some innate 'talent'? Is the nervous system of experts 
different from that of non-experts? If it is, is that because it has changed as a 
consequence of practice or because it was different before becoming dedicated to 
the domain? Or, could the nervous system be in no way different, and the 
knowledge of the experts is what counts? This thesis is devoted to the study of 
expertise and will address some of these questions. 
Why is it important to know about experts? Because the understanding of 
expertise has social, educational and psychological implications. From the social 
point of view, an example is that expert scientists contribute to the improvement of 
the quality of life of people by generating complex knowledge, which in tum, is 
applied to increase the life expectancy of the popUlation (e.g., the discoyery of 
1 
penicillin). If one knew how expertise is acquired it would be possible to generate 
educational systems that favour its emergence. From the psychological standpoint, 
it is important to understand the circumstances under which experts surpass the 
normal limits of the cognitive system. If what differs between an expert and a 
novice is the software 1 , the theoretical framework of cognitive psychology is safe; 
whereas if the difference is in the hardware, the whole theoretical framework of 
cognitive psychology might be jeopardized. 
It is widely accepted that a fundamental study in the development of the 
scientific study of expertise was De Groot's (1946) study of chess players (e.g., 
Hoffman, Feltovich & Ford, 1997). Chase and Simon (1973) revived De Groot's 
study and proposed the 'chunking theory' from which two statements were quite 
influential in the wider domain of cognitive psychology. First, an expert does not 
have a different cognitive system from that of the lay person; what differs is the 
amount of knowledge. Second, this knowledge is acquired by thousands of hours of 
practice, and it requires at least 10 years of intensive dedication to reach the level 
of expert. Chase and Simon (1973) has been a widely cited article in cognitive 
psychology and has generated two lines of research. The first concerned the 
cognitive system of the experts and eventually led to the development of-among 
others-the 'template theory' (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), and the second had as its 
main purpose the demonstration that dedicated practice is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the attainment of expert performance, a view that reached 
its summit in the 'deliberate practice' framework (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-
Romer, 1993). 
I Software and hardware are two psychological terms introduced by the information processing 
account of psychology. The former refers to knowledge. representations, strategies, etc: \\"hich are 
assumed to be flexible. The latter refers to the more stable components of the cognitive system such 
as short-term memory, long-term memory (see Charness et a1.. 1996). 
Neither of these two lines of research has proposed a general theory of 
expertise capable of irrefutably answering the questions presented above. This 
thesis explores both lines of research, and one of its aims was to gather data to 
contribute towards a general theory of expertise in which the two strands are 
combined. In so doing, chess was chosen as a task environment to carry out all the 
experiments. This is not a casual choice: as mentioned earlier, De Groot's (1946) 
study of chess players was a fundamental study that directly addressed the topic of 
expertise. Chase and Simon (1973) stated that chess is the drosophila of cognitive 
psychology, indicating that it is an excellent task environment to carry out 
experiments of psychological interest. 
Continuing this idea I propose that a good research setting in psychology is 
one that allows researchers to study several relevant psychological phenomena, via 
different tasks and techniques, in order to generate or test theories, in the most 
controllable and ecological way possible. One of the purposes of this thesis is to 
show that chess has these characteristics. The advantages of using chess as a 
research setting were articulated in several articles (e.g., Simon & Gobet, 2000). 
Chess offers a good compromise between controllability and ecological validity. 
Nowadays, playing chess against a computer program or against a human opponent 
on the Internet is commonplace in players ranging from top-class to beginners. 
Furthermore, the study of chess openings with databases which display games on a 
computer screen is an unavoidable part of chess training. Thus, asking chess 
players to sit in front of a computer screen on which chess stimuli are presented, 
and asking them to give a response by clicking a computer mouse is a naturalistic 
task for them. 
., 
-' 
Another interesting feature of chess is that a very simple environment 
containing a white and black 8 x 8 board with 32 pieces (16 white and 16 black) of 
6 different types-therefore a very controllable environment--could generate a 
vast number of positions (approximately 2143 , see De Groot & Gobet, 1996). 
Therefore, without losing experimental control it is possible to create many 
different experimental conditions (the classic example is the use of normal chess 
game positions and random positions). This flexibility also allows the researcher to 
design a variety of tasks (e.g., reconstruct a chess position, solve a chess problem, 
make a decision of a move to play, recognise previously seen positions, reproduce 
a sequence of moves). Once again, natural tasks can be used in a controlled 
environment. 
A very important factor is that, during a chess game, a chess player has to 
perform numerous cognitive processes intensively, such as perception, imagery, 
encoding and retrieval of information, as well as thinking. Hence, the use of chess 
players as participants offers the possibility of investigating a variety of 
psychological phenomena. 
A practical reason why chess is a favourable research setting is that there 
are numerous chess games in chess databases (the most important chess data base 
nowadays is Chess Base, which began to be commercialised in 1987) easily 
available for researchers in order to produce the stimuli. Finally, a further 
important factor is that chess players, ranging from top-class grandmasters to 
beginners, are ranked on an interval scale (Elo, 1978), which allows an easy 
assessment of the level of expertise of any player2. This is a very important tool 
2 Arvad Elo developed a rating scale in 1978, and since then the World Chess Federation (FIDE) 
has used it to rate chess players. The scale is exclusively based on games played in tournaments that 
fulfil FIDE's requisites. Almost all national federations have also their own rating with the same or 
similar system developed by Elo. The scale has a normal distribution and a standard deviation of 
inasmuch as detennining the level of expertise within a domain is more difficult 
than one could expect. In some domains (e.g., medicine), the years of experience 
within a domain, or the position held, are taken as parameters to differentiate 
experts from novices. This measure may be correct; however, the profit that 
different people take from their experience in a domain is not constant, and some 
newcomers might have an equal or better level than more experienced individuals. 
ELO rating scale avoids this kind of problem, because it measures perfonnance 
directly. In addition, expertise can be assessed categorically (i.e., experts vs. 
novices, as in most of the other domains) and parametrically (i.e., expertise can be 
measured along a continuum). 
In summary, understanding expertise has social, educational and 
psychological implications. A general theory of expertise that fully explains the 
phenomenon has not yet been developed, and would be valuable. Two lines of 
research have explored expertise. One investigated the characteristics of the 
cognitive system, and the other focused on the role of practice. This thesis aims to 
contribute towards a theory of expertise, combining these two strands of research. 
For this purpose, chess has been chosen as a task environment, for it provides the 
conditions for investigating several psychological phenomena related to expertise. 
In the next section I will state explicitly the purposes and theses of this 
piece of work. Then, I will give details of how this work is organised. 
200 points. The best player has around 2800 points and the weakest player has 1800 (last year the 
cut-off threshold was 2000, and five years ago it was 2200). In the psychology literature, players 
between 1600 and 1800 points are called 'class B players', players between 1800 and 2000 points 
are considered 'class A players', players between 2000 and 2200 are labelled 'experts'. players with 
more than 2200 are considered masters. The World Chess Federation awards players with titles 
according to their level; players with more than 2300 are called 'FIDE masters', most of the players 
with more than 2400 are international masters and most of the players with more than 2500 are 
grandmasters. 
1.1. Purposes and theses 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to gather data in order to contribute 
towards a general theory of expertise. Except for chapter 9, all the experimental 
chapters focused on different psychological phenomena related to expertise. 
Providing a definite theory of expertise is beyond the scope of this work; instead, 
the data gathered are used in order to suggest improvements to an extant theory-
the template/CHREST [CHunks and REtrieval STructures] theory (Gobet & 
Simon, 1996a; see next chapter, section 2.1.2). 
The second purpose is to gather data in order to support three specific 
theses, which are stated below. 
First thesis: Chess is a versatile and powerful task environment to study expertise 
and psychological phenomena related to expertise. 
Second thesis: Extended practice is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to 
achieve expert performance in chess. 
Third thesis: There are individual differences in factors not-related to extended 
practice within chess that account for part of the differences in chess rating. 
In order to deal with the first thesis, chess experiments were carried out in a 
range of tasks, using a variety of techniques, and various psychological phenomena 
were investigated. Regarding the tasks, a questionnaire was administered to a large 
number of chess players of different levels (see chapter 4); in chapter 5, the task 
used was blindfold chess;3 in chapter 6, a questionnaire of similar characteristics to 
the one in chapter 4 was used; in chapter 7. numerous immediate and delayed 
3 Blindfold chess is a variant of chess in which at least one or the players do not use the chessboard: 
instead (s )he communicates herlhis move out loud and receives the move of the opponent by the 
same procedure. 
memory recall tasks were performed. In chapter 8, a number of problem-so lying 
tasks were carried out. In chapter 9, a delayed recall task was performed, and the 
participants carried out two similar delayed response recognition tasks. 
The techniques used to record data also varied in nature; questionnaires 
were used in chapter 4 and 6; standard behavioural measures "-ere obtained in 
chapters 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10; eye-movement recordings and think-aloud protocols 
were obtained in chapter 8; finally, in chapters 9 and 10 functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) was carried out (see methods section in chapter 3, 
section 3.1). 
A range of psychological phenomena was covered by this work. Chapters 4 
to 8 investigated expertise from different perspectives. Chapters 4 and 6 
investigated the role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance, 
chapter 5 researched the subject of expert imagery, chapter 7 dealt with the topic of 
expert memory, and chapter 8 with expert thinking. Chapter 9 enquired into neural 
aspects of autobiographical memory, and chapter 10 was devoted to the influence 
of expert knowledge upon working memory tasks in brain activation. 
The second thesis expresses the idea that extended practice is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to achieve expert performance. Chapters 4 and 6 
addressed this issue via a correlational study, in which a large sample of chess 
players reported the amount of time studying and playing chess. 
Since extended practice cannot account for all the variance in chess rating, 
the third thesis argues in favour of individual differences unrelated to practice. This 
subject was addressed in chapters 6, 7 and 8, where 6 participants (two strong chess 
masters, two intermediate players and two non-players) took part in several tasks. 
Using a small number of participants in numerous tasks-following the framew-ork 
of Gobet and Ritter (2000)-allowed me to detect some individual differences that 
otherwise would have remain unnoticed. In anticipation, some individual 
differences in non-domain specific factors were observed; however, prudence 
should be observed before making strong claims. In chapter 11, I will suggest some 
candidate factors to be further investigated. 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter (chapter 2) 
presents a literature review of all the topics treated in the experimental chapters. 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodological issues of the thesis, and the technique of 
fMRI will be explained in detail. Chapters 4 to 10 are empirical and an overview of 
them has been already given. Finally, chapter 11 has three sections. The first 
summarises the results, the second proposes improvements to the 
template/CHREST theories and the last evaluates the purposes and theses stated in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical and empirical review of expertise 
In chapter l, it was stated that one of the goals of this thesis is to provide 
data towards a general theory of expertise. Fortunately, I am not alone in this 
endeavour; indeed, a vast amount of work has been done before with the same aim. 
In section 2.1, a brief review of theories of expertise, as well as the reasons why 
one of the theories-template/CHREST-was chosen as a guide, is presented. In 
section 2.2, one of the strands of research within expertise is explored (i.e., the 
acquisition of expertise), emphasising the 'innate talent vs. deliberate practice' 
debate. Section 2.3 moves to the characterisation of the cognitive system of the 
expert. The analysis will be carried out at two levels: the functional level (sub-
section 2.3.1) and the brain level (sub-section 2.3.2). The first of these sub-sections 
will review studies into expert imagery, expert memory and expert thinking. The 
second sub-section will be devoted to brain imaging studies. 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
Several theories of expertise have been put forward and a number of 
reviews have appeared elsewhere (e.g. Gobet, 1998a; Holding, 1985, Saariluoma, 
1995). Here, I will only highlight the most important aspects of the theories. As 
indicated earlier, there are two main strands of research into expertise. The first 
strand of research investigates how the expert levels are acquired (e.g., Ericsson et 
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aI., 1993; Howe, Davidson & Sloboda, 1998). This line of research \\-ill be 
extensively discussed in section 2.2 when the 'innate talent ys. deliberate practice' 
debate will be presented. The second, enquires into the cognitiye processes of the 
experts (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1996a; Holding. 1985; 
Saariluoma, 1990). In the next sub-section (2.1.1), a number of these theories will 
be summarised, and the following sub-section (2.1.2) will concentrate on the 
template/CHREST theory. The latter will be explained in more detaiL for it is the 
one that I chose to guide my empirical studies. 
2. 1. 1. Theories of expertise 
The following theories will be briefly summarised: chunking theory (Chase 
& Simon, 1973), SEEK (SEarch, Evaluation and Knowledge) theory (Holding, 
1985), long-term working memory theory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), 
apperception-restructuring theory (Saariluoma, 1992), and constraint attunement 
hypothesis (Vicente & Wang, 1998). The next section will be devoted to the 
template/CHREST theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a). 
Chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973). 
This is the best detailed theory of this section, allowing for clear predictions 
to test its accuracy. This is an important issue, because many psychological 
theories are ill-defined, and in tum unfalsifiable (see Popper, 1959, for the 
importance of falsifiability of scientific theories). Indeed, the chunking theory \\'as 
falsified and modified (see next section, 2.1.2). 
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This theory explained the differences in chess skill by the amount of 
familiar chunks stored in long-term memory. The cognitive system of the chess 
master has the same limits of capacity as the normal cognitive system. The chunks 
are familiar configuration of 3 or 4 chess pieces stored in long-term memory by 
practice. These patterns allow chess players to recognise positions rapidly and 
automatically generate moves. 
This theory was implemented in a computer model (EP AM) which 
contained a long-term memory, a short-term memory and a 'mind's eye'. All the 
systems had the characteristics of the normal cognitive system (e.g .. the short-term 
memory capacity was limited to 7 chunks (Miller, 1956). storing a chunk into long-
term memory needed 8 seconds (this estimation takes into account the verbal 
learning studies; see Jung, 1968)). 
The theory accounted for the available data quite well; however new data 
put the theory into question (see the memory section for details, section 2.3.1.2) 
and some alternative theories were proposed. One of them. SEEK, will be 
explained next. 
SEEK theory (Holding, 1985). 
Holding denied the pattern recognition explanation of the chunking theory. 
and proposed that thinking ahead, evaluation and knowledge are the main factors 
that explain expertise in chess. Masters play better than novices because they 
search deeper and faster, and they evaluate better using their knowledge. Unlike the 
chunking theory, Holding proposed the idea that verbal knowledge, instead of 
visuo-spatial patterns, are fundamental in chess expertise. 
1 1 
Holding has the merit of pointing out some shortcomings of the chunking 
theory and giving emphasis on the search processes of the chess players. SEEK has 
been well considered, for it seemed to solve the problems of the chunking theory. 
However, it is very difficult to derive predictions from the theory without ad-hoc 
assumptions because the theory has not been formalised. Moreover, Gobet (1 998a) 
showed that it does not account for the available data. 
Apperception-restructuring theory (Saariluoma, 1992). 
Based on the fact that human thinking is highly selectiye and that experts 
are capable of segregating the relevant from the irrelevant, Saariluoma revived the 
concept of apperception (Kant, 1781; Leibniz, 1704). Apperception refers to 
conceptual perception or construction of semantic representations (Saariluoma, 
1995). He argues that while thinking, chess players construct mental spaces via 
apperception, and also that shifts between mental spaces are carried out by 
restructuring (using a term of Gestalt psychology; Duncker, 1945). 
The apperception-restructuring theory has the value of trying to reconcile 
the chunking and SEEK theories. Also, it paid attention to a typical phenomenon in 
problem-solving situations (i.e., functional fixation), and tried to explain a feature 
of expert thinking-selectivity in search. The disadvantage of the theory is that it 
has not been formalised yet, and it is difficult to derive predictions in order to 
falsify the theory. 
Long-term working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). 
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This theory emerged to account for all the data available in the psychology 
of expertise. In the field of chess, it proposes the point that masters use a retrieyal 
structure representing the chessboard, which allows them to encode chess pieces 
forming a hierarchical organisation, and having rapid access to long-term memory. 
It also proposed that chess players encode information by elaborating long-term 
memory schemas. The theory has the advantage of putting together empirical data 
of a variety of fields of expertise, including language. Therefore, it is not only a 
theory of expertise but also a general theory of memory. 
Once again, although quite popular, this theory is vaguely defined, not 
formalised, and ad-hoc assumptions must be made in order to derive predictions. 
Gobet (1998a) considered two versions of the theory in order to compare its 
explanatory power to that of chunking, SEEK and template theory, and the theory 
does not explain all the available data in chess in any of the two versions. 
Constraint attunement hypothesis (Vicente & Wang, 1998). 
This theory was proposed as an ecological theory of expert memory. In fact 
this is not a theory of the cognitive system; Vicente and Wang proposed that it is 
more important initially to have a product theory (i.e., a theory of the production of 
an expert) than a process theory (i.e., a theory of the cognitive processes of an 
expert). The reason why it is included in this group is because it is closely related 
to the theories explained above (indeed several arguments between the theories 
were published; see Simon & Gobet, 2000). 
The constraint attunement hypothesis proposes that one of the hallmarks of 
expertise is the attunement to goal-relevant constraints. For instance, the fact that 
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chess masters search selectively could be the consequence of haYing educated their 
attention to focus on relevant moves. When no goal-relevant constraints are present 
in the environment then expertise does not emerge (for instance, in random chess 
positions). The more goal-relevant constraints in the en\·ironment the higher the 
differences between the experts and novices. 
Another example is a study in recognition memory for X-rays (Myles-
Worsley et aI., 1988). In this study expert radiologists performed better than 
novices when recognising abnormal X-rays and they performed worse than novices 
when recognising normal X-rays. Vicente and Wang (1998) proposed that this 
result could be explained by the fact that the relevant goal of expert radiologists is 
to identify abnormalities; when the relevant goal is absent the expertise effect does 
not arise. 
Simon and Gobet (2000) argued that process theories do not need to \vait 
for product theories to be completed, and that theories should be clearly defined in 
order to be tested and, if necessary, falsified. Once again, the lack of formalisation 
and vagueness are some of the shortcomings of the theory. 
2.1.2. Template/CHREST (Gobet & Simon, 1996) 
The brief review of theories of expertise presented above has shown a 
common pattern: vagueness, lack of formalisation, and difficulty in deriving 
predictions that could falsify the theory. The only exception is the chunking theory. 
A good example of how scientific knowledge should deyelop is the change from 
the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) to the template theory (Gobet & 
Simon, 1996a). Eyery theory should be formulated in a way that clear predictions 
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could be derived from it; if these predictions are empirically tested and they fail to 
pass the test, the theory must be changed (Popper, 1959). The reasons for the 
change are explained in the expert memory section (see sub-section 2.3.1.2). Here, 
I will focus on the explanation of the theory. First, I will briefly explain the 
CHREST model and its advantages, and then I will point out some disadvantages 
that this thesis aims to improve. 
Like the chunking theory, the template theory suggests that chess players 
store in long-term memory familiar patterns of chess configurations, and that these 
patterns elicit moves. When a chess position is seen, the patterns in long-tenn 
memory are automatically accessed, and a move is generated. The difference with 
the chunking theory is that chunks that are visited several times, evolve into more 
complex structures called templates. These differ from the retrieval structures of 
the long-term working memory theory in that the retrieval structures are explicitly 
acquired, whereas the templates are implicitly acquired throughout the practice of 
chess. The templates contain a core with approximately 12 pieces, and slots in 
which additional information could be added. This infonnation may be other 
chunks, moves, or more abstract knowledge such as the name of the opening, 
strategies and plans. 
Parts of the template theory were implemented in a computational model 
called CHREST. Except from the templates, the rest of the model contains the 
same characteristics as the chunking theory: a short-tenn memory, a long-tenn 
memory with a discrimination network and a mind's eye. The short -tenn memory is 
an array in which pointers of the chunks accessed are placed. (its capacity limit has 
changed from 7 in the chunking theory to 4 chunks in CHREST, based on Zhang 
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and Simon's (1985) estimation). The mind's eye is a transient \'isual storage in 
which information from the retina or from memory could be placed. 
CHREST not only aims to explain how the cognitiye system of the expert 
works, but also, how expertise is acquired. By two processes-discrimination and 
familiarisation-the model is capable ofleaming the information fed into it (for a 
detailed explanation of these processes see De Groot & Gobet, 1996). These 
processes and others have estimated time parameters (for instance, it takes 8 
seconds to discriminate, 2 seconds to familiarise, 250 milliseconds to fill in a 
template slot; see chapter 11, table 11.1 for a complete description of the 
parameters) 
Like the chunking theory, the difference between an expert and a no\'ice is 
explained by a differential amount of information that is stored in long-term 
memory. CHREST could be fed with chess positions, and it will create chunks, and 
eventually templates, throughout the discrimination network. The more positions 
fed into the model, the larger the discrimination network and the larger the 
templates and chunks available. 
The model can simulate the most studied paradigm up to that point: the 
reconstruction of a position that had been seen for a brief period of time. Another 
appealing feature of the model is that it simulates eye-movements during the 
reconstruction task. When presented with a chess stimulus, the model fixates on a 
part of the board, extracts information, accesses a chunk or template that matches 
the information, and places a pointer to it in the short-term memory. When familiar 
positions are presented, the model accesses the chunks or templates that correspond 
to the positions presented, and the performance is high (in fact, the higher the 
network, the higher the performance). However, when a random position is 
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presented, the model only recognises the familiar chunks that by chance are present 
in the stimulus, therefore the performance is lower. 
One of the criticisms of chunking theory was that it did not take into 
account the search aspect of the thinking behaviour of chess players (see SEEK 
theory). Gobet and Simon (1998) explained that "pattern recognition makes search 
possible". Pattern recognition procedures that elicit moves when they are accessed, 
apply not only to the stimulus presented but also to recursively over the ne\\' 
positions that are updated in the mind's eye when a move is triggered by the 
chunk/template accessed. 
There are several advantages in template/CHREST. First, it is a formal 
theory from which clear predictions can be derived and empirically tested, and if 
necessary, falsified. Second, it provides mechanisms not only of how the cognitive 
system of the expert works, but also of how the level of expertise is acquired. 
Third, it accounts for a wide range of data, including eye-movement measures (see 
De Groot & Gobet, 1996). Fourth, it takes into account the role of high-level 
knowledge that is part of the templates. 
There are shortcomings, some of which this thesis will try to help to correct. 
First, so far, within chess the computational model is only prepared to simulate the 
reconstruction task (although a model of the CHREST family-CHUMP 
[CHUnking of Moves and PatternsJ-simulates the generation of moves by pattern 
recognition). In chapter 11, it is proposed how some other tasks can be easily 
simulated without changes in the model. Second, high level knowledge is part of 
the template theory but is still not fully implemented in the computational model. 
The data provided by the think-aloud protocols analysis (see chapter 8) could be 
taken as the content of this knowledge. Third, some of the parameters estimated are 
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based on empirical data, but the number of nodes in the long-term memory network 
is estimated in order to roughly fit the performance of the humans in the task (see 
Gobet & Simon, 2000). An estimation of some of the parameters based on the data 
of this thesis is presented in chapter 11. Fourth, the search behaviour is part of the 
template theory but is still not implemented in CHREST. As an intermediate 
solution, Gobet (1997) calculated the depth of search and total number of moves 
generated in a problem-solving situation as a function of the number of nodes of 
the long-term memory network. In so doing, Gobet estimated the number of mo\'es 
generated by templates, chunks and heuristics. An evaluation of this estimation is 
carried out in chapter 8. 
It is worth noting that these improvements could be proposed only because 
of the clarity and formalisation of the theory. The other theories reviewed earlier 
would not have allowed me to carry out this work. 
Now that the theories of expertise have been discussed and that I have 
shown the one that I chose as a guide for my experiments, the review becomes 
somewhat more empirical. The next section (2.2) will deal with the strand of 
research devoted to the acquisition of expertise, and the following section (2.3) will 
focus on the characteristics of the expert cognitive system. 
2.2. Acquisition of expertise 
There is a consensus that individual differences in performance exist in 
most, if not all, domains of expertise. The debate arises when researchers try to 
explain the source of these individual differences: some authors, continuing the 
tradition established by Galton (1869)' propose that innate talent accounts for most 
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individual differences, while others argue that these differences are better e:\plained 
by the extended period of intense practice that most experts have to go through. 
Support for innate talent theories is offered by the study of precocious attainments 
such as those of Mozart (music), Ramanujan Srinivasa (mathematics), and more 
recently, Bobby Fischer (chess). 
First, the debate on general expertise is presented and then the application 
of this debate to chess expertise will be discussed. Geschwind and Galaburda 
(1985) proposed an influential neuropsychological theory describing the 
relationship between brain development and cognitive abilities. Great exposure or 
high sensitivity to intrauterine testosterone in the developing male foetus would 
lead to a less developed left hemisphere and, as a consequence, a more developed 
right hemisphere than in the general population. This would result in a higher 
probability of being non-right-handed and being gifted in visuo-spatial abilities, 
and as a consequence, in domains such as mathematics, music, and chess. 
At the other extreme of the talent/practice continuum, one finds the 
framework of deliberate practice, which was developed by Ericsson et al. (1993), 
influenced by Simon and Chase's (1973) earlier work on chess e:\pertise. The main 
assumption is that the differences observed in performance in a number of domains 
(including sports) are due to differences in the amount of deliberate practice. 
Deliberate practice consists of activities deliberately designed to improve 
performance (playing and teaching are excluded from this category), \vhich are 
typically effortful and not enjoyable. Moreover, these activities cannot be e:\tended 
throughout long periods and must therefore be limited to a fe\\" hours a day (around 
4), because of risks of bum out. High attainments are possible only ifthere is 
strong family support and a favourable environment and after 10 years of deliberate 
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practice. Ericsson et aI. (1993) reported results from music expertise, sho\\'ing that 
the more skilled engaged more in deliberate practice. The same pattern was found 
in karate (Hodge & Deakin, 1998), soccer and hockey (Helsen et aI., 1998). as \\'ell 
as skating and wrestling (Starkes et aI., 1996). 
Ericsson et al. do not rule out the participation of inherited factors. but 
they limit their role to motivation and general activity levels, explicitly excluding 
cognitive abilities. Evidence supporting the role of deliberate practice and 
questioning the role of talent includes a series of longitudinal experiments in the 
digit-memory span task. The results show that, with sufficient practice, average 
college students could achieve higher levels than those attained by individuals 
previously thought to have inherited skills (Chase & Ericsson, 1981). Proponents 
of the essential role of practice adduce several arguments against the innate talent 
theory: this theory is mainly supported by anecdotal studies, and based on common 
sense, and there are no scientific tests for the theory (Howe et aL 1998; Ericsson & 
Chamess, 1994; Ericsson et aI., 1993). 
Chamess et al. (1996) outlined a general framework of skill acquisition 
and expertise, where five factors support the acquisition of skill: (a) external social 
environment, (b) internal motivation and personality, (c) external information, (d) 
practice, and (e) cognitive system (software and hardware). Charness et aI. consider 
that the cognitive system (both the software and the hardware) changes as a 
consequence of practice in the domain of expertise. 
Innate talent in chess. 
Based upon Geschwind and Galaburda's (1985) theory, Cranberg and 
Albert (1988) speculate that the primary neurological components of chess skill are 
located in the right hemisphere, and that chess skill develops more in males and 
non-right-handers than in females and right-handers, respectively. They argue that 
individuals with enhanced right-hemisphere development might ha\'e an advantage 
at chess. Cranberg and Albert's (1988) reasoning runs as follows: chess is a \"isuo-
spatial task, visuo-spatial tasks are performed by the right hemisphere, non-right-
handed individuals have the right hemisphere more developed, so the non-right-
handers should be more represented in the chess population. 
There is an extensive literature showing that visuo-spatial tasks are 
mainly performed by the right hemisphere (e.g., Kogure, 2001; Stiles-Davis, 1988; 
Witelson & Swalow, 1988). There is also a documented link between visuo-spatial 
abilities and chess. Robbins et al. (1996) and Saariluoma (1991) showed that when 
chess players were presented with a visuo-spatial secondary task, their performance 
in a chess task decreased, but when the secondary task was verbal, the performance 
remained unchanged. 
Sending an informal questionnaire to 396 US chess players, Cranberg and 
Albert (1988) collected data on handedness to test another prediction of Geschwind 
and Galaburda (1985)-that there should be proportionally more non-right-handers 
in the chess population than in the general population. They found that there were 
18% of non-right-handers in the chess population, which is significantly different 
from the rate in the general population (10 to 13.5%; Bryden, 1982; Geschwind, 
1983). However, they could not find differences between a group ofhigh-le\"el 
players and a group of low-level players. 
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Deliberate practice in chess. 
In their seminal study of perception in chess, Simon and Chase (1973) 
pointed out that a decade of intense preoccupation with the game is necessary in 
order to reach grandmaster level. They also estimated that a master has spent 
roughly from 10,000 to 50,000 hours playing or studying chess, and that a class A 
player has spent from 1,000 to 5,000 hours. As we have seen, Ericsson et al. 
(1993) have taken these results to their extreme by stating that levels of 
performance are not limited by putative innate factors, but that they can be further 
increased by deliberate efforts. 
Indeed, the supporters of deliberate practice (e.g., Ericsson et aI., 1993; 
Ericsson & Chamess, 1994; Howe et al., 1998) reject the existence of innate 
cognitive talent in expert performance, arguing that there is no evidence for 
inherited abilities and that expert performance is directly related to the amount of 
deliberate practice. Chamess et al. (1996) tested this theory in the field of chess by 
asking players to report the number of hours spent both studying chess alone and 
playing or analysing games with others. They proposed that the number of hours of 
study alone, rather than the number of hours of studying and practising with others, 
best measures the concept of deliberate practice. The results showed a strong 
correlation between chess skill-measured by the Elo rating-and the number of 
hours spent studying alone. They also found a strong but less important correlation 
between chess skill and the number of hours spent studying or practising \\·ith 
others. 
Biographies of world chess champions and other strong grandmasters 
(e.g., Botvinnik, 2000; Brady, 1973; Forbes, 1992) show that intense dedication to 
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chess is needed to attain high levels of performance. Krogius ( l 9 ~ 6 ) ) presents data 
showing that former world champion Bobby Fischer-the case mostly discussed by 
the proponents of the innate talent hypothesis-is almost within the bounds of the 
10-year practice rule. Fischer attained his first grandmaster result after 9 years of 
starting playing chess. Even Judith Polgar, grandmaster at 15 years and 5 months, 
started intensive practice at 4 (Forbes, 1992). However, there are a number of 
recent cases that do not seem to respect the 10-year rule. World champion Ruslan 
Ponomariov attained the grandmaster title at the age of 14 years and 17 days. and 
Peter Leko (top 5 in the world) at 14 years and 5 months. In interviews. both of 
them reported starting playing chess at the age of 7. Also. Ponomariov attained 
2550 Elo points (considered grandmaster level) at the age of 12 years and 8 months 
and Leko at the age of 13 years and 9 months. More recently, the record of the 
youngest grandmaster has been broken three times: Teimur Radjavob, Bu 
Xiangzhi, and Sergey Karjakin achieved the grandmaster title at the age of 1.+ 
years, 14 days; 13 years, 10 months, 3 days; and 12 years, 7 months respecti\'ely. 
Hence, although there is substantial evidence supporting the deliberate practice 
framework, it may be the case that inter-individual variability has been 
underestimated. 
My standpoint is that extended practice is a necessary condition to acquire 
expert performance. However, it is not a sufficient condition-the position of the 
deliberate practice framework-and there are other factors not related to the 
practice within the domain of expertise that influence the acquisition of expe11 
performance. I propose four sources of individual differences. although I do not 
rule out others. The first one is interaction with the enyironnlent made \\'ithout any 
purpose of acquiring expert performance. One example of this, in the case of chess. 
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is rich visuo-spatial stimulation in early years. The brain is quite flexible in early 
years (see for example, Eliot, 1999), and the interaction \\"ith the en\"ironment 
shapes its development. If, for any reason, a child is exposed to a rich visuo-spatial 
environment, (s )he might have an advantage in chess. 
The second source is also environmental, but is during pregnancy" 
Basically, Geschwind and Galaburda's (1985) proposal; as explained abm"e. great 
exposure or high sensitivity to intrauterine testosterone in the developing foetus. 
causes a more developed right hemisphere, and as a consequence, the probabilities 
of being non-right handed and having an advantage in visuo-spatial abilities over 
the general population increase. 
The third source of individual differences is genetic. So far, there is no 
possibility of measuring this source of individual differences in cognitive abilities 
directly and it was only estimated by the heritability paradigm. However. the 
accelerated progress of genetic studies will open doors to measure directly genetic 
influences in expertise (see Grigorenko, 2000). 
The fourth source of individual differences is related to the age at which the 
serious practice starts. Elo (1978, p. 100) presented data supporting the hypothesis 
that early introduction to the game of chess and to organised competition is 
important to achieve master level. All the masters (n=60) reported that they had 
learned the rules of chess before 17 years of age (range: 5 to 16; mean: 9.6). 
Moreover, they began organised competition before 19 years of age (range: 10 to 
18; mean: 14.8). A possible explanation for this is related to the flexibility of the 
brain in childhood (e.g., Eliot, 1999). Starting to play chess seriously at early ages 
would allow the fonnation of appropriate domain-specific neuronal networks 
before the brain becomes more rigid. 
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Chapter 4 addresses this debate experimentally, by submitting a 
questionnaire similar to that of Chamess et al. (1996) to a group of chess players of 
different levels. Furthermore, the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory was used to 
investigate more formally an issue that was the interest of Cranberg and Albert 
(1988). 
2.3. Cognitive system 
As acknowledged in sub-section 2.1.1, Chase and Simon (1973) proposed 
that the cognitive system of experts has the same limits as the normal cogniti\'c 
system (e.g., limited short-term memory capacity). What differentiates an expert 
from a novice is the amount of knowledge stored in long-term memory. Chi, Glaser 
and Rees (1982) suggested that not only the amount of knowledge matters but also 
its organisation is important. At the opposite end, Jensen (1972) suggests that the 
intelligence of a person is explained by a faster cognitive processor. Chamess et al. 
(1996) proposed that the 'hardware' (i.e., the more stable structures) of the 
cognitive system can be modified by practice. 
My view is that amount of knowledge and its organisation are fundamental 
and that extended practice is the most important cause of its acquisition. Howe\'er, 
similar amounts of practice could lead to different levels of expertise and that may 
be because the stable components of the cognitive system are different. Practice 
could do a lot in order to acquire knowledge, but very little to modify the hard\\'"uc. 
The flexibility of the brain (i.e., hardware) decreases with age, being \'ery flexible 
in childhood, less in adolescence and even less in adulthood (see Eliot 1999). 
Therefore, it is more likely that changes in hardware happen at early ages than in 
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adulthood. In chapter 11, I will propose different parameters for the cognitive 
system of players. Interestingly, the differences in aggregate data between players 
of different levels in parameters of the cognitive system may be not yery large; on 
the other hand, individual differences within the same level of expertise \\'ere found 
and were analysed. 
From chapter 5 to chapter 10, this thesis investigates three features of the 
cognitive system in experts: imagery, memory and thinking. In this section, studies 
that tried to elucidate the functioning of the cognitive system of experts are 
reviewed. In so doing, two different levels of explanation of psychological 
phenomena are considered: the functional level (subsection 2.3.1) and the brain 
level (2.3.2). In order to link this review to the experiments carried out in this 
thesis, in some cases it was necessary to provide a brief review of general aspects 
of cognitive processing. 
2.3.1. Functional level 
Three cognitive processes will be examined: imagery (2.3.l.1), memory 
(2.3.l.2) and thinking (2.3.l.3). 
2.3.1.1. Expert imagery 
Mental imagery, and in particular visual mental imagery. has been the subject 
of intensive research in psychology. For instance, interest in mental imagery has 
risen since the classical studies on rotation and scanning of mental images by 
Cooper and Shepard (1975). Mental imagery was also a topic of a sharp debate in 
cognitiye psychology about whether imagery is made possible by propositions or 
by analogous mental images. Pylyshyn (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1973 )-supporting the 
propositional view- and Kosslyn (e.g., Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977)-leading the 
analogous position-were the main contenders (see Kosslyn, 199-1- for a complete 
history of the debate). Recently, experimental and theoretical research has been 
backed up by brain-imaging techniques, which have helped de\'elop hypotheses 
about the brain areas involved in manipulating mental images (for a reyiew, see 
Kosslyn, 1994). 
Regarding expert imagery, as pointed out by Saariluoma (1991 ), little 
research has been done outside the chess field. Although some studies gave indirect 
clues about the existence of expert imagery (e.g., architects, Akin, 1980; electronic 
engineers, Egan & Schwartz, 1979; mathematics, Hayes, 1973; mental abacus 
operation, Hatano et aI., 1977), none of those studies directly focused on expert 
imagery. On the other hand, blindfold chess has been instrumental in providing 
preliminary conceptualisations of this phenomenon. The following section tackles 
this issue. 
Blindfold chess 
The focus of research using blindfold chess has been to understand how 
chess masters can use mental imagery to maintain a representation of the positions 
generated during look-ahead search. Blindfold chess, where players play without 
seeing the board, has been especially informative on the cognitive processes and 
representations used by chess players to manipulate mental images (see 
Saariluoma, 1995, for a review). 
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Blindfold chess seems to require remarkable cognitive capabilities: hence, 
this style of play has attracted the interest of a number of psychologists, starting 
with Alfred Binet (189311966), who asked well-known chess players to fill in a 
questionnaire about the characteristics of their representations while playing 
blindfold chess. He found that skilled players do not encode the physical properties 
of the pieces and board, such as the colour or style of pieces, preferring an abstract 
type of representation. In an introspective account of the way he played 
simultaneous blindfold chess, grandmaster and psychoanalyst Reuben Fine (1965) 
emphasized the role of hierarchical, spatio-temporal Gestalt formations, which 
allow the player to sort out the relevant from the irrelevant aspects of the position. 
He also noted the possible interference between similar games, and the use of key 
statements summarizing the positions as a whole. Finally, he stated that the use of a 
blank chess board was more of a hindrance than a help for him, although other 
players, such as George Koltanowski, who held the world record for the number of 
simultaneous blindfold games, found this external help useful. 
Pertti Saariluoma, in a series of ingenious experiments, systematically 
explored the psychology of blindfold chess. In these experiments, one or several 
games were presented aurally or visually, with or without the presence of 
interfering tasks. With auditory presentation, the games were dictated using the 
algebraic chess notation, well-known to chess players (e.g., l.e2-e..1- c7-c5; 2. Ngl-
f3 d7-d6; etc.). With visual presentation, only the current move was presented on a 
computer screen. Saariluoma (1991) uncovered several important issues. First, 
blindfold chess relies mainly on visuo-spatial working memory, and makes little 
use of verbal working memory. Second, differences in LTM knowledge. rather 
than differences in imagery ability per se, are responsible for skill differences. 
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Third, in a task where games are dictated, masters show an almost perfect memory 
when the moves are taken from an actual game or when the moves are random, but 
legal, while perfonnance drops drastically when the games consist of (possibly) 
illegal moves. Saariluoma took this result as strong e\"idence for the role of 
chunking (Chase & Simon, 1973) in blindfold chess. Fourth, visuo-spatial \yorking 
memory is essential in early stages of encoding, but not in later processing. 
According to Saariluoma (1991), this is because the positions are later stored in 
L TM and thus insensitive to tasks interfering with working memory. 
Continuing this line of research, Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) 
uncovered additional phenomena. First, replacing chess pieces with dots had little 
effect on the memory perfonnance for both masters and medium-class players-a 
result that supports Binet's (1893) conclusion of abstract representation in 
blindfold chess. Thus, when following a game blindfold, the critical infonnation is 
that related to the location of the piece being moved, and not information about 
colour or size. Second, transposing the two halves of the board leads to a strong 
impainnent, which, according to Saariluoma and Kalakoski, is due to the time 
needed to build a mapping between the perceived patterns and the chunks stored in 
L TM. Third, they found no difference between an auditory and a visual 
presentation mode. Finally, given more time, less skilled players increase their 
perfonnance, although they still perfonn less well than highly skilled chess players. 
In a final set of experiments, Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1998) scnltinized 
players' problem-solving ability after a position had been dictated blindfold. They 
found that, in a recognition task, players show better memory with functionally 
relevant pieces than with functionally irrelevant pieces; this effect disappears \yhen 
players' attention is directed towards superficial features (counting the number of 
white and black pieces) instead of semantically important features (searching for 
white's best move). Moreover, in a problem-solving task, players obtained better 
results when a tactical combination is possible in a game rather than in a random 
position. Finally, although there was no perfonnance difference between yisuo-
spatial vs. auditory presentation of the moves, a visuo-spatial interfering task 
(Brook's letter task) negatively affected problem solving. 
In chapter 5 of this thesis, two experiments with blindfold chess are 
presented. Both experiments were devoted to the interference produced by 
irrelevant contextual infonnation over the image that players had to bear in mind. 
2.3.1.2. Expert memory 
As discussed in the previous sub-section, chess players are capable of some 
memory feats, such as playing several blindfold games at the same time. Taking 
this into account, it was natural to think that chess players may have a higher 
memory capacity than the general population. In the following sections, an 
examination of studies of memory in chess players is presented. Briefly, all the 
studies agree on one point: chess-players' general memory is nonnal, their memory 
feats are restricted to their domain of expertise. 
The review of expert memory will be divided into three sub-sections. The 
first two sub-sections (2.3.1.2.1 and 2.3.1.2.2) succinctly rcyiew the relation 
between general memory and memory in experts; 2.3.l.2.1 is deyoted to immediate 
recall tasks and 2.3.1.2.2 to delayed recall tasks. The last section (2.3.1.2.3) directly 
addresses memory studies in chess. 
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2.3.1.2.1 Immediate recall 
The memory span task was first used by Jacobs (1887) who presented 
sequences of items to students. They had to remember and say the list in the correct 
order. Then, the number of items in the sequence increased until the students failed 
to produce the correct sequence. Miller (1956) showed that the immediate memory 
span in random letters is 6. When the items in a list can be meaningfully grouped 
into 'chunks' the span counted in number of items increases. However, the number 
of chunks remains constant in about 6 (see Baddeley, 1990 for a more complete 
review). Later, it was found that long-term memory was involved in this task, and 
that a better estimate of short-term memory capacity is 4 (see Cowan, 2000). The 
digit memory span task was used to train college students to increase their span. 
Ericsson and Chase (1981) showed that the memory span could be immensely 
increased by using long-term memory retrieval structures. The same individuals 
who by training attained a digit span of around 100, possessed a normal span for 
letters, suggesting that expertise could be acquired by extended practice without the 
need a 'talented' cognitive system. 
Chi (1978) examined the influence of knowledge for memory span. She 
submitted children chess players and adult non-players to a digit-span task and to a 
reconstruction of a chess position (see subsection 2.3.1.2.3). The former performed 
better than the latter in the reconstruction of chess positions (9.3 pieces to 5.9 
pieces); however, the children's memory span for digits was smaller than that of 
adults (6.1 digits to 7.8 digits). Schneider et al. (1993) replicated this finding, 
reaching similar figures: young chess players reconstructed 8.8 pieces correctly 
against 4.6 pieces in the non-player adults, and 5.8 and 7.6 \\"ere the digit spans, 
~ ~ 1 
respectively. These results show that the skill effect in the chess memory task is not 
due to an increased memory capacity, but to the knowledge base stored in long-
tenn memory. 
In chapter 7 (sub-section 7.2.2), a number of memory span tasks \\'as 
carried out in order to compare the perfonnance of chess players in a general 
memory task to that of domain-specific memory tasks. 
2.3.1.2.2 Delayed recall 
In the previous sub-section, the retrieval phase of the memory tasks 
occurred straight after the encoding phase. In this sub-section, the retric\'al phase is 
perfonned at least 30 minutes after the presentation (and, sometimes, weeks later) 
of the to-be-remembered stimuli. Typically, the studies aimed at testing the limits 
of the cognitive system in storing infonnation when enough time is given to its 
encoding. 
Standing (1973) assessed the capacity of the cognitive system to store 
infonnation by presenting 10,000 pictures. The perfonnance of participants \\as 
above 80% for 10,000 pictures and above 90% up to 1,000 pictures when the 
recognition phase was perfonned two days later. These results led to the conclusion 
that long-tenn memory for visual stimuli is unlimited. Moreover, this study also 
uncovered that participants perfonned better for pictures than for words. Franken & 
Rowland (1979) tested their volunteers a week after the encoding shmving a clear 
decrease in perfonnance, demonstrating a remarkable decay of the information in 
long ten11 memory over time. 
In chess, there were two studies aiming at testing the limits of the cognitiye 
system in storing information: Cooke et al. (1993), and Gobet and Simon (1996a). 
In both studies the participants were presented with a series of positions that they 
had to remember. All the studies found that players increased the number of pieces 
recalled as a function of the number of positions presented, and that the percentage 
correct diminished. In Cooke et al. (1993), the best participant managed to 
reconstruct 50% with 9 positions, summing a total of 120 pieces. In Gobet and 
Simon (1 996a) the master group of the second experiment performed at 50% with.f 
boards (i.e., 80 pieces). In the same article an international master \\"as trained with 
mnemonics, and after 150 trials he reconstructed 178 pieces correctly (abo\'e 60% 
correct). 
The long-term retention of visual information was tested in this thesis by 
presenting 250 pictures. Additionally, in a different session, participants were given 
the same test but with chess positions. The comparison of the individual scores 
between the two conditions led to intriguing findings (see chapter 7, sub-section 
7.l.1). 
2.3.1.2.3. Expert memory ill chess 
The previous sub-section dealt with the link between general memory 
experiments and expert memory experiments, whereas the present sub-section 
focuses on chess. Three types of tasks are reviewed: reconstruction ofnonnal game 
and random positions, recognition experiments and memory for move sequences. 
All these tasks were used in chapter 7; hence a review of them is appropriate. 
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Reconstruction of game and random positions 
The reconstruction task is the 'classic' task in chess expertise. In this sub-
section the highlights are given; for more exhaustive reviews of this topic see 
Holding (1985), Saariluoma (1995), Gobet (1998a), and Gobet et aI. (in press). 
Djakow, Petrowski & Rudik (1927) designed an experiment that became a 
classic in chess psychology research. The best players in the world at that time 
were presented during 60 seconds with a chessboard resembling a chess position. 
After this presentation, the players had to reconstruct the position on an empty 
chessboard. They found differences between the performance of the grandmasters 
and that of non-chess players. DeGroot (1946/1978) followed Djakow et al.'s 
technique, but instead of presenting the position for 60 seconds, he diminished the 
time of presentation to a range varying from 2 to 15 seconds. De Groot had also 
access to the strongest grandmasters (something incredibly expensive nowadays) 
who performed almost perfectly. A group of intermediate level players performed 
below 50 per cent (later, Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Jackson, 2001, found that 
a non-chess player cannot remember more than 4 pieces (12 to 15%)). This pattern 
of results was replicated in several studies (see Gobet & Simon, 1996b). Chase & 
Simon (1973) asked the players to reconstruct not only a chess position but also a 
position in which the chess pieces were randomly distributed throughout the board. 
Strikingly, their chess master hugely decreased his performance and showed only a 
small difference in comparison to weaker players. This result showed the domain-
specificity of the chess players' expertise. Another 'control' task used was the 
reconstruction of a position of 3 dimensional shapes displayed on an irregular 
board (see Schneider et aI., 1993). In this case, no skill effect \\as found in the 
immediate recall task (in chapter 7, sub-section 7.2.1, a similar task was 
introduced). 
Chase and Simon (1973) explained the results in terms of the 'chunkin a 
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theory' (see sub-section 2.1.1). They were interested in the analysis of the size and 
number of groups of pieces that the players used in order to reconstruct the 
positions. The pieces placed on the chessboard within a time window of 2 seconds 
were considered part of the same piece of information, i.e., 'chunk', and the ones 
that were placed with a gap of more than 2 seconds were considered belonging to 
different chunks. The number of pieces reconstructed within the 2 seconds time 
window was 3 or 4. The chunking theory was implemented in a computer model of 
the EP AM family. One of the critical assumptions of the model was that the 
information for the memory task was stored in short-term memory (7 chunks of 
information (see Miller, 1956) times 4 pieces equals 28 pieces which is close to the 
highest number of pieces that could be present in a chess position (32 pieces)). 
Chamess (1976) introduced an interference task (i.e., counting backwards) 
during 30 seconds between the presentation of the position and its reconstruction. 
He found that, unlike with verbal material, players' performance diminished very 
little. This result supported the involvement of long-term memory storages in the 
reconstruction task. In the same direction, Frey and Adesman (1976) presented 
chess players with 2 positions to remember instead of one. The performance of the 
second position was fairly high, creating difficulties for the chunking theory, since 
the number of chunks needed to be stored in short-term memory were more than 
the known limit of 7+/-2. Moreover, Cooke et al. (1993) and Gobet and Simon 
(1996a) presented the participants with up to 9 positions. Although the percentage 
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of correctly placed pieces diminished, the number of pieces accurately placed 
increased. Therefore, the chunking theory needed a revision. 
Gobet and Simon (1996a) accounted for those results by reyising the 
chunking theory and turning it into the 'template theory' which was also 
implemented in a computer model (see sub-section 2.1.2). 
In chapter 7 (section 7.2.1) of this thesis, the reconstruction task is 
presented with normal game positions, random positions, and a new \'ersion-
'shapes'-. The performance in this task was compared to that of general memory 
span measures. To anticipate, the typical results of the literature were replicated: 
high skill effect in the reconstruction of normal game positions, small effect in 
random positions, null effect in a 'shape' condition, and no effect in general digit 
and letter span. However, a tendency towards differences in spatial span was found. 
Recognition tasks 
Goldin (1978, 1979) carried out a series of recognition experiments and 
found skill effects in this type of task, as well. Following Craik and Lockhart's 
(1972) levels of processing framework, Goldin (1978) presented the participants 
(range, from class B to experts) with 24 positions. The participants performed 
either a deep task (by finding the best move) or a shallow task (by counting the 
number of pieces on black squares) for between 42 to 60 seconds. After 10 minutes 
of an interpolation task, the players went through a forced-choice recognition 
session (the target and two distractors were presented in each of the 2.+ trials). They 
perfon11ed at 67% for the move task and 55 0 0 for the count task (chance = 3 3 , 3 3 ~ / ( ) ) . .
In a second expeliment, class A players in a similar task, performed at 87% for an 
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evaluation condition (deep level of processing) and 71 % and 8..+% for two shallow 
tasks. Class D players performed at 71 %, 71 % and S"+% respectiyely; and non-
players at 7S%, S8% and SO% (chance = SO%). 
In Goldin's (1979) experiment 1, the participants were presented with 21 
game positions during 90 seconds, and they had to think out loud and decide which 
side had the advantage. After this session they went through a IS-minutes session 
of interpolated activity and then they went through an incidental forced-choice 
task. Across participants, 87% of the responses correctly recognized the stimuli 
seen in the presentation session. Moreover, there was a skill effect. In a second 
experiment, class A and class B level players were presented with 80 game and 80 
random positions. The time of presentation was self-paced, and its average was 
around SO seconds per position. In a subsequent forced-choice tasks, class A 
players performed at 9S% and class D players at 72%. 
In chapter 7 (section 7.l.1), a recognition task was used with chess 
positions and pictures; however, there the number of items was much higher (i.e., 
2S0) and the presentation time much lower (i.e., S seconds). 
Memory for chess game sequences of moves 
The study and memorisation of opening-moves sequences is an important 
aspect of chess training. Monographs, books and encyclopaedias are devoted to 
increasingly specialised sub-variations of openings. This material can be found 
both in paper and electronic format. However, the chess psychology literature has 
paid little attention to this facet of chess preparation. For instance. Chase and 
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Simon (1973), Saariluoma (1991), and Campitelli (1999) showed move sequences. 
but with different goals. 
Chase and Simon (1973) found that there is a skill effect for the recall of 
move sequences, both with normal games and with random games. This is not in 
agreement with the lack of skill effect in the reconstruction of random positions. 
The researchers explained the results in terms of the long time of presentation (.2 
minutes). This is enough time to recognise information and to store the outcome in 
long-term memory. Additionally, Gobet and Simon (2000) showed a skill effect in 
random positions, when the time of presentation has increased to 1 minute. 
Saariluoma (1991) and Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) showed sequences 
of moves in a blindfold way. Those data have already been revie\ved in section 
2.3.1. Suffice it to say that skill effect was found for real and random games; 
however, no effect (and really bad performance; below 20%) was found in random 
illegal games. Campitelli (1999) showed a sequence of opening-moves, but he 
tested memory for the position and not the sequence. 
In chapter 7 (section 7.3), memory for move sequences was tested in three 
conditions: move sequences of a chess game, of a draughts game and of a GO-like 
game. To anticipate, a skill effect was found for memory of move sequences, and 
interestingly, it was higher for the least chess-related tasks-GO. 
2.3.1.3. Expert thinking 
Expertise in science and chess are strongly related to expert thinking. The 
tradition of studying thinking by problem-solving situations started \vith the 
behaviouristic and Gestalt schools at the beginning of last century. Beha\'iourism 
and Gestalt psychology studied problem solving behaviour from different 
approaches. Thorndike (1911)-main contender of behaviourism-studied problem 
solving with cats and developed a series of rules of learning from his studies. 
Gestalt psychology, strongly opposed to behaviourism, was more interested in 
internal aspects of problem solving (e.g., Kohler (1917/1957) studying monkeys: 
Duncker (1945) in humans). They proposed concepts like restructuration and 
functional fixation; however, the features of the internal processes were not 
defined. Selz (1924) proposed a model of thought processes. He suggested that 
thinking processes are determined by the "intelectual personality" of the person. 
her/his subjective perception of the features of the problem, and her/his motivation 
to perform the task. De Groot (1946) took Selz as his mentor, and realised a think 
aloud protocol analysis of chess grandmasters. Newell and Simon (1972) gave the 
first analysis of thinking processes in terms of information processing, using think-
aloud protocols of participants solving chess problems and other types of problems. 
The relation of the last two studies with chess is apparent. Now, the direct analysis 
of thinking in chess is to be carried out. 
Expert thinking in chess 
A review of this topic can be found in Holding (1985) and Gobet et al. (in 
press). DeGroot (1946/1978) investigated the think aloud protocols of players 
ranging from very strong grandmasters (some of them world champions). to class 
level players. He analysed in depth the qualitative factors of the results and gaye 
less importance to the quantitative aspects. Gobet et al. (in press) proyide a reyie\\' 
of both factors, giving the same importance as De Groot. In this thesis more 
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importance is given to the quantitati\'e components of problem solving; 
consequently, only the latter are reviewed in this section. 
De Groot's participants were presented with a chess position displayed on a 
chessboard. The experimenter asked the subjects to analyse the position, 
communicating their thoughts out loud until they decided which move they would 
play if they were playing a game. The most important finding was that, although 
grandmasters prevailed over the experts in terms of the quality of moves chosen. no 
differences were found in the macro-structure of the protocols. That is. number of 
moves visited, depth of search, and speed of search (number of moves per 
minute )-among other variables-remained constant across the different levels of 
players. 
Wagner and Scurrah (1971), Newell and Simon (1972). and Holding (1985) 
carried out the same reconstruction task used by De Groot's (1946/1978) with only 
one player (the first two employed one of the positions used by DeGroot). 
Accordingly, they were not interested in the comparison between masters and 
weaker players, but they analysed the protocols in order to put forward theories of 
information processing. 
Chamess (1981) submitted a number of players of varying levels of skill, 
ranging from class D to class A, to the same task as DeGroot's (1946/1978) in four 
different positions. Once again, Chamess found that the quality of moves was a 
function of chess skill. Unlike DeGroot, he did find a slight but a significant 
difference in depth of search in terms of chess skill (1.5 plies depth increase per 
standard deviation increment in rating). Moreover, total moves analysed, number of 
episodes and number of branches differed in terms of skill, the better the players 
the higher the figures. 
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Finally, Gobet (1998b) reused De Groot's popular position A (as \\Tagner & 
Scurrah, 1971 and Newell & Simon, 1972). In this case a number of players of 
different levels (ranging from international masters to class B players) \\"ent 
through the same procedure. Once again, quality of moves yaried across skill 
levels. Unlike De Groot (1946/1978) and in agreement with Charness (1981 ), mean 
depth of search varied across levels of expertise; however, the difference \\"as rather 
low (i.e., 0.6 plies per standard deviation in chess rating). 
It is worth noting that De Groot (1946/1978) took notes of the think aloud 
protocols of the players, whereas in all the other studies, tape recorders \\"ere used 
in order to obtain the data. This difference may be the cause of the lesser absolute 
number of nodes, branches, episodes, etc in De Groot's study in comparison with 
all the other studies. 
In a different approach, Calderwood, Klein and Crandall (1988) and Gobet 
and Simon (1996c) investigated the role of reflection time at the skill level. They 
showed that when thinking time is reduced, the skill level of masters (including the 
world champion) decreases only slightly. The researchers suggested that this is 
evidence in favour of the strong influence of pattern recognition processes. 
Chamess et al. (2001) showed that experts were faster at solving a simple chess 
problem. They also measured eye movements and found that experts performed 
less eye fixations than the intermediate players. 
In chapter 8 several of these issues are tackled. By using thinking-aloud 
protocols, depth of search, speed of search and quantity of information generated 
were the variables investigated. The results are not in agreement \\ith the literature 
just reviewed; in short, all the yariables were found linearly related to chess rating 
(see section 8.3). Regarding short reflection times, a 10 seconds problem-soh"ing 
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task was used. There was a skill effect, and the differences \\'ere not explained by 
differences in a simple reaction time. However, within the master leyel, a relation 
between simple reaction times and performance in a quick problem solving task 
may exist. 
2.3.2. Brain level 
In this sub-section two research fields will be reviewed. They correspond to 
the experiments presented in chapters 9 and 10. One of this work's theses is that 
chess is a versatile and powerful task environment to investigate psychological 
phenomena. The emergence of brain imaging techniques opens a new area of 
research, and there are only a handful of brain imaging studies in chess. Indeed, 
when this study began, there was not any functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) study in chess published. In fact, the experiments presented in chapter 10 
are the first ones comparing experts and novices using flvfRI. Thus, one of the 
reasons of these experiments was to extend the use of chess as a research task using 
a new technique. 
Chapter 10 focused on comparisons between chess players and non-players 
in memory tasks. A review of studies with experts, chess players and practice 
studies is presented in the next sub-section (2.3.2.1). Chapter 9 has a different 
rationale than the other experimental chapters. Instead of emphasising the 
difference between different levels of expertise, chess was used as a tool to study 
autobiographical memory. A review of this topic is presented in sub-section 
2.3.2.2. 
2.3.2.1. Brain imaging of expertise 
In this sub-section, a review is carried out of brain imaging studies in 
expertise (section 2.3.2.1.1) and practice (2.3.2.1.2). Within the first section 
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studies with chess players and other experts are considered. In the case of chess 
not only the high-spatial resolution brain imaging studies are examined, but also 
studies with patients and EEGs are taken into account. This review is an 
introduction to the two fMRI studies with chess players presented in chapter 9. 
2.3.2.1.1. Brain imaging in expertise. 
Chess players 
EEGs and brain lesions. 
, 
Cranberg and Albert (1988) reviewed a series ofEEG 
(electroencephalogram) studies with chess players and brain lesions. For example, 
Malkin (1982) recorded EEGs of strong grandmasters - including a world 
champion - prior to their games, showing completely normal patterns. In another 
study, Cranberg and Albert presented data of a chess master playing a blindfold 
game showing higher frequencies (beta range) in the right hemisphere in 
comparison with those of the left hemisphere (alpha range) when the position was 
quiet. However, when the master had to analyse a number of variations and he 
reported use of a sub-vocalisation strategy (e.g. " ifhe goes there, I reply like this, 
and then he ... ") the pattern of the left hemisphere resembled that of the right one. 
However, another chess player in the same situation did not sho\\' differences 
between hemispheres. In the same book chapter. Cranberg and Albert presented 
data of players that suffered brain lesions. They tried to test their theory of right 
hemisphere specialisation in chess playing. Their data suggest that relatively large 
lesions in the left-hemisphere did not impair chess skill. Nonetheless, these data 
should be considered cautiously inasmuch as no extended right hemisphere lesion 
was reported, and the assessment of the chess skill was not very accurate. 
In a more recent study, Volke et al. (2002) performed an EEG study with 
chess experts and novices, carrying out simple tasks with chess stimuli. In the more 
complex tasks ( i.e. check detection, check mate judgement, and mating in one) the 
experts showed a more posterior pattern of brain activity, whereas the novices 
showed a higher activation in frontal areas. Moreover, chess players displayed a 
greater coherence on their EEG signals. 
Brain imaging (high spatial resolution). 
Only four brain imaging studies have been carried out with chess players 
until now. Additionally, an fMRI study with GO players is included in this section. 
A number of techniques were used in the studies (SPECT, PET, gamma bursts, 
and fMRI). Nichelli et al. (1994) pioneered in this field conducting a PET study 
with ten chess players (the level of the players is only vaguely reported). They 
applied the hierarchy cognitive subtraction method, in which they used four 
conditions (black and white discrimination, spatial discrimination, rule retric\'al 
and checkmate judgement). They found bilateral activations in medial and lateral 
posterior parietal and superior occipital cortices (Brodmann areas 7 and 19) in t\\'O 
of their subtractions. When retrieval of rules was required, they found activations 
in the inferior, lateral and medial parts of the left temporal lobe includin lJ the 
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hippocampus. 
Onofrj et al (1995) carried out a SPECT study with 5 players (1 master, 2 
experts and 2 Class A level players). The participants had to solve a problem 
blindfold (i.e. they first saw a chess position in which there was a winnina 
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combination and then they searched for the winning combination without looking 
at the position). They found activation in non-dominant dorsal frontal and middle 
temporal lobes in all of the players. 
Amizdic et al. (2001) conducted a gamma-bursts study with 20 chess 
players. The range was from Class B players to grandmasters. The tasks consisted 
in playing a chess game against a computer, and the subjects were scanned 5 
seconds after the computer made its move. They found a pronounced activity in 
medial temporal structures (i.e. perirhinal, entorhinal cortex and hippocampus) in 
amateur players -but not in masters- relative to the activation in parietal and frontal 
areas. 
Atherton et al. (2003) carried out an fMRI study with novice chess players. 
The participants performed two conditions: 'game', in which a normal chess 
position was presented, and 'random', in which the pieces of a chess position were 
randomly distributed throughout the board and were also transposed to the edges of 
the squares. In the game condition, the task consisted in determining the next best 
move for white, and in the random condition, the players were asked to search and 
identify the pieces that were previously marked with a low contrast embedded fhc-
pointed star. Also, there was a resting session in which an empty board \\as 
presented and participants looked at the centre of it. In the game> random contrast 
a large area was bilaterally activated, including Brodmann areas (BA) 7, 19, 39 and 
40 in posterior parietal areas, superior occipital gyrus, supramarginal gy TllS and 
inferior parietal lobe. Furthermore, some frontal areas (BA 6, 8 and 9) were actin? 
in the left hemisphere. 
Chen et al. (2003) present a GO fMRI study that was a twin of Atherton et 
al.'s (2003) study. Chen et al. carried out exactly the same design as Atherton et aI., 
using GO stimuli and GO players rather than chess stimuli and players. Although 
the players were considered amateur, all of them possessed GO rating, giving the 
hint that their level was greater than that of the chess players. The pattern of results 
was similar to Atherton et al. 'so A posterior area in parieto-occipital regions was 
bilaterally activated (BA 7, 40, 19) and also a number of frontal areas (BA 9. 6, 4) 
and the somato-sensory cortex (BA 1,2,3). In addition, a posterior temporal area 
(BA 37) was activated. 
Summing up, three of the studies used a problem solving task (Onofrj et aI., 
1995; Atherton et aI., 2003; Chen et aI., 2003). In one, participants played a chess 
game (Amizdic et al., 2001) and a series of simple tasks was carried out in Nichelli 
et al. (1994). Four out of 5 showed brain activity in posterior parietal regions, and 
four out of five found brain activity in a number of frontal regions. Unfortunately, 
the quality of the reports is not good; in some cases the level of the player is rather 
low (Nichelli et al., Atherton et aI), other reports are very concise and some 
important details are missing (Nichelli et aI, Amizdic et aI.). For that reason, no 
strong conclusions could be drawn from this set of data. However. there \\'as 
agreement in 80% of the studies in that chess playing or problem solving recruits a 
number of frontal and posterior parietal areas. It is well known that these areas are 
engaged in working memory processes (e.g. Goldman Rakic. 1998; Fuster. 1998; 
Duncan & Owen, 2000). 
The prediction of Cranberg and Albert (1988) regarding the predominant 
involvement of the right hemisphere over the left hemisphere in chess was not 
supported by more powerful techniques. 
Regarding experts vs novices contrasts, only two articles carried out such 
comparisons (Amizdic et aI., and Volke et al.). Volke et al. (2002) uncoyered that 
chess experts recruit more posterior areas of the brain, and they show more 
coherence in their EEG signal. Unfortunately, Amizdic et al. (2001) grouped 
together frontal and parietal activations, consequently it is not possible to compare 
the studies in that sense. Nonetheless, Amizdic et al. found a different pattern of 
brain activity in experts and novices; in short, the former recruited more frontal and 
parietal than temporal areas, and the latter displayed an equally distributed pattern 
of activation. 
There are two lessons we can learn from this review of brain imaging 
studies with chess players: first, frontal and parietal areas are needed in order to 
solve chess problems and in order to play chess; second, the pattern of brain 
activity of chess experts differ from that of the novices. As we will see in chapter 
10, these two findings were corroborated by the fMRI studies of the present thesis. 
Other experts 
Pesenti et al. (2001) compared a mental calculation expert to normal 
participants in mental calculations. They used calculations that could be retrie\'cd 
from long-term memory as a baseline task, and they subtracted its acti\'ations from 
those of mental calculations that could not be retrieved from memory. Thcy found 
activations that the expert and the normal subjects shared across the \\'hole brain . 
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Moreover, they found areas activated only in the expert: left paracentral lobule, 
right middle occipito-temporal junction, right medial frontal gynls, right anterior 
cingulate gyrus. The authors concluded that the acceleration of existing processes 
does not explain the results. Instead, expertise requires new processes relying on 
different brain areas. These new processes are shifting from strictly short-tenn, 
effort requiring storage strategies to highly efficient episodic memory encoding and 
retrieval strategies, application of automated resolution algorithms, and careful 
monitoring and control of these algorithmic resolution (see Chase & Ericsson, 
1981; Pesenti et aI, 1999). 
Isabel Gauthier and her group realised a number of brain imaging studies 
with experts. Their interest in expertise comes from a controversy in the face-
recognition field of research. Kanwisher et al (1998) and many other studies 
showed that there is an area in the fusiform gyrus (temporal lobe ) which selectiYely 
activates when the participants recognise faces. This finding is quite robust, and 
was also found in monkeys (e.g. Heywood & Cowey, 1992). The natural 
explanation that different parts of the brain are specialised in the processing of 
different kinds of stimuli was challenged by Gauthier who follows Tanaka's ( 1993) 
ideas. Gauthier et al. (1999) suggest that the activation of the fusifonn 'face' area is 
not specific to faces, but this develops with expertise. Since humans are experts at 
recognising human faces at the individual level, the activation in the fusifonn 'face' 
area while humans recognise faces, is caused by the human capacity to differentiate 
faces at the individual level. Following this idea, this group submitted experts to 
brain imaging scans looking only at the fusiform gyrus. 
Gauthier et al (2000) studied bird and car experts in memory tasks. They 
found more activation in the "fusiform face area" in car experts when they \\crc 
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presented with cars and in bird experts when they \\ere shown bird stimuli. 
Gauthier et al. (1999) and Tarr and Gauthier (2000) trained subjects in recognising 
novel objects, which they called 'greebles'. They found increased actiYity in the 
fusiform gyrus when the participants were experts in recognising 'greebles' at the 
individual level. It is worth noting that the increase in brain activity occurs when 
the recognition is at the subordinate level. For instance, an expert can recognise a 
robin more categorically as a living object (superordinate level) or as a bird 
(ordinate level) or at a more individual level as a robin (subordinate leyel). 
Gauthier et al. (2000) investigated changes in brain activation of the fusiform 'face' 
area with participants that were trained in recognising novel objects called 
'greebles'. The results followed the same pattern: experts showed increased activity 
in the fusiform face area when recognising greebles at a subordinate level. 
Finally, Krings et al (2000) studied 4 piano players in a complex motor 
task. They compared them to 4 normal volunteers, focusing on 4 areas of the brain 
known to be activated in motor tasks: primary sensori-motor cortex, supplementary 
motor area, superior parietal areas, and premotor areas. They found a reduction in 
the activation in all the areas in the piano players. The researchers concluded that, 
due to long-term motor practice, manual dexterity increased in piano players; 
therefore, for the same movements, fewer neurons have to be activated. 
2.3.2.1.2. Brain imaging related to practice 
The rationale of this field is simple. First, volunteers go through a scanning 
section perfom1ing a task for which they are naIve. After this, they are trained in 
this task, and finally, they are scanned again. The pattern of activations obtained 
49 
after training are compared to that of before training in order to know the effect of 
training over brain activity. Alternatively, volunteers go through training while 
they are scanned, and the comparison takes place between the first scans and the 
last ones; sometimes, there could be parametrical analysis of time and brain actiyit\ 
changes. An example of this kind of studies is the one explained abo\"e, that is, 
training 'greeble' experts. Those studies were included in the previous section 
because participants acquired expertise level for the authors. Nonetheless, they 
could also be part of the present section. 
Van Hom et al. (1998) asked participants to find the correct pathway 
through a maze while they were being scanned. In order to do this, they had to try 
and err at the beginning and learn with the feedback provided. In the first scans, 
participants showed a frontal lobe pattern of activations with less activity in 
posterior areas. In the last scans -when the subjects were performing the task 
almost perfectly- the activation in the frontal lobes almost disappeared and a 
pattern of posterior areas emerged. Particularly noteworthy is the activation in 
bilateral precunei and posterior cingulate. 
Kassubek et al. (2001) scanned subjects before and after training of a mirror 
reading task. They measured the activations obtained during mirror reading as \\TIl 
as those of a normal reading task. Brodmann areas 6 (frontal eye field and 
supplementary eye field), 7 (superior parietal lobule including right precuneus) and 
40 (inferior parietal lobule) showed greater activation in the mirror reading task in 
comparison with that of the normal reading task before training. After training, 
there was a reduction in activation in areas 6 and 7, but not in 40, in the mirror 
reading task in comparison to normal reading. The authors proposed that the 
reduction in BA6 was due to a decrease in the effort and precision of gaze fixation 
and saccadic scanning. Moreover, the reduction in BA 7 suggested an increase in 
the efficiency of specialised mental transfonnation processes, which led to a 
reduction in the effort and time required to decode mirror-reversed letters and to 
hold them in visuospatial working memory. 
Bennan et al. (1995) scanned volunteers before and after training of the 
Wisconsin card sorting test. The pattern of activations included areas in the frontal 
parietal, temporal and occipital lobes. Somehow surprisingly, the pattern did not 
change after training. 
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Jansma et al. (2001) submitted participants to the Sternberg's item 
recognition paradigm in which a target set of consonants is followed by individual 
consonants presented sequentially. The task consisted of deciding whether the 
current consonant belonged to the target set or not. There were two conditions of 
interest. In the trained condition, the subjects were presented with the same target 
set during the whole experimental session within the scanner. The participants had 
previously gone through a period of practice with the same target set. In the novel 
condition the subjects were presented with a new target set. Jansma et al. compared 
the brain activity of the trained condition with that of the novel condition. They 
found a reduction of brain activity in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right 
frontal pole and right superior parietal cortex; all those areas had been previously 
selected by the researchers because they are thought to be 'working-memory areas'. 
Weissman et al. (2002) trained participants to direct their attention to either 
local or global aspects of the stimuli. When the practice coincided with the task the 
participants had to perfonn, there was a reduction of neural activity in left inferior 
parietal lobe, whereas when the practice led to a conflict between the previously 
practised and the current task there was an increase of brain activity in medial 
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frontal regions. Weissman et a1. 's explanation of the results is that practice 
strengthens schemas. 
Petersson et a1. (1999) scanned participants in novel and a pre-learned recall 
tasks. The subjects had to recall either a well-learned design or a novel one. They 
found practised related decrease of neural activity in prefrontaL anterior cingulate, 
posterior parietal and medial temporal regions. Petersson et a1. explain the results 
in terms of automaticity. Practice causes a decrease of dependence on attentional 
and working memory processes. They also found an increase in superior temporal 
and supramarginal gyrus and in the right mid-occipito-temporal region in well 
learned designs. The researchers believe that the superior temporal and 
supramarginal gyrus activation is due to a lower degree of attentional suppression 
of task irrelevant components, whereas the increase in right mid-occipito-temporal 
areas may be related to more fully developed representations of the design. 
2.3.2.2. Autobiographical memory 
As specified earlier, in chapter 9 the emphasis was not on expertise but on 
using chess as a task environment in order to elucidate a psychological 
phenomenon. There are several problems to carry out brain imaging studies in the 
field of autobiographical memory. Chapter 9 shows a methodology to deal with 
these problems. In this review, chapter theoretical views and empirical studies of 
autobiographical memory will be considered. 
Research into autobiographical memory started with Galton (1883) \\ho 
developed a technique that is still broadly used. This entails presenting a participant 
with a cue word, and asking her/him for the retrieval of some personal memory 
related to the cue word. This technique was used in one of the brain imaging 
studies reviewed in this section (Conway et aI., 1999). More structured techniques 
were developed such as the autobiographical memory schedule (Kopelman, \\rilson 
& Badeley, 1989) and single case studies (e.g., Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986). 
Extensive reviews can be found in Baddeley (1990) and Conway and Plevdel-
Pearce (2000). 
Autobiographical memory is a topic investigated in several sub-fields of 
psychology such as cognitive psychology (e.g. Conway, 1990), personality 
(Mikulincer, 1998), developmental psychology (Howe & Courage, 1997), and 
neuropsychology (Conway & Gthenaki, 2000). Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000) presented a model of autobiographical memory that encompasses the 
knowledge obtained in different fields of research. They proposed that 
autobiographical memories are transitory mental constructions within a self-
memory system (SMS). The SMS is composed of two structures: a knowledge base 
and a working self. The system only works when the two structures are linked and 
both structures can also work independently. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce propose that the knowledge base is 
hierarchically organised according to three types of information: lifetime periods. 
general events, and event-specific knowledge (ESK). For instance, in the memory: 
" When I was tH'en(1' years old I was stlld.ving philosophy at Cambridge. I cun 
perfectZ1' remember Professor X lectures. One day, he came with a pinkjacket ... " 
the expression "when I was twenty years old" gives information of the lifetime 
period, "Professor X lectures" indicates a general event within the lifetime period. 
and "pink jacket" is an ESK of the general event. The last one is info11l1ation of the 
perceptual characteristics of the memory (in this case visuaL but infomlation of any 
sense could be encoded). Conversely, lifetime period and general event infonnation 
are more abstract and they are not related to the type of sensory infonnation 
encoded during the acquisition of the memory. 
The other component of the SMS is the working self. Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce introduced this term, explicitly linking it to the working memory concept 
developed by Baddeley (1986). Its function is to coordinate and to modulate 
computationally separate systems. The working self has a goal structure that 
restrain cognition and behaviour and that have a critical role in encoding and 
retrieving autobiographical memories into and from the knowledge base. 
An autobiographical memory could be retrieved in two ways: generative 
retrieval and direct retrieval. In generative retrieval, the working self accomplishes 
a vital role. The generative retrieval concept was derived from Norman and 
Bobrow (1979) and consists of a number of stages. First, the elaboration of a cue 
with which to begin the searching for a memory and the simultaneous 
establishment of verification criteria, which form the retrieval model (working self 
goal). Second, the memory description (i.e., the cue) triggers the activation of 
nodes of the autobiographical knowledge base. These nodes become automatically 
available to control processes and are constantly evaluated in terms of the 
verification criteria. When the evaluation is satisfactory (i.e., is compatible with 
working self goals), a stable pattern is formed in the knowledge base, and the 
searching ceases. Conversely, in direct retrieval no cue elaboration or search 
phases occur. This type of retrieval occurs when a an ESK existent in the 
autobiographical knowledge base is directly presented to the rememberer. 
Therefore, the working-self does not play an important role in this type of retrieval. 
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Another important theoretical conceptualisation was put forward by 
Maguire and Mummery (1999) who proposed that in the classification of memories 
into impersonal facts-semantic memory-and personal events with specific 
temporal context-episodic memory- (Tulving, 1983) the temporal context and 
the personal relevance of the memories are two factors that are unconfounded. 
Therefore, Maguire and Mummery proposed four types of memories: general 
knowledge (no personal-relevant, no temporal context), autobiographical facts 
(personal relevant, no temporal context), public events (no personal relevant, 
temporal context), and autobiographical events (personal relevant and temporal 
context) in order to unconfound the two factors: personal relevance, and temporal 
context. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) give some information about the brain 
locations of the SMS. They propose that the goals of the working self are located in 
the frontal and anterior temporal regions (specifically, in the left hemisphere), the 
retrieval model is formed in the right frontal lobe, and the autobiographical 
knowledge base is situated in posterior networks (primarily in the right 
hemisphere). The abstract lifetime period knowledge is stored in the right frontal 
lobe, knowledge of general events in the temporal lobes and ESK in occipito-
parietal networks. Additionally, they suggest that when a memory is generated, its 
maintenance in awareness requires the activation of right frontal, posterior 
temporal and occipital sites. 
2.3.2.2.1 Brain imaging studies in autobiographical memory. 
Although autobiographical memory has been extensively studied in many 
domains of psychology, only a handful of brain imaging studies ha\'e been carried 
out. Fink et al. (1996) carried out a PET study with three conditions: 'Personal', 
'impersonal' and 'control'. In the first conditions, participants were aurally presented 
with a sentence related to an event of their own lives and they were instructed to 
imagine what happened to themselves in the described situation. The infonnation 
of the life events was obtained in a semi-standarised interview carried out weeks 
before the scanner. In the interview questions about childhood, adolescence and 
early adulthood were asked. The impersonal sentences referred to a person the 
participants had met 1 hour before the scanner, where they had to imagine \vhat 
happened next to that person. In the control condition, the subjects remained with 
their eyes closed. As expected, the impersonal> control contrast showed bilateral 
activation of temporal areas related to speech processing. The personal> 
impersonal contrast displayed a right lateralised pattern of activations in medial and 
lateral aspects of the temporal lobe (including, hippocampal, parahippocampal, and 
amygdaloid regions), anterior insula, posterior cingulate, temporo-parietal junction 
and prefrontal cortex. 
Conway et al. (1999) undertook a PET study containing an autobiographical 
memory condition and a paired-associate recall task as control. For the first 
condition participants were trained to recall an event of their own lives after the 
visual presentation of a word before the scanning session. During the scanning 
session, they were presented with those words and they were asked to report as 
much detail as possible of the episode. Participants were also requested to respond 
with a word that in the future would allow them to retrieve the situation that they 
remembered during the scanning session. The age of the memories was also 
manipulated. The participants were asked to generate less than 12 months' old 
memories in the recent condition and memories before they were 15 years old in 
the remote condition (the average age of the participants was 31). In the control 
task, the participants learnt a list of word pairs before the scanning session, and 
during the experiment, they were presented with a word of the list and they \\"ere 
asked to provide the word corresponding to the same pair. Unlike the Fink et al. 
(1996) study, Conway et al. (1999) found a left hemisphere pattern of activations 
when they subtracted the activation of the control task from that of the 
autobiographical memory condition. They found activation on frontal areas BA -1-5, 
BA 47, BA6 and BA9, as well as in the parieto-occipito-temporaljunction (BA 
39). When they compared recent memories with remote memories no effect was 
found in either direction. 
Conway et al. (2001) perfonned a slow cortical potential study of 
autobiographical memory similar to the one reported above. The high temporal 
resolution of this technique allowed the researchers to investigate the timing of the 
fonnation of the memories. They found that the generation of an autobiographical 
memory starts on the left frontal lobe and afterwards the activation was apparent in 
posterior temporal and occipital areas, mainly in the right hemisphere. 
Maguire and Mummery (1999) perfonned a PET study. They manipulated 
the temporal context and the personal relevance of the memories as explained 
above. An interview before the experiment was carried out and infonnation of the 
participants' lives were obtained in order to generate statements of those four types 
of memories that ranged from 2 weeks to 20 years of age. The task consisted of a 
truth judgement of the statements. When all the tasks were compared to a control 
task in which the participants listened to a disorganised sentence - like COJ1\\"ay et 
al. (1999) - Maguire and Mummery found a left hemisphere pattern of actiYations. 
This pattern included medial pre-frontal areas (BA 10), anterior lateral middle 
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temporal gyrus (BA 21), temporal pole (BA 38), hippocampus and 
parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28/36), posterior cingulate (BA 31) and occipito-
temporo-parietal junction (BA 39). In the contrast personal relevant memories> 
no-personal relevant memories the following areas were activated: frontal cortex 
(BA 10), the temporal pole (BA 38), and the occipito-temporo-parietal junction 
(BA 39). 
Age of autobiographical memories 
Niki and Luo (2002) followed Conway et al.'s (1999) investigation of the 
age of autobiographical memories in an fMRI study. One or two days previous to 
the scanning session, the participants provided a list of places that they visited 7 
years before the experiment and other places that they visited 2 years or less 
previous to the scanning session with landmarks present in the place. Within the 
scanner, the participants were presented with either the name of the place, or 
landmarks present in the place and they were required to recall the experience of 
visiting the place. The main interest of the researchers was to assess the differential 
role of the medial temporal lobes in remote and recent memories. They found more 
activation in this area for recent memories, but also many other areas were 
activated, specially the left medial occipital gyrus (lingual gyrus, BA 18). In the 
opposite contrast (i.e., remote> recent memories), the major area was the left 
frontal lobe (local maxima at BA 10). This finding contrasts \yith Stark and Squire 
(2000) study, in which no differences were found in the medial temporal lobe 
between recent and remote memories (although, no autobiographical memories 
were used). However, in the last study shorter time windows \\'ere used (1 \\ed" 1 
day and 1 half hour before the scanning session). 
Maguire et al. (2001) did not find differential actiYity in the hippocampus. 
but they found a parametric increase activity in the right ventro-lateral prefrontal 
cortex for recent memories. In this study, the memories \vere collected in an 
interview and ranged from 20 years' old memories to two weeks of age memories. 
Finally, as stated above, Conway et al. (1999) did not find differences in brain 
activity between remote and recent memories. 
The study carried out in this thesis (see chapter 9) used two chess masters 
as participants. This study involves a new methodology in studying 
autobiographical memory which does not require a previous interview, and the 
experimenter has great control over the generation of memories. Furthermore, the 
ecological validity of the autobiographical memory field is in no way lost. 
2.4. Summary 
The extensive review of literature presented in this chapter is a necessary 
basis for the experimental chapters. How does this review leave the three theses 
stated in the introduction? Regarding the versatility and power of chess, the revie\\ 
shows that chess is a flexible tool that offers the possibility to study several 
psychological phenomena, and several influential theories in cognitive psychology 
originated directly or indirectly from studies related to chess. HO\\'eyer, the use of 
chess in brain imaging did not show a clear pattern of results, and some of the 
studies had several weaknesses. Therefore, it is important to investigate further the 
use of chess as a task environment in brain imaging studies (flvfRl in this thesis) 
using adequate experimental designs. 
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The second thesis stated that extended practice is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition to reach high levels of expertise. The review showed that there 
is a strong controversy. Some researchers state that deliberate practice is a 
necessary and a sufficient condition to achieve high levels of expert performance, 
and others indicate that innate talent is essential. Previous studies in\"estigated 
either the role of practice or they looked for innate talents. In this thesis a less 
extreme position is adopted, and both aspects are considered. 
The third thesis expressed the idea that there are factors not related to 
practice that influence the attainment of expert performance. No experimental 
evidence of the existence of any of these factors was found in the literature. 
However, lack of evidence does not mean evidence oflack. In this thesis, a search 
for cognitive processes in which individual differences may exist, was 
implemented. 
Before starting with the experimental chapters, in the next one some 
methodological issues will be considered. In particular, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) will be extensively discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methods 
In this thesis a variety of techniques were used in order to collect data. 
These included standard behavioural experiments, questionnaires, eye-movement 
recording, and functional magnetic imaging. Additionally, not only the standard 
psychological paradigm of comparing the performance of two groups was used, but 
also a relatively novel methodology was used (i.e., the cross-tasks study in chapters 
6,7 and 8). 
In this chapter I will describe the fMRI apparatus and the rationale of this 
technique, the eye-tracking apparatus and the cross-tasks paradigm. fMRI, due to 
its complexity, covers more than two thirds of the chapter. Other methodological 
issues are discussed in the methodological section of each experimental chapter. 
3.1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
Three fMRI experiments were carried out, and they are presented in 
chapters 9 and 10. In this section the foundations of the technique are explained, 
and issues that apply to all the fMRI experiments are reviewed. The design of each 
experiment is detailed in chapters 9 and 10. 
3. 1. 1. Foundations 
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Functional MRI affords the possibility to map brain acti"ity while a 
participant is performing a particular task. However, it is paramount to mention 
that fMRI does not measure brain activity directly. Instead the fMRI signal is the 
consequence of a difference in oxygen consumption and blood flow that occurs 
during the task. This signal is called the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
signal. Since the ultimate goal is to measure neuronal activity and not blood £10\\, 
there are several studies that compare BOLD signal with more direct measures of 
neuronal activity such as single and multi unit spiking activity (Logothetis, Pauls, 
Augath, Trinath & Oeltherman, 2001; see sub-section 3.1.1.2,2). The re!c\'ance of 
fMRI is that, whilst sacrificing temporal resolution, it provides excellent spatial 
resolution which allows one to determine with high accuracy what anatomical areas 
are active. The physical basis of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) will be 
explained, and several issues related to fMRI will be discussed. 
3.1.1.1. Physical principles of MRI 
An MRI image of biological tissue is obtained as follows. Some atomic 
nuclei such as the hydrogen nucleus are spinning charged particles \vith their own 
magnetic field. When a biological tissue containing hydrogen is exposed to a strong 
magnetic field (such as the MR scanner) the hydrogen nuclei change their 
orientation (outside the magnetic field the orientation is random) \vith respect to the 
strong magnetic field. A radio-frequency (RF) coil generates a brief RF gradient-
which generates a second magnetic field orthogonal to the scanner magnetic 
field- that changes the orientation of the hydrogen nuclei away from the scanner 
magnetic field. Following this excitation, the hydrogen nuclei retum to the 
orientation towards the scanner magnetic field. There are two relaxation rates _ T 1 
and T2. The first one indicates the time needed to recover the orientation 
longitudinal to the scanner magnetic field, and T2 is the time taken to decay in the 
plane perpendicular to the scanner magnetic field. These two values yary according 
to the water composition of different tissues. When the hydrogen nuclei return to 
the scanner magnetic field orientation, RF energy is released and detected by an 
antenna surrounding the brain (see Frackowiak et aI, 1997, chapter 18). Relaxation 
time (Tl) depends on the type of tissue containing the relevant water molecules. 
For instance, in cerebrospinal fluid, which is close to pure water, protons relaxation 
time is about 3 seconds, but in white matter, the Tl is about 0.5 seconds. Two other 
parameters to take into account are Tl * and T2* which are Tl and T2 with inflow 
(i.e., relaxation times when blood flow increases to the area; see Chen & Ogawa, 
1999). 
An important issue that it is vital to understand in fMRI is that 
deoxyhemoglobin contains a paramagnetic iron. Therefore its magnetic 
susceptibility is higher than that of oxyhemoglobin which does not contain it. This 
magnetic property generates an increase in the local inhomogeneity of the magnetic 
field. This produces a quick decay ofRF energy, therefore a decreased magnetic 
resonance signal (D'Esposito, Zarahn & Aguirre, 1999). In the resting state of the 
brain there is a coupling between cerebral blood flow (CBF) and the cerebral 
metabolic rate of oxygen consumption (CMR02) (Siesjo, 1978). When eleyated 
neuronal activity occurs, there is an uncoupling of CBF and CMR02, the latter 
being smaller than the former, therefore increasing oxyhemoglobin leyels and the 
BOLD signal. The increase in CMR02 is 0 to 5% and the CBF increase is 4() to 
51 % during functional activation elevated by visual and somatosensory stimuli 
(Fox et a!, 1988, Fox and Raichle, 1986, Ribeiro et a1.. 1993) 
In the fMRI experiments of this thesis the images used \\'ere 12* weighted 
EPI ( Echo planar imaging) images. EPI is a method which is used to form a 
complete image from a single data sample, or a single "shot". which allo\\'s 
collecting one image in 40-150 ms. The images are 12* \\'eighted' because BOLD 
fMRI has not absolute interpretation, it is not exactly a measure of 
deoxyhemoglobin concentration, but is a measure that is weighted by this 
concentration (T2* weighted) (Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999). 
3.1.1.2. Physiological basis of fMRI 
Glucose is the energy source for the brain. Whereas the brain weight is only 
the 2% of the total body weight, it consumes 25% of the total body glucose 
utilisation (Magistretti & Pellerin. 1999). When a brain event occurs an increase is 
detected in cerebral blood flow in the area in which this event happens. Howc\'er, 
not all the oxygen brought to the area is immediately utilised. This fact produces a 
change in the ratio between oxy- and deoxyhemoglobin. thus producing a 
detectable fMRI signal (Ogawa et a1., 1990). With the increase of blood flow, the 
concentration of deoxyhemoglobin decreases (therefore relative concentration of 
oxyhemoglobin increases), because of the presence of oxygen which is not 
consumed. This fact decreases the RF decay rate and therefore it produces an 
increase in the fMRI signal. 
3.1.1.2.1. Hemodynamic response fUllction (HRF) 
In most of the blocked designs (the design used in this experiment; see sub-
section 3.1.2.1.1) the HRF is convolved to a box-car function in order to model the 
data (see sub-section 3.1.3.3.5). HRF is the function that describes the behaviour of 
the BOLD signal when a neuronal event occurs. 
When neuronal activity starts due to a brief period of visual stimulation or 
motor activity (e.g., finger tapping for 2 seconds), the BOLD signal in the \'isual 
and the motor cortices respectively changes. The BOLD signal starts increasing 
approximately 2 seconds after stimulus onset (some laboratories observed an initial 
dip in the BOLD signal lasting from 500 ms (Henning et a1., 1995) to 2 seconds ( 
Hu et aI., 1997; Menon et aI, 1995)) reaching the peak of activation after 4 to 6 
seconds and returning to baseline after approximately 10 seconds. In visual 
cortex-more than in motor cortex-a post-undershoot has been found, the timing 
depending on stimulus duration (Davis et aI., 1994, see Bandettini, 1999 for a more 
detailed explanation). 
HRF is also used as a low-pass filter, which eliminates the high frequencies 
of the BOLD signal. The advantage of using HRF as a low-pass filter is that the 
statistical power of the experiment increases. The disadvantage is that reduces the 
temporal resolution. The higher the frequency of the paradigm the less efficiently 
the variance of the task will be passed into the BOLD signal. 
3.1.1.2.2. Relation of the BOLD signal with physiological measures 
Provided the BOLD signal is not a direct measure of neuronal activity, it is 
imp0l1ant to compare this signal with more direct measures of neuronal activation 
such as local field potentials (LFPs), which measure synaptic acti\'ity, and multi 
unit spiking activity (MUA), which is electrical actiyity of neurons. Logothetis et 
al. (2001) showed several important issues. First, LFPs contribute to BOLD signal 
more than MUA, therefore fMRI signal might reflect the incoming input and local 
processing in a particular area and not spiking activity which is thought to reflect 
the output of the area. Second, there is linear relationship bet\\'een the BOLD and 
the magnitude of neural signal (i.e., LFPs). 
3.1.2. Methodological issues 
3.1.2.1. Design 
The sluggishness of the BOLD signal puts some constraints on the type of 
experiments that it is possible to carry out. Here, two of the most frequently llsed 
methodological techniques will be explained, and it will be argued why one of 
these was chosen to be used in the series of experiments to the detriment of the 
other. 
3.1.2.1.1. Blocked design paradigm 
This is the prototypical flvfRI design (Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999). The 
rationale is quite simple: in the activation condition the cognitiye process of 
interest is present as well as other cognitive processes of no interest; in a second 
control condition, all the non-interest processes are present but none of the 
processes of interest. The subtraction of the brain actiyity of the control condition 
from that of the activation condition gives the actiyity related to the cognitiye 
process of interest. Additionally, more than one activation condition can be used. It 
is called 'blocked' because the unit of analysis is a block and not a trial: that is, 
there are several trials of the same type in a block. As mentioned in section 3.1.1.1, 
the HRF needs about 10 to 12 seconds to return to baseline. Therefore it is a good 
practice in a design to separate trials, having them 12 seconds from each other. 
This constraint makes a trial-based design time-consuming and there are health and 
ethical limits to the time that a volunteer can spend within a scanner. To solye this 
problem, a number of trials of the same type are put one after the other forming a 
block and separated by 12 seconds from another block of trials of different type. 
There are several advantages and disadvantages with this type of design. 
The fact that trials are blocked does not allow one to randomise trials - a common 
practice in experimental psychology; therefore, the predictability of the trials 
within a block could be a confound. There are two assumptions in this design that 
are not always satisfied (Zarahn et al., 1999). First, 'pure insertion'; the addition of 
a new cognitive process to the control condition could produce an interaction, i. c., 
the activation due to the processes of no interest could change with the insertion of 
the new cognitive process. If this happens - thus, pure insertion does not hold -
activity attributed to the processes of interest could be due to a non-interest 
process. The second assumption is linearity. It is assumed that the summation of 
the HRF generated by the different trials within a block is linear. This assumption 
does not always hold (Zarahn, 1999). Another problem of this design is that it is 
not possible to tease apart the activation from correct trials from that due to 
incorrect trials. 
There are several advantages to a blocked design and there are situations in 
which the use of this paradigm is optimal. The most important feature of this 
design is that it has the strongest statistical power. If this design has the problem of 
detecting false positives (detecting activation where there is not), other paradign1s 
have the problem of having false negatives (not detecting activation \vhere it 
exists). The use of this paradigm is acceptable when the trials produce a 
homogeneous response (i.e., there are very few incorrect responses) and also for 
exploratory studies in which brain regions of interest are not well documented (see 
Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999). 
In the first two fMRI experiments of this thesis simple tasks were chosen in 
order to have homogeneous responses; therefore, avoiding the problem of having 
mixed correct and incorrect trials within blocks in most occasions. In pilot studies, 
this was the case, with subjects performing above 80%. Similar results were 
obtained in the actual fMRI studies (especially in the first study with a mean abO\'e 
90% both in chess players and non-chess players). 
The block design paradigm was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the 
use of a block design is desirable in an exploratory study in which regions of 
interest are not well documented in the literature. The shortage of studies in the 
field make my studies exploratory ones, therefore the choice of a blocked design is 
justified. Second, in a new field it is important to use a design with strong statistical 
power, such as the blocked design. Third, the homogeneity of the responses \\as 
obtained in a pilot study. Therefore, one of the problems of blocked designs \\'as 
not present in my studies. Fourth, the main interest in these studies is not the exact 
location of particular processes but the general pattern of brain activity that they 
produce; therefore, the problem of false positives is alleviated. 
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3.1.2.1.2. Event related paradigm 
The introduction of event-related designs in the late 90's (e.g., Dale & 
Buckner, 1997) was aimed at overcoming the difficulties of the blocked design. 
The rationale is to use the trial as a unit of analysis. It has been already pointed out 
that the HRF takes about 12 seconds to return to baseline; hence. a separation of 
this period is needed between trials, making the experiment very long. 
Dale and Buckner (1997) considered the possibility of reducing the spacing 
between trials. In short spacing, the probability of detecting differences between 
the trial and the inter-trial interval is lower than that of the blocked designs; 
however, sensitivity in detecting differences between different types of trials 
increases because the assumption of linearity is optimally satisfied. Additionally, 
including some jittering in the timing of the inter-trial interval increases the 
sensitivity because the participants are not able to engage in anticipation processes. 
Another advantageous feature of event-related designs is the possibility of 
randomising trials and assessing the differential activity of correct and incorrect 
trials. However, the event-related designs are still not as powerful as the blocked 
designs. That is, differences in brain activity between conditions are more difficult 
to detect in event-related designs. 
3.1.3. Data acquisition and processing 
3.1.3.1. Apparatus 
The three fMRI experiments were carried out at the UniYersity of 
Nottingham Magnetic Resonance Centre. The MRC is equipped \\"ith a 3 Tesla 
scanner developed in the Physics department with a TEM Nova Medical head-coil. 
The stimuli were presented on a screen that was placed at 220 cm in front of the 
volunteer. Participants wore prism goggles in order to see the stimuli. 
3.1.3.2. Acquisition 
In the three experiments, images of the whole brain were obtained. T\\"cl1ty-
two coronal slices were obtained at a rate of 136 ms each, hence the TR (time 
between the acquisition of one volume [the whole brain] and the following one) 
was 2,992 ms. the images were T2* weighted Echo-Planar images (EPIs). The size 
of the images was 64 x 64 voxels. The voxel size was 3 mm x 3 mm in-plane, and 
the slice thickness was 9 mm. At the end of the session, two types of anatomical 
images of higher resolution were obtained in order to plot the activations. Sixty-
four (normal and inversion recovery) slices to cover the whole brain. instead of 22. 
were collected; hence, increasing the resolution. High-resolution images afford the 
possibility to observed in detail the sulci and gyri of the brain. The experimental 
paradigm started 12 seconds after the scanner started recording, in order to allow 
for magnetic saturation effects. The 4 volumes obtained during these 12 seconds 
were discarded. 
3.1.3.3. Data analysis 
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The raw data obtained went through several steps of pre-processing before 
acquiring SPM format-which is a standard software package for carrying out the 
statistical fMRI analysis (see below). The software used for the pre-processing "-as 
developed by the Nottingham Magnetic Resonance Centre. This software allO\ved 
one to eliminate part of the ghost (i.e., shadows produced by the scanner signal not 
related to brain structures) from the raw images and to transform the coronal 
images into axial images which is needed to perform statistical analyses in SPi\199. 
The processing of the data was carried out with Statistical Parametric 
Mapping (SPM99, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; 
Friston et al., 1995). Another piece of software utilised in the thesis and available 
on the Internet is the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster et aI., 1997; http://www.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/) which was used to obtain Brodmann areas given 
Talairach coordinates as input (see figures 3.1 and 3.2 for lateral and a medial-
sagital views of the brain with the Brodmann areas). Also a formula l provided by 
Mathew Brett on the website www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging (see also, Duncan 
et aI., 2000) was used to transpose the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNt 
Coscoso et aI., 1997) coordinates provided by SPM99 to the Talairach and 
Tournoux (1988) atlas coordinates. 
In the next sections the standard procedures of SPM will be explained. It is 
worth noting that all the participants' data underwent all the steps detailed below. 
SPM99 runs under Matlab (Mathworks Inc). 
I For the regions above the anterior commissure of the brain (Z=>O) the following formula was 
used: X'= 0.9900X ,Y'= O.9688Y +0.0460Z. Z'= -0.0485Y +0.9189Z . For the regions below the 
anterior commissure (Z < 0) the formula used was: X'= 0.9900X, Y'= 0.9688Y -O.(1'+20Z, Z'= -
O.0485Y +0.8390Z (see figure 3.3 for the x, y, z axes). 
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Figure 3.1. Lateral view of the brain with its Brod111a1l1l areas. Obtaillen 
from the website of the Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, U1liversity of 
Michigan (http://www.umich.edu/-cogneuro/jpg/Bron111anl1.ht1111). 
Figure 3.2. Medial sagittal view of the brainwitlz its BrOn11la1l11 areas. 
Obtained from the website of the Cognitive Neurosciellce L a b o r ( 1 t 0 0 ~ y , ,
University of Michigan 
(lzttp://www.llmich.edu/-cogneuro/jpg/Bron111al111.lzt111l) . 
3.1.3.3.1. Reorientation 
When functional 3D brain volumes are in SPM format, the first standard 
procedure is to establish the location of the Anterior Commissure of the brain 
which will be the 0, 0, ° in the x, y, z axes (x-axis is from left to right-negati\c 
numbers from the midline to the left-y-axis is back to front-negatiYe numbers 
from the anterior commissure to the back-and z-axis is bottom to top-negati \'e 
numbers from the line joining the anterior and posterior commissures to the 
bottom) and horizontally aligned with the posterior commissure. 
This is achieved by rotating the image in any of the three axes (yaw, pitch, 
roll) and moving in any of the three directions (up-down, right-left, forward-
backwards). When this is done, SPM is able to set the 0,0,0 origin to all the images 
and to rotate and translate them the same way as the first one. 
3.1.3.3.2. Realignment 
The second procedure is realignment. All the images are realigned to the 
first one. It also calculates the deviation of each of the volumes compared to the 
first one in terms of rotation and translation. A mean image is also generated, 
which will be used for the next steps. 
In the three studies of this thesis, volunteers that translated their heads 
more than 5 mm in any of the directions or rotated their heads more than 5 degrees 
in any of the axes, were discarded and their data were not further analysed. 
3.1.3.3.3. Spatial normalisation 
In order to locate in which brain area the activation of each volunteer is 
present, it is necessary to standardise the individual brain volume into a template in 
which analysis of brain areas had been previously accomplished. Each volume was 
normalised to a standard EPI template volume (based on the Montreal National 
Institute reference brain; Cocosco et aI., 1997) by transforming the mean image of 
each volunteer into a standard space. 
3.1.3.3.4. Spatial Smoothing 
The purpose of performing spatial smoothing is to increase the statistical 
power. Smoothing produces a loss in spatial resolution; therefore, the bigger the 
smoothing kernel used the higher the probability in detecting a significant effect. 
but the coarser the spatial resolution. Smoothing with an 8 mm x 8 mm x 8 mm 
Gaussian kernel is the standard procedure for group comparisons. 
3.1.3.3.5. Specification and estimation of model 
In the specification of the model, the researcher has to input a range of data 
into SPM99.These data are: TR, number of volumes in the entire session, number 
of conditions, a vector indicating the starting point (in scans or volumes) of each 
block for each condition, the duration of each block (in scans), the type of design 
(e.g., blocked or event-related), function to model the design (e.g., boxcar function 
convolved or not convolved with hemodynamic response function). The output of 
this procedure is a design matrix with one column per condition indicating \\"hich 
volume corresponds to which condition. With this matrix SPM99 calculates the 
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statistics for each column. All the statistics used are special cases of the general 
linear model (GLM), 
Y=BX+e (1) 
where Y is a matrix of the brain activity for each voxel at a particular time, :\. is the 
design matrix for each voxel, B is the parameter obtained for each yoxeL and e the 
error for each voxel. The first step of analysis is to test for each voxel and for each 
condition the null hypothesis that there is no effect. The outcome of this procedure 
is a map of statistically significant voxels. 
Before doing this, the researcher has to set a high-pass temporal filter (that 
is, only variations at frequencies higher than the threshold will be taken into 
account) which in my experiments was established using the default (2*number of 
scans per cyc1e*TR) and a low-pass temporal filter (the hemodynamic response 
function was chosen). 
The second statistical procedure is to perform t tests between the 
conditions. This procedure has as its output a map of voxels with t values (or z 
values)2. In this process it is important to establish the statistical threshold. For that 
purpose it is important to consider that a great number of comparisons are carried 
out, and that, by chance, several significant activations can be false positives. To 
solve this problem of multiple comparisons, the solution adopted in this thesis' 
experiments is the Bonferroni correction (Friston et aI., 1995) in which the 
threshold p value of .05 is divided by the number ofvoxels. In one of the contrasts 
of experiment 3, a less stringent value ofp=.001 overall was adopted. 
2 In fMRI the contrast between conditions are usually referred as condition A > condition B. whICh 
shows the voxels that remain activated when the activation due to condition B is subtracted Ii'om 
that of condition A. The opposite contrast, condition A < condition B means the \"oxels that remain 
activated when the activation of condition A is subtracted from that of condition B. 
3.1.3.3.6. Post-processing 
Once the clusters of activation of the different contrasts \\ith their 
respective coordinates were obtained using SPM99, the coordinates were 
transformed from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates provided 
by SPM to the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas stereotaxic system. This 
process was carried out using the formula provided by Mathew Brett (see sub-
section 3.l.3.3). The purpose of this process is that Talairach and Tournoux is the 
only atlas classified in terms of Brodmann areas. The Brodmann areas were 
obtained by the Talairach Daemon software (see sub-section 3.1.3.3) or by visual 
consultation of the atlas when the software did not provide a Brodmann area. 
3.2. Eye-movement recording 
In one of the experiments of chapter 8, recordings of eye-movements were 
obtained. The eye tracker used was an ISCAN RK-726PCI Pupil/Corneal 
Reflection Tracking System (PCI Card Version) (1/1/00). The eye tracker consists 
of a video-based, dark-pupil-to-corneal-reflection method to track eye movements. 
An infrared light beam is directed towards the right eye of the participant. The 
pupil absorbs the infrared light beam, and a reflection is produced on the cornea. A 
remote video camera detects the image of the eye, and uses the pupil and the 
corneal reflection to determine the position of fixation. Once the device is 
calibrated to the eye, it is able to track the eye pupil and the corneal reflection 
detern1ining moment-by-moment the actual position of the fixation. 
A template stimulus was presented at the beginning of each experiment. 
The experimenter asked the participants to direct their sight alternatively to the four 
extremes of the stimulus, as well as to its centre. In this \yay. the location of the 
stimulus in terms of pixels is known, and also the space of the participants' 
fixations is determined by these borders. 
The eye tracker sampled at a rate of 60Hz. and "-as able to track a 
subject's eye position with accuracy typically better than 0.3 degrees oyer a + - 20 
degree horizontal and \'ertical range. The camera and infrared light of the eye 
tracking device "-ere situated midway between the CRT \TIU and the subjects' eye 
(420mm from the eye) but sufficiently low down so that the yie\\' of the screen was 
unobstructed (approximately 30° from the line of sight perpendicular to the screen). 
The optimum set-up was determined as a result of yarious configurations 
investigated in a pilot phase of testing the new equipment. 
In order to restrain head movements, a deyice consisting of a chin rest 
attached to a g-clamp that could be adjusted in height was used. A chair with height 
adjusted was used. The most comfortable position was obtained, modifying the 
height of the chair and the height of the chin rest until the participant felt 
comfortable. A helmet was comfortably secured in a fixed position on top of the 
subject's head to further restrict movement. 
3.3. Cross-tasks study 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 contain a study in which an atypical paradigm was used. 
The tasks performed by the participants were standard. The novelty was that each 
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of the participants went through numerous tasks and techniques and the number of 
subj ects in the study was small. 
Gobet and Ritter (2000) put forward an approach called individual data 
modelling in which the data acquired in several studies should be analysed on an 
individual basis. This suggestion follows Newell's (1990) idea that psychological 
researchers should intend to develop unified theories of cognition. Gobet and Ritter 
recommend that individual data modelling is the ideal paradigm to develop general 
theories of cognition. They proposed that data of an individual or a few indi\'iduals 
analysed in an individual basis should be acquired in a number of tasks and that 
these data should be simulated by a computer model. The idea is to reduce the 
problems of the standard approach of aggregating data and using the mean of a 
sample as the value that represents it, and probably does not represent any 
individual of the sample. Another important aspect of the approach is to estimate 
parameters. For the importance for parameters estimation and use of individual 
data see Estes (2002). 
In a totally different approach, Masunaga and Hom (2000,2001) carried out 
the study in expertise with the highest number of volunteers (N=263). The 
participants were all GO players ranging from novices to master-level players. 
They used standard tests of fluid intelligence, short-term memory and cognitive 
speed and they specially designed similar tests using domain-specific (i.e., GO) 
stimuli. 
The purpose of my study was to give the first step in the Gobet and Ritter's 
(2000) approach and, for this, I followed Masunaga and Hom's (2000, 2001) idea 
of using general and domain-specific stimuli and of using players of different 
levels as participants. In general the rationale in choosing the tasks was the 
opposite to Masunaga and Hom inasmuch as tasks that are rele\'ant from the chess 
point of view were chosen, and general tasks similar to the chess ones were 
specially designed. However in some cases, Masunaga and Hom rationale \\"as 
carried out as well. 
Six participants took part in the study (l grandmaster, 1 international 
master, 1 expert, 1 class B player and 2 non-chess players). All of them \\'ere 
submitted to numerous tasks, the chess players also carried out 3 additional 
experiments and the 2 strongest players participated in an fMRI study as well ( the 
fMRI study presented in chapter 9). A number of techniques was used: fMRL eye-
movement recordings, think aloud protocols, a questionnaire, and standard 
behavioural measures such as response time and accuracy were also recorded in a 
number of tasks. The tasks performed were: simple reaction time, short-term 
memory spans, reconstruction of a chess board, long-term memory recognition, 
learning of sequences, looking ahead, and problem solving. The results were 
analysed individually- as proposed by Gobet and Ritter (2000) -but also the 
differences among levels (masters, intermediate, non-players), between players and 
non-players and within the master level were taken into account. This is an 
exploratory study which has the purpose of providing data towards a general theory 
of expertise. As stated earlier, this endeavour does not start from scratch and an 
extant theory is taken as a starting point (i.e., template/CHREST). In chapter 11, 
the results obtained in this study were used to improve the theory by estimating 
parameters and proposing a new memory structure. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The role of practice in expertise 
This chapter aims to give support for the second thesis stated in chapter 1, 
which proposes that extended practice is a necessary, but not a sufficient. condition 
to attain expert performance. Moreover, the third thesis-that there are factors not 
related to deliberate practice that influence the attainment of expert performance-
is also considered. In so doing, two of the four sources of individual differences 
pointed out in chapter 2 are examined; an environmental influence during 
pregnancy (measured by handedness) and the age at which serious deliberate 
practice started. Additionally, the role of a number of activities to improve chess 
skill is evaluated. 
In chapter 2 (section 2.2) a review of the debate 'innate talent vs. deliberate 
practice' has been presented. Ericsson et al. (1993) put forward the 'deliberate 
practice' framework, which emphasises the role of practice in the acquisition of 
expert levels in several fields, including chess. From the opposite perspective, 
Cranberg and Albert (1988) stressed the role of innate factors for the achievement 
of high levels of expertise. 
This chapter's study is an extension of Chamess et al.'s (1996) study. The 
next section will concentrate on the latter and the framework presented in it. 
This first empirical chapter gives a general view of chess expertise. Once this broad 
picture is presented, then it will be possible to tackle more specific aspects in the 
following chapters. 
4.1. Charness et al. (1996) study 
The skill acquisition framework of Charness et al. (1996) has been 
presented in chapter 2; it postulates the existence of five factors to the acquisition 
of skill: (a) external social environment, (b) internal motivation and personality, (c) 
external information, (d) practice, and (e) cognitive system (software and 
hardware). 
Using retrospective questionnaires and multiple-regression techniques, 
Charness et al. studied different hypotheses derived from their framework in chess 
players. External-social factors were addressed by questions about the role of 
coaching. They found that these factors were not as important as in other sports. 
External information was measured by the number of books owned and the age at 
which the players joined a chess club. It was hypothesized that books are important 
knowledge sources, and that joining a club allows one to access dissemination 
channels such as journals, books, and databases. The role of practice was assessed 
by asking about the number of hours spent studying alone and the number of hours 
spent studying or practicing with others. It was found that individual practice 
predicted skill better than practice with others (.60 vs .. 35, respectively). Like 
internal motivation and personality, the role of the cognitive system was not 
directly assessed in their study; however, Charness et al. suggested that the 
cognitive system (both the hardware and the software) changes with practice, 
enabling skilled individuals to break normal information-processing limits. 
Another piece of intriguing data presented by Charness et al. (1996) and Elo 
(1 978)-but not addressed in this study-is the loss of chess rating as a function of 
age. Chess players show a peak of performance between 30 to 40 years of age and 
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their rating starts declining after that period. The fact that this trend is similar to 
that of scientists (see Simonton, 1996), and differs from the curve of sportsmen 
who peak and decline earlier, may suggest that the acquisition of knowledge is 
critical for chess. 
4.2. Overview of experiment 
In order to explore the joint role of practice and talent, a large sample of 
players were submitted both to a questionnaire similar to that used by Charness et 
aI. and to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). In comparison to 
Charness et aI., some new questions about the amount of practice were added, such 
as use of computer databases and computer programs, playing blindfold chess, 
reading games without seeing the board, and number of rapid chess games. These 
items were analysed in a hierarchical way. At the first level, the issue 'innate talent 
vs. deliberate practice' was considered. Then, an attempt to identify the best 
predictor of chess skill within the two practice variables was made, by comparing 
the number of hours of study alone with the number of hours of practice or study 
with others. Finally, the frequency and the importance of each of the chess 
activities to improve skill were examined. With respect to the hardware factors, the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was utilised to test Cranberg and 
Albert's (1988) theory that processes underlying chess skill should be performed 
mainly by the right hemisphere. The higher prevalence of non-right-handed 
individuals can be seen as a marker of the role of right-hemisphere processing. 
A further improvement over Charness et aI. (1996) is that not only was 
the dependent variable Elo rating for standard games used. but also the rating for 
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speed chess. While standard games are played with an average of three minutes per 
move, in speed chess each player has only five minutes to finish their game. To 
my knowledge, the latter measure has not been used in previous research. 
Questions related to the skills required by this special modality of chess, \\'here 
pattern recognition plays an important role (Gobet & Simon, 1996c) \yere 
addressed. 
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
The participants were 104 chess players (101 males and 3 females). They 
filled in a three-section questionnaire that was left on a desk in the Circulo de 
Ajedrez Torre Blanca, one of the most important chess clubs in Buenos Aires 
(Argentina). Posters asking for volunteers were also put on the notice board of the 
club. Additionally, I went to several tournaments, both in the Circulo de Ajedrez 
Torre Blanca and other chess clubs in Buenos Aires, and distributed the 
questionnaires to the players participating in these tournaments. Three 
grandmasters, 10 international masters, 12 FIDE masters, 40 untitled players with 
international rating, and 39 players without international rating filled in the 
questionnaire. (Not all players answered all questions, with the result that the 
number of data points varies across measures.) Since not all players had 
international rating, the national rating was used in order to measure chess skill. 
Note that the two ratings are closely related: for the 65 players having both 
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international and national rating, the correlation between the two scales was .89.1 
The range of the sample was 983 points (from 1490 to 2473), with a mean of 
1990.8 and a standard deviation of 221.5. Since the Elo rating has a normal 
distribution with a theoretical SD of200, the sample had a range of nearly 5 SD. 
The mean age was 30.8 years (SD = 14.5). 
4.3.2. Materials 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. The first section 
contained questions about date of birth, age, profession, international rating, 
national rating, speed chess rating (rating of the Circulo de Ajedrez Torre Blallca),2 
chess title, chess category, age when starting to play chess (henceforth, starting 
age), age when starting to play chess seriously (henceforth, age for starting 
seriously),3 age at joining a chess club ( club age), years of coaching, number of 
books owned, number of speed games played, and type of training (blindfold chess, 
reading games without seeing the board [henceforth, blindfold reading], use of 
chess databases, use of chess programs). The second section contained a grid in 
1 The scores were somewhat lower in the national rating, due to differences in the results taken into 
account. For instance, the four best players had 2520,2491, 2490 and 2488 in the international 
rating and 2438,2473,2400 and 2463 in the national rating, respectively. 
2 The speed chess rating, where, in some cases, the calculation is based on more than a thousand 
games, is computed independently from the national rating. 
3 What did the players consider by "seriously"? Apparently, they assumed that this term referred to 
the time they joined a chess club. The question about starting playing seriously yielded similar 
results to the question about the age of joining a chess club (age for starting seriously: :--. 1 = 15.0, 
SD=8.0; club age: M=15.0, SD=8.2: r=.89, p<.OOl). 
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which the participants had to fill out the number of hours per week they spent 
studying chess alone at each age (henceforth, indiYidual practice). They also had to 
fill in a second row with the number of hours per week they spent studying or 
practicing with other chess players, including tournament games (henceforth. group 
practice ):-l Note that, when considering the role of practice as a whole, these two 
variables will be combined-by adding the absolute values-in order to obtain a 
single variable called 'dedication'. The third section contained a Spanish translation 
of a modified version (Ransil & Schachter, 1994) of the Edinburgh handedness 
inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Handedness 
The three women were excluded from the analysis since the trend in 
handedness is different for women and men (Cranberg & Albert, 1988). It was 
found that 17.9% in the present male sample were non-right-handers. Using the 
normal approximation to the binomial distribution, it was found that the difference 
with the general popUlation (10 to 13.5% of non-right-handers; Bryden, 1982; 
Geschwind, 1983; Porac & Coren, 1981) is statistically significant (z = 1.86, P < 
.05). Within the present study's sample, there were no reliable differences in 
handedness between players with international rating (N = 60; percent of non-right-
handers = 15%) and players without international rating (N = 35; 22.8°0). nor 
between titled players (N = 24; 8.3%) and untitled players (N = 71, 21.1 00). If 
-I In Charness et a1. . s study (1996, table 2"'+). players considered actiYe participation in chess 
tournaments as the most relevant acti\'ity. 
anything, the pattern of results was in the opposite direction to what is predicted by 
Geschwind and Galaburda's theory. 
The present study's results show the same pattern as that found by Cranberg 
and Albert (1988): chess players are more likely to be non-right-handed than the 
population, but, within chess players, handedness does not correlate \\"ith chess 
skill. To explain the latter result, Cranberg and Albert hypothesized that the group 
of weaker chess players contained numerous young players who could become 
masters and would be in the master group in the future, resulting in an increase of 
the proportion of non-right-handers in the population of high-level chess players. In 
this study's sample, the age gap between the two groups was not as wide as in 
Cranberg and Albert's sample, so this explanation does not seem to apply. 
4.4.2 Innate talent and practice: A multiple-regression analysis 
Are high levels of chess skill acquired simply by extended practice or is 
there a biological determination? Should other factors be taken into account? One 
way of dealing with these questions is with a multiple regression analysis 
predicting chess skill with the following variables: dedication (combination of 
individual practice and group practice), starting age, age for starting seriously, 
handedness, and age. Dedication was included as a measure of chess practice. 
Handedness is a biological indicator of talent according to Cranberg and Albert. 
The starting age for playing chess and the starting age for playing seriously \\'ere 
set into the formula in order to test the role of the critical period proposed by Elo 
(1978). Finally, Charness et al. (1996) proposed age as a predictor of chess skill. 
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These independent variables have been log-transformed because of the skewness of 
their distributions. 
Table 4.1. Predictors of chess skill: Bivariate correlations. 
Speed Log Log Log Log Log 
rating Dedication Age seriously Starting age Age Handedness 
National rating 
.83** .57** 
-.37** 
-.28** 
.08 
-.07 
(72) (89) (100) ( 104) 104) (95) 
.37** 
-.46** 
-.23 
-.04 .12 Speed rating 
(63) (70) (72) (72) (65) 
-.08 
-.17 .42** .11 
Log. Dedication 
(85) (89) (89) (83) 
.59** 
Log. Age seriously 
.54 
-.01 
(100) ( 100) (92) 
.29** 
-.19 
Log. Starting age 
(104 ) (95) 
.14 
Log. Age 
(95) 
Note. ** p < .01, * P < .05. Number in parentheses are number of subjects. :\ot all the players 
have speed rating and some of them did not answer all the questions. 
Zero-order correlations were first analysed (see Table 4.1 ), using as 
dependent variables national rating and speed chess rating, which measure chess 
skill in long games and in quick games, respectively. Age and handedness did not 
correlate significantly either to national rating or to speed chess rating. 
l ' ~ ~
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National rating had the higher correlation with dedication, followed by' age for 
starting seriously and starting age. With respect to speed chess rating. age for 
starting seriously had the highest correlation, followed by dedication. Two stermise 
multiple regressions, respectively with national rating and speed chess rating as 
dependent variable, keep only Log dedication and Log age for starting seriously as 
predictors. These variables yielded the following multiple regression equations, 
where the adjusted R2 were .39 for national rating and .34 for speed chess rating: 
National rating = 1448.3 + 239.2 Log dedication (1) 
- 357.3 Log age for starting seriously 
Speed chess rating = 1981.9 - 536.2 Log age for starting seriously (2) 
+ 150.7 Log dedication 
4.4.3. Practising behaviour 
Within dedication to chess, which is more important: the number of hours 
of study alone or the number of hours of practice or study with others? This 
question directly addresses one important result in Chamess et al. 's (1996) study, 
in which individual practice was found to be a better predictor than group practice. 
When variables are strongly correlated, as it is the case here, the use of 
stepwise multiple regression may lead to arbitrary decisions: the variable chosen to 
be the most important, and entered first in the equation, will also account for the 
variance shared with other independent variables. Hence, the analyses \\'cre limited 
to the bivariate correlations (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Scatter plots of national rating and speed rating as afunction of log 
individual practice and group practice. (The plots for individual practice have 
excluded nine players who reported zero hours of practice. With these players 
included, the equations are 1754.508 + 73.490x (r2 = 0.175) for national rating, 
and 1817.242 + 43.808x (/ = 0.063) for speed rating.) 
The results suggest that national rating and speed chess rating are better 
predicted by group practice than by individual practice (see Figure 4.1 ). Both 
variables are correlated with national rating, but individual practice is not 
correlated with speed chess rating at the .01 significance level. These results are 
different from those found by Chamess et al. (1996), in which individual practice 
turned out to be the best predictor of chess skill. In the present study, group 
practice predicted chess skill at least as well as individual practice. 
4.4.4. Activities used to improve chess skill 
The items in the questionnaire corresponding to chess activities could be 
classified in two categories: activities performed with others and activities 
performed alone. Variables that correspond to the first group are: coaching, Log 
individual coaching, Log group coaching, blindfold chess, playing speed chess and 
Log speed chess games. Study alone is represented by the following activities: 
blindfold reading, databases, chess programs and Log number of books. The latter 
variable was one of the predictors identified by Chamess et al. (1996). Book 
ownership is not an activity but it can be assumed that if chess players have books 
they read them, or at least some of them. So, the number of books owned could be 
a predictor of hours spent reading books, which is an activity performed alone. 
The percentages of players reporting the practice of these activities were as 
follows: playing speed chess (83.6%), coaching (80.5%), use of databases (67.3%), 
use of programs (66.3%), blindfold reading of games (55.7%) and blindfold chess 
(23%). The zero order correlations between these practice activities and chess skill 
were assessed. With national rating used as dependent variable, the correlations 
were .44 for Log number of books, .35 for the presence of coaching (0,1), .32 for 
the use of databases (0,1), .27 for playing speed chess (0,1), and .27 for Log speed 
games (all Q < .05). There was no significant correlation between skill and 
blindfold chess, blindfold reading of games, use of chess programs, Log years of 
individual coaching, and Log years of group coaching. 
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The most popular activities-speed games and coaching-\\'ere correlated 
with chess skill and, thus, seem to be useful activities as well. Use of databases and 
computer programs had the same level of popularity, but the mean national rating 
of players using databases was higher than that of players using programs. Howard 
(1999) showed a historical trend in which young players are increasingly 
occupying top positions in the world ranking. Gobet, Campitelli and Waters (2002) 
suggested that Howard's data could be accounted for by the use ofne\\' 
technologies. The lack of correlation between Use of chess program and chess skill 
is somehow surprising. It may be the case that playing with a chess program that 
uses a very different strategy (i.e., brute force in look ahead search) than that of 
humans does not help to improve the level playing against humans. However, the 
use of chess data bases is correlated with national rating, suggesting that good 
players are selective when choosing the appropriate technologies for their training. 
Playing blindfold games was neither popular nor useful, as players that 
did not play blindfold chess were not weaker than the ones who did. With speed 
chess rating used as dependent variable, the correlations were .38 for Log number 
of books, and .35 for coaching (0,1) (both 12 < .05). There was not a significant 
correlation in the other variables. 
Taking into account the activities measured in the questionnaire, it can be 
concluded that reading (as inferred by the number of books), an activity performed 
alone, is the most important predictor of chess skill. On the other hand, contrary to 
Chamess et al. 's results, Log speed games and coaching, two activities that 
included practice with others, were also good predictors of chess skill. 
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4.4.5. Test of Simon and Chase's (1973) hypothesis 
Simon and Chase (1973) estimated that it is necessary to dedicate 
between 10,000 to 50,000 hours to chess to achieve master leyel. They also roughly 
estimated that it is necessary to spend from 1,000 to 5,000 hours to attain the le\'el 
of a class A player. In the present study's sample, the mean number of hours of 
dedication accumulated when players attained 2200 Elo points (master leyel) was 
10,528, with a standard deviation of 5,327, and a range of 20,384 (from 3,224 to 
23,608). Thus, the lower bound of Simon and Chase's estimate coincides with the 
mean of this study's data. However, it is worth highlighting the variability of the 
data. One player attained master level with just 3,224 hours, while another needed 
23,608 hours (a 1:7 ratio). Furthermore, some players in the present sample had 
spent more than 25,000 hours of deliberate practice without attaining the master 
level. 
These data suggest that extended practice (more than three thousand 
hours) is necessary to achieve master level; however, extended practice is not 
sufficient to acquire master level, and the same amount of practice does not have 
the same effect in all the players. 
4.4.6. Differences with Charness et al. 's (1996) results 
While the overall pattern of results of the present study are consistent \\'ith 
Charness et al. (1996), several important differences may be noted. First, Chamess 
et al. concluded that individual practice is more important than group practice. In 
this study's sample, group practice was at least as important as individual practice. 
Second, Charness et a1. rejected the influence of coaching. The present study 
showed that the presence of coaching is important, but the quantity of years spent 
in coaching is not. Third, although Charness et a1. found negative correlations 
between chess skill and starting age, age starting seriously and age joining a chess 
club (-.35, -.36 and -.42 respectively), they also found that these variables did not 
explain additional variance in their regression analysis beyond practice and age. 
Accordingly, they proposed that the correlations were accounted for by amount of 
practice (i.e., earlier starters had more time to study than later starters). A different 
pattern emerged in this sample. Controlling for the number of hours of dedication 
with a partial correlation analysis, it was found that the correlations between 
national rating and starting age, age for starting seriously and club age were -.11 (p 
> .10), -.45 (p < .001) and -.40 (p < .001), respectively. In all cases, the correlations 
were calculated over 80 players. Similar partial correlations were found with speed 
chess rating, where the correlations were computed with over 56 players: starting 
age = -.27 (p < .05), age for starting seriously = -.53 (p < .001) and club age = -.49 
(p < .001). Therefore, the present data are consistent with Elo's (1978) proposal of 
the presence of a critical period. 
A final difference is that in the present study some variables were added 
in comparison to Charness et aI's (1996) work. One of them, Log speed chess 
games, turned out to be one of the activities predicting chess skill. 
Several reasons may explain the differences between the present results 
and Charness et a1.'s. First, the sample of this study was drawn from a 
homogeneous population, while Charness et a1. 's sample combined sub-samples 
from cities (Toronto, Berlin, and Moscow) located in three different countries. 
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Second, different statistical techniques were used in some cases, in particular to 
estimate the role of practice in the correlation between starting ages and skill. 
Third, there may have been differences in the organisational structure that 
produced differences in the environment of the two samples. The data of this study 
were obtained from players in Buenos Aires, which is a city with several chess 
clubs open more than 8 hours daily. This allows players to meet regularly to play 
and study in groups. Also, most of these clubs offer both group and individual 
coaching. 
4.5 General Discussion 
This study addressed four of the five factors mentioned in Charness et al. 's 
(1996) framework (no measure of internal motivation or personality factors were 
taken). Here follows a summary of the most important findings with respect to their 
framework. 
4.5.1. External social factors 
Like Charness et al. (1996), the importance of external social factors was 
explored by examining the role of coaching in chess. Contrary to what was found 
by Charness et al. (1996), group practice was strongly correlated with chess skill. 
Individual practice was also correlated, but not to the same extent. In this study'S 
sample at least, the presence of a coach at some point of the players' career (but not 
the number of years of coaching) was a good predictor of skill. 
94 
4.5.2. External information factors 
Two activities performed by chess players highlighted the role of external 
information factors in acquiring chess skill: reading books (indirectly measured by 
the number of books owned), and the use of game databases (but not the use of 
programs to play chess). Gobet, Campitelli and Waters (2002) discussed the impact 
that changes in information technology have had on training practices in chess of 
skilled players, and they concluded that this factor explains the decrease of age in 
the top chess players in the world. 
4.5.3. Dedicated practice 
The third factor mentioned by Charness et al. (1996) is practice. While the 
role of practice has been emphasized for a long time (e.g., by De Groot, 
194611978), Ericsson et al. (1993) have taken the extreme position that deliberate 
practice is a sufficient, not merely necessary, condition for expertise. The present 
results are not consistent with this position. Although the overall correlations both 
between individual practice and chess skill and group practice and chess skill show 
a reliable pattern, there were a number of exceptions: some players with relatively 
few hours of practice achieved master level, while others with a huge amount of 
practice did not reach this level. This pattern is apparent in the scatterplots of 
Figure 1 and in the numerical estimates of variability provided. 
As to the detail of the activities in which players engage in practice, the data 
of this study differ in several ways to those reported by Charness et al. ( 1996). The 
impOliance of group practice in the present study'S sample, which \\"as not found in 
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Charness et al. 's sample has been already discussed. A new result of the present 
study was that playing speed games was a good predictor of chess skill. 
4.5.4. Hardware of the cognitive system 
Charness et al. (1996) emphasized the changes that practice may cause to 
the cognitive system (both hardware and software). Given the lack of clear 
empirical evidence, they were more reserved about the effects that individual 
differences in hardware may have on the acquisition of knowledge through 
practice. Waters et al. (2002), who reviewed the literature on intelligence and 
visuo-spatial abilities in chess, found a complex pattern of results, with some 
pointing to abilities developed by domain-specific practice, and others pointing to 
abilities not specific to chess and perhaps innate. Two outcomes of the present 
study relate to this question: handedness and the starting age. 
It was found that handedness and chess were related (non-right-handers 
were more represented in the chess sample than in the general population). 
However, there was no relation between handedness and skill level. These results 
replicate Cranberg and Albert's (1988) using a well-validated measure of 
handedness. One possible explanation for the relation between chess and 
handedness, but the lack of relation between handedness and skill level, is that 
having a more developed right hemisphere does not always lead to being non-right 
handed (Geschwind & Behan, 1984). In other words, there may be chess players 
with more developed right hemispheres who are right-handers. Indeed, there is 
evidence that only one third of the people with more developed right hemisphere 
are not right-handed (Geschwind & Behan, 1984). If this is the case, the failure to 
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identify a correlation between skill and handedness as a marker of brain 
asymmetry-a factor not related to chess practice-does not mean that brain 
asymmetry is irrelevant, but that other measures of brain asymmetry, including 
measures of structural differences using MRI, are needed to test this hypothesis. 
Starting age showed a correlation between skill level and the age of starting 
playing seriously; critically, this correlation remained strong after hours of 
deliberate practice were partialed out. The correlation was even stronger with speed 
chess skill. Indeed, the correlation between starting age and speed chess rating is 
stronger than that between dedication and speed chess rating. Calderwood et al. 
(1988) and Gobet and Simon (1996c) have proposed that efficient pattern 
recognition is essential to play high-quality games in speed chess, because there is 
no time to calculate variations. It may be the case that starting to play seriously 
early influences the speed in which pattern-recognition processes are carried out. 
4.5.5. Software of the cognitive system 
This study has not investigated this aspect of chess expertise. In the 
following chapters cognitive processes related to imagery, memory and thinking 
will be considered. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated different variables-some related and some 
not related to domain-specific practice-in order to inyestigate t\\'O of the theses 
stated in chapter 1. 
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Regarding the thesis that extended practice is a necessary-but not 
sufficient-condition for the acquisition of high levels of chess skill, the present 
study has shown that, although the time spent studying and playing chess was a 
good predictor of skill, this variable on its own did not explain all the variance. 
Thus, the data suggest that practice is necessary, but not sufficient, to acquire 
master level. In this study, the minimum number of hours of deliberate practice 
required to reach international-master level was 9,360 hours. It might be argued 
that the necessity of extended practice has not been proven, because the 
correlational nature of this study does not allow one to establish causal relation. 
This point is well taken; however, there is no case of a player with few hours of 
dedication attaining high levels (3,224 hours was found as the minimal time to 
reach 2200 Elo points, and 9,360 hours for international master). Therefore, this 
position may be adopted as correct until new data disconfirm it. 
In order to consider the second thesis (factors not related to domain-specific 
deliberate practice influence the acquisition of expert performance), one of the 
possible sources of individual differences, environmental influences during 
pregnancy, was investigated indirectly by measuring handedness. It was found that 
the proportion of non-right-handers in the chess population was greater than that of 
the general population. However, no differences in handedness within the chess 
population were found. 
Another of the non-domain-specific practice factors that contributed to 
explain chess skill was the age at which players started studying seriously. Almost 
all players who obtained a title started studying seriously or joined a chess club 
when they were 12 years old or earlier. In contrast to previous studies, the results of 
my research indicated that the age at which players started playing seriously 
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predicted speed chess rating better than hours of dedication. These results support 
Elo's (1978) proposal of a critical period in skill development. In the present study 
a suggestion was put forward that being actively exposed to a chess en\'ironment at 
an earlier age (i.e., not just playing chess with friends or relatives, but reading 
chess books, solving problems and receiving feedback from advanced players) is 
important for developing efficient pattern-recognition skills. 
In summary, starting to play chess seriously before twelve years of age, 
carrying out individual practice such as reading chess books, playing chess with 
others, receiving feedback from a coach and playing speed chess games are all 
important factors to attain a high level of expertise in chess. There was some 
evidence that individual differences in abilities not related to the chess environment 
differentiate between players and non-chess-players (handedness and starting age). 
Together, these results refute strong interpretations of Ericsson et al. (1993) and 
Cranberg and Albert's (1988) theories, suggesting that the talent/practice debate is 
based on a false opposition. 
Having given a broad view of expertise in chess, now the study of the 
cognitive system will begin, with the next chapter focussing on expert imagery. 
CHAPTERS 
Expert imagery 
One of the purposes of this thesis stated in chapter 1 is gathering data 
towards a general theory of expertise. The template theory (Gobet & Simon, 
1996a) implemented in the CHREST (e.g., Gobet & Simon, 2000) computer model 
was taken as theoretical basis in this endeavour. 
This chapter's study aims to understand the relationship between visual 
perception and imagery (in particular, the overlap of internal and external 
infonnation within the mind's eye). A further goal of this study is to link empirical 
data on mental images in chess to the template theory. Particularly, since the 
amount of infonnation stored in long-tenn memory (LTM) is crucial in the 
template theory, I was interested in the role of previous knowledge and its 
interaction with the problem of overlapping infonnation in the mind's eye. 
The template theory was developed as a theory of expertise, therefore it 
should be able to account for data in blindfold chess. However, one component of 
the template theory which is vital for blindfold chess, the mind's eye, is not well 
specified. In the following section (5.1) a tentative explanation of the mind's eye 
will be put forward. Furthermore, the two experiments of this chapter are aimed at 
gathering infonnation about this component. 
In chapter 2 (section 2.3.1.1) a review of research into blindfold chess was 
presented. In that review, it has been shown that the most important studies were 
carried out by Saariluoma (1991) and Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997, 1998). 
They explained their results utilising a number of theoretical ideas: Chase and 
Simon's (1973) chunking theory, Ericsson and Kintsch's (1995) Iong-teml 
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working memory theory, Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) theory of working memory. 
and Leibniz' (1704) and Kant's (1781) concept of apperception-that is. 
conceptual perception (Saariluoma, 1995, p.l02). In section 5.2 ,it will be shown 
that most of Saariluoma and Kalakoski's results can be explained within the 
framework of the template theory. 
5.1. The mind's eye in the template theory 
In chapter 2 (sub-section 2.1.2) an explanation of the template theory and its 
computer implementation (CHREST) has been introduced. In this section, more 
detail about one of its components-the mind's eye-is given. 
Like in the chunking theory, the mind's eye in the template theory is 
considered a visuo-spatial structure preserving the spatial layout of the perceived 
stimulus, where information can be added and updated (Chase & Simon, 1973; De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 2000). The theory includes time parameters 
(see chapter 11, table 11.1) for carrying out various types of operations, such as 
moving a bishop diagonally or a rook horizontally. Search processes are done in 
the mind's eye: when an anticipated move is carried out, the changes are performed 
there (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1997). The information in the mind's eye is 
subject to decay and to interference; the latter both from information coming from 
other memory structures and/or from external information coming through the 
retina. 
5.2. Applying the template theory to blindfold chess 
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Several mechanisms inherent in the template theory are of importance in the 
application of the theory to blindfold chess. First, positions that recur often tend to 
lead to the development of templates; as a consequence, the initial chess position, 
as well as the positions arising from the first moves in the openings familiar to 
players, will elicit templates. This will be particularly the case with masters. 
Second, templates can be linked to each other and can be linked to moves. For 
example (see figure 5.1), the initial position is linked, among other moves and 
templates, to the move 1.e2-e4 and to the template encoding the position arising 
after this move; in tum, this template is linked to the move 1 ... c7-c5 and to the 
template describing the position arising after l.e2-e4 c7-c5. 
n 
!\ .. ~ ~
Figure 5.1. The template theory proposes that positions that recur often in 
a player's practice (such as the position after 1.e2-e4, diagram on the left, 
and the position after 1.e2-e4 c7-cS, diagram on the right) lead to the 
creation of templates. Templates may be linked in LTM, for example by the 
move or sequence of moves that lead from one to another (in the example, 
the move 1 ... c7-cS). 
I propose here to apply the theory to blindfold chess research, starting \\'ith 
Saariluoma's (1991) results. The role of L TM knowledge and of chunking are 
obviously at the centre of template theory. For example, the fact that actual games 
are better recalled than random legal games, which are in tum better recalled than 
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random illegal games, can be explained as follows (essentially Saariluoma's, 1991, 
explanation): masters, who have more chunks with which they can associate 
information about moves, are more likely to find such chunks even after random 
moves. With random illegal games, however, chunks become harder and harder to 
find, and masters' performance drops. Random legal games drift only slowly into 
positions where a few chunks can be recognized, and, therefore, allow for a 
relatively good recall. 
The fact that players are sensitive to visuo-spatial interfering tasks when the 
latter is employed while a stimulus to be remembered is presented, but not when 
the interference task is executed after its presentation, is explained as follows. 
Early on, these tasks would interfere with the access of chunks and templates, and 
with their potential modification; once this has been done, interfering tasks are less 
detrimental because information is already stored in L TM. The predominant role of 
visuo-spatial memory over verbal memory is captured by the mainly visuo-spatial 
encoding of chunks (Chase & Simon, 1973). 
Similarly, the results of Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) are consistent 
with the template theory. Information about colour and size may be hidden to 
players, because it is easy for them to derive them from location, as chunks are 
location-sensitive (Gobet & Simon, 1996d; Saariluoma, 1994; but see chapter 11 of 
this thesis for an alternative explanation). The effect of transposing the two hal\'es 
of the board is explained by the difficulty of accessing chunks (basically the same 
explanation as Saariluoma and Kalakoski' s). Modality of presentation (\'isual or 
auditory) does not matter, as long as the information can be used to update the 
position internally, and therefore access chunks. Finally, the speed of presentation 
time strongly affects perfom1ance, a direct prediction of the template theory, \\"here 
103 
cognitive processes, including decay of information in the mind's eye and L T)'1 
storage, directly depend upon the amount of time available. 
With respect to problem solving (Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1998), the fact 
that functionally-relevant pieces are better encoded than irrelevant pieces follows 
from the idea that functionally-relevant pieces are more likely to attract attention 
and therefore to elicit chunks and templates in the simulations with CHREST. This 
can already be observed in the early seconds of the presentation of a position (De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996). Similarly, orienting tasks (e.g., counting the number of 
pieces) change the object of attention; as a consequence, they affect which chunks 
will be retrieved, which in tum influences memory perfonnance. Better prob1em-
solving performance with game than with random background is explained by the 
fact that game background is more likely to elicit relevant chunks, because it offers 
more context and therefore more opportunity for accessing knowledge. Finally, 
visuo-spatial interference tasks offer a checkered pattern of results. They affect 
problem solving because search mechanisms occurring in the mind's eye are 
impaired. However, these tasks do not affect performance in a memory task if the 
position is presented before the interfering task (Saariluoma & Kalakoski 1998, 
expo 4). On the other hand, if the task is performed at the same time as the 
presentation of a game, the perfonnance in memory is indeed impaired 
(Saariluoma, 1991, expo 6). According to template theory, this result is explained 
by the fact that, as soon as a template has been accessed, infonnation can be stored 
there rapidly, which makes memory less sensitive to the operations of the mind's 
eye. 
As has been seen, varying the background affects problem-so!ying 
perfonnance, and, presumably, the cognitiye operations carried out in the mind's 
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eye. It is also likely that background affects cognition in a memory task as \\ell. To 
test this hypothesis, and to explore how a possible effect is modulated by skill 
level, a game was presented blindfold with a background, which is totally 
irrelevant to the target game. 
5.3. Experiment 1 
The purpose of this experiment was to understand the relationship between 
visual perception and imagery within the mind's eye. A method similar to that of 
Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) was used: chess games were presented on a 
computer monitor 'blindfold'--only the current move was displayed on an empty 
board. While these authors were interested in the type of information used by 
chess players (type of piece, colour and location), I was interested in the effect of 
background interference in blindfold chess, and manipulated the context 
surrounding the piece being moved. Hence, the moves were presented normally, 
but, in the interference conditions, pieces not related to the target game were 
placed throughout the board. Two games were presented simultaneously, and the 
ability to remember positions was measured three times: after 10 ply,l 30 ply, and 
50 ply; memory for the entire game was tested at the end. 
5.3. 1. Methods 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
1 A l2lY (or half-move) corresponds to a piece movement by either \\"Illte or Black .. \ move 
consists of t\\'o ply, one by White and one by Black. 
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Sixteen Argentinian players volunteered for this experiment: 8 masters 
(including 3 international masters and 3 FIDE masters) and 8 Class A players. The 
masters had an average international rating (ELO) of 2,299 and an average national 
rating (SNG)2 of2,193. Class A players had an average national rating of 1,885. 
(They did not have international rating.) The average age of the sample was 20.5 
years (SD = 5.2) with a range from 14 to 3l. 
5.3.1.2. Material 
Six grandmaster games were carefully chosen from Chess Base. They were 
chosen on the basis that they not been played by elite grandmasters and did not 
follow very common opening lines. The mean number of pieces for the three 
stages of reconstruction was 32 (SD = 0) after the 10th ply, 26.7 (SD = 1.5) after 
the 30th ply, and 20 (SD = 1.2) after the 50th ply. 
5.3.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The design was 2x3x3 ANOVA, where Skill (masters and Class A players) 
was a between-participant variable, and where Interference (Empty Board, Initial 
Position and Initial Position in the Middle) and Depth (10, 30 and 50 ply) were 
within-participant variables. The orders of the conditions and of the games were 
counterbalanced. 
:2 SNG (National Grading System) is the Argentinian national rating. It utilizes the same 
method as Elo ( 1978) and it is highly correlated to Elo. 
The six games were presented on a computer screen 'blindfold,' that is. the 
players could see only the moves but not the current position. The moves \\"ere 
presented visually on a chessboard. Three experimental conditions were used. In 
the control condition, the moves were presented on an empty board. In the first 
interference condition, the moves appeared on a board that contained the initial 
position of a chess game. In the second interference condition, the moves \vere 
displayed on a board where the initial position was transposed to the middle of the 
board (the 32 pieces were placed on rows 3 to 6, rather than on rows I, 2, 7. and 8, 
as in the normal initial position). 
In the three conditions, the participants were told that they had to follow 
two games mentally, starting with the initial position and updating the position 
with the moves presented on the board. Every move was presented as follows: the 
target piece was first presented for one second in its origin square and then for two 
seconds in its destination square. Then this piece disappeared, and the piece 
corresponding to the next move was displayed on its current location for one 
second, and then on its destination square for two seconds; then new moves were 
presented in the same way. The moving piece was always surrounded by a green 
square border to discriminate it from the interference pieces. 
The games were presented as follows. The first 10 ply of game 1 were 
presented, followed by the first 10 ply of game 2. At this point, an empty board and 
a box with chess pieces appeared on the screen, and participants had to reconstruct 
the last position in each game, by clicking the mouse in a piece and then clicking 
again in the square of the board in which they wanted to place the piece selected. 
Then, ply 11 to 20 of game 1 were presented, followed by ply 11 to 20 of game 2. 
and then ply 21 to 30 of game 1, followed by ply 21 to 30 of game 2. At this point. 
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participants had to reconstruct the last position of each game. Finally. ply 31 to -+() 
of game 1, ply 31 to 40 of game 2, ply 41 to 50 of game 1, and ply -+ 1 to 50 of 
game 2 were played. At the end, participants had again to reconstruct the final 
position of each game. 
When they had finished reconstructing the positions after 50 ply, 
participants were presented with a board containing the initial position and had to 
reconstruct the moves of game 1 and, then, the moves of game 2. Players were 
allowed a maximum of 4 minutes to reconstruct the two positions and a maximum 
of 10 minutes to reconstruct the moves of each game. The time spent in 
reconstruction was recorded with a stopwatch. At the end of this procedure. 
participants had a five-minute break, after which they started the same cycle with 
games 3 and 4 in a different experimental condition, followed by another five-
minute break and the same cycle with games 5 and 6 with the third condition. 
Before starting the experiment, all subj ects went through a practice session 
in order to familiarise themselves with the procedure and the use of the mouse in 
the reconstruction of positions. The practice consisted of following the procedure 
explained above, for 6 practice games (2 per condition) until the reconstruction of 
ply lOin all the games. 
5.3.2. Results 
5.3.2.1. Recall of Positions 
Figure 2 shows the means for the percentage of pieces correctly replaced. 
ANOYA indicated a main effect of Depth [ F(2,13) = 92.1. MSE = 20.320; 12 < 
.001]. Post-hoc Scheffe tests showed that the differences ,,"ere bet\yeen Ply 10 and 
lOS 
Ply 30, P ly 10 and P ly 50, as well as between P ly 30 and Pl y 50 . There was also a 
main effect of Ski ll LE(1 ,14) = 122.2 , MSE = 26,9 56; Q < .00 1]. Howe\'er, no main 
effect was fo und for Interference LE(2 , 13 ) < 1, MSE = 20.7]. There was found 
on ly one sign ificant interaction: Depth x Skill [£:(2 ,13) = 25.3 , MSE = 5,5 8 1. Q < 
.001J , due to the fact that C lass A players were more affected by depth than 
masters . 
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co;,ditioll (empty board, initial condition, and initial condition in tlI e middle) and 
of til e number of ply (top, masters; bottom, Class A players). 
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Errors of omission (total number of pieces minus the number of pieces 
replaced) and of commission (pieces incorrectly replaced) were also analyseu. 
Errors of commission consist of pieces placed on the board that \\'ere not present in 
the actual position and pieces placed on an incorrect square. Since the positions 
did not have the same number of pieces, the results are reported as percentages. 
With respect to the percentage of errors of commission, I found a pattern 
similar to that found with the percentage of pieces correctly replaced. The mean 
percentages for Skill were 6.0 (SD = 12.0) for masters, and 25.5 (SD = 26.2) for 
Class A players. The mean percentages for Depth were: 1.7 (SD = 3.8) for Ply 10; 
15.5 (SD = 16.3) for Ply 30; and 30.0 (SD = 29.1) for Ply 50. Finally, the mean 
percentages for Interference were: 16.3 (SD = 23.3) for Empty Board; 1.+.9 (SD = 
2l.5) for Initial Position, and 16.0 (SD = 22.8) for Initial Position in the Middle. 
There were main effects for Skill [F(l,14) = 109.7, MSE = 27,332; Q < .001], 
Depth [F(2,13) = 76.8, MSE = 19,146; Q < .001], but not for Interference [E(2,13) 
< 1, MSE = 55.34]. Again, Depth x Skill was the only significant interaction 
[F(2,13) = 24.1, MSE = 6,010; Q < .001]. The same pattern of results was found for 
the percentage of errors of omission: Skill LE(l,14) = 12.5, MSE = 1,842; Q < 
.001]; Depth [F(2,13) = 12.6, MSE = 1,860; Q < .001]; Interference [[(2,13) < 1, 
MSE = 13.36]; Interaction Depth x Skill [E(2,13) = 4.0, MSE = 592.04; Q < .02l 
Finally, a similar pattern of results for reconstruction time was found, with 
main effects of Skill LE(l,14) = 7.7, MSE = 36,450; Q < .01] and Depth [[(2.13) = 
98.9, MSE = 469,204; Q < .001], but not of Interference [E(2,13) < 1, \ISE = 
555.96]. No interaction was significant. 
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5.3.2.2. Reconstruction of games 
For this variable a 2 x 3 ANOVA model (Skill x Interference) \\"as utilised. 
The mean percentages of moves correctly reported were 86.4 (SD = 13.9) for 
masters and 41.1 (SD = 24.6) for Class A players. Regarding Interference, the 
means were 60.7 (SD = 32.5) for Empty Board, 67.0 (SD = 28.1) for Initial 
Position and 63.6 (SD = 30.5) for Initial Position in the Middle. Once again, there 
was a Skill effect [F(l, 14) = 122.8, MSE = 49,232; 12 < .001], but no Interference 
effect [F(2,13) < 1, MSE = 322.4]. The interaction term was not significant 
[F(2, 13) < 1, MSE = 392.6]. 
5.3.3. Discussion 
In this experiment, the following pattern of results was repeatedly found: 
(a) a main effect of Skill; (b) a main effect of Depth; (c) an interaction between 
Skill and Depth, and (d) no main effect of Interference. The first result naturally 
flows from the template theory, as seen above. As a consequence of their 
experience with the game and their study of chess literature, chess players have 
acquired a considerable knowledge base of both chunks and templates. which 
allows them to recognise familiar patterns automatically. Since masters' 
knowledge base is much larger than that of Class A players, the main effect of 
Skill arises. 
The second and third findings can also be explained easily by the template 
theory. The difference in performance between masters and Class A players arises 
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at Ply 30 and increases at Ply 50, but it does not exist at Ply 10. Most of the 
positions and the moves close to the starting position are well known both to 
masters and to Class A players; hence, no big differences in the corresponding 
recall performances were expected. However, as soon as the game progresses, 
masters can recognize more chunks and templates than Class A players. 
Interestingly, some of the masters (but not all of them) experienced impairment in 
their performances at Ply 50. I suggest that this is due to the lack of familiarity 
with positions corresponding to Ply 50, which makes pattern recognition harder. 
The fourth finding is more challenging, and led me to design the second 
experiment. Surprisingly, performance was not impaired in the conditions 
displaying the initial position, either on its normal location or in the middle of the 
board. In addition, there was no sign of interaction for this variable. Two 
explanations are suggested. First, it may be not necessary for chess players to use 
the perceived representation of the external chessboard as an aid to update the 
internal representation of the position in the mind's eye. Therefore, they just 
process the move that is being presented, and ignore the board and the other pieces. 
Thus, the interference position never gets processed. Second, chess players use the 
external board's percept as a help to refresh the image of the current position, but, 
early on, they can avoid processing the other (irrelevant) pieces on the board in 
depth, because they are not unexpected (the interference position remained 
unchanged during the whole task). 
In order to tease apart these hypotheses (no processing of the board, or 
processing-plus-early-filtering), a second experiment was designed where the 
interference positions changed during the task. It was speculated that the no\'clty of 
the position would cause its automatic processing, therefore impairing perfonnancc 
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for all skill levels. This assumption flows naturally from the template theory and, 
and in particular from its computer implementation, CHREST, where novelty is 
one of the heuristics used to direct eye movements and is at the heart of its 
discrimination learning mechanism. A further goal of this experiment was to gain 
additional information about templates by an analysis of the types of errors made 
during reconstruction. 
5.4. Experiment 2 
The purpose of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that the lack of 
main effect of interference in the first experiment was due to the lack of novelty in 
the interference positions. Two interference conditions, different from those used 
in experiment I were used. In the first condition (move-by-move condition), fifty 
positions (one for each move in the target game) were used as interference. These 
positions belonged to an unrelated game, which started with the same opening as 
the target game. In the second condition (semi-static condition), five different 
interference positions were displayed, which corresponded to five positions in a 
game, ordered chronologically. 
In a pilot study, it was found that a class A player could not do the task at 
all. Therefore, I decided to increase the skill level of the two groups in comparison 
to the first experiment, recruiting stronger masters and having experts instead of 
class A players. In addition, a FIDE master tested in the pilot study reported that 
the task had been demanding and that he felt extremely tired in the second part of 
the experiment. Hence, it was decided to eliminate some components of the 
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experiment, leaving intact the elements that were considered essential for the 
research questions investigated. 
5.4. 1. Methods 
5.4.1.1. Participants 
There were 16 volunteers: 8 masters (4 international masters and 4 FIDE 
masters) and 8 Experts (all of them with international rating but without any FID E 
title). The mean international rating was 2,351 (SD = 45.8) for the masters and 
2,113 (SD = 51.9) for the Experts. The mean national rating was 2,256 (SD = 
67.85) for the masters and 1,996 (SD = 70.14 ) for the Experts. The average age of 
the sample was 25.9 years (SD = 8.1; range 15 to 39). 
5.4.1.2. Material 
From a pool of grandmaster games with relatively uncommon openings, 6 
games were selected for the stimuli to memorise, and other 6 games for 
constructing the interference positions. For the stimuli positions, the mean number 
of pieces at the two moments of reconstruction were 26.8 (SD = .75) at Ply 30, and 
21.0 (SD = .89) at Ply 50. For the interference positions, the means were 27.8 
(SD= .98) at Ply 30 and 21.5 (SD = 1.0) at Ply 50. The interference positions were 
similar to the experimental games on the first moves. In the move-by-mo\'e 
interference condition, 50 different positions were used; in the semi-static 
condition, I used 5 different positions. 
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5.4.1.3. Design and Procedure 
A 2x3x2 ANOV A design was utilised. Skill (masters and Experts) was a 
between-participant variable; Interference (Empty board, move-by-mo\'e and semi-
static) and Depth (30 and 50 ply) were within-participant variables. The procedure 
was similar to that in experiment I, with changes mainly with the interference 
conditions. In addition, I asked the participants neither to reconstruct the position 
after 10 ply, nor to reconstruct the games at the end. These decisions were taken in 
order to keep the length of the experiment within bearable bounds. 
Every interference position corresponded to a game starting with similar 
moves in the first ply. In the move-by-move condition, a different interference 
position at each ply was presented. In the semi-static condition, the interference 
positions lasted 10 ply. Hence 5 interference positions, taken after 10, 20, 30, 40 
and 50 ply were used. The presentation of the game in the control condition was 
similar to that in Experiment 1. 
Before starting the experiment, all subjects went through a practice session. 
The practice consisted in following the procedure explained in Experiment 1, for 6 
practice games (2 per condition) until the reconstruction after 10 ply in all games. 
(Note again that during Experiment 2 itself, the players did not reconstruct the 
positions after 10 ply.) 
5.4.2. Results 
1 1 :' 
Figure 5.3 shows the means for the percentage of pieces correctly replaced. 
There was a main effect of Skill [F(l, 14) = 42.6, MSE = 16,894; P < .001). Depth 
[F(2, 3) = 20.3, MSE = 8,066; p < .001) and Interference [E(2, 13) = 13.7. i\ISE = 
5,432; P < .001). No significant interaction was found. Post-hoc Scheffe tests 
showed a significant difference between the means in the empty-board and semi-
static conditions (17.3%; p < .001), and between the empty-board and move-by-
move conditions (14.5%; p < .001). However the difference between the two 
interference conditions (3.1 %) was not statistically significant. 
A similar pattern of results was found for the percentage of errors of 
omission: main effects of Skill [F(1,14) = 16.1, MSE = 6,958; P < .001], Depth 
[F(2,13) = 16.7, MSE = 7,226; P < .001], and Interference LE(2,13) = 4.4, MSE = 
1,927; P. < .02]. No interaction was significant. The only discrepancy was that the 
post-hoc Scheffe tests showed that only the difference between the empty-board 
and semi-static conditions (10.2%; p. < .03) was significant. The results for the 
errors of commission were the same in all respects except for Depth: main effects 
of Skill [F(1, 14) = 13.4, MSE = 4,134; P. < .001) and of Interference [E(2,13) = 
4.4, MSE = 1,346; P. < .02], but not of Depth [E(2J3) = 2.7, MSE = 837.46; ns]. 
There was no statistically significant interaction. Post-hoc Scheffe tests showed 
reliable differences only between the empty-board and semi-static conditions 
(8.9%; p. <. 02). 
Errors of commission were further classified into the following subtypes: 
Same (the piece is placed on a correct previous [but not actual] location of the 
same game), Interference (the piece belongs to the interference position), Pair (the 
piece belongs to a previous position of the game presented in the same pair). and 
Inference (the location of the piece is inferred incorrectly). In order to help 
116 
visuali se the re lative influence of errors of commission and omi ssion , they \\·ere 
plotted together in Figure 5.4 , which shows the average percentages of en ors after 
30 and 50 ply, a ll p layers included. 
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Figure 5.3. Experiment 2. Percentage correct as a function of the 
experimenta l condition (empty board, semi-static, and move-uy-move) and 
of the number of ply (top, masters; bottom, Experts). 
The use of a template for each game, predicts that there should be few 
errors where infonnation is confused between the two games (pair en ors) and 
where the information is confused with the interference position (interfe rence 
errors). On the other hand, the template theory predicts that there shoul d be more 
errors within the same game (same errors) , since pl ayers may mainta in a templ ate 
II 
for the game but fai l to update it correctly. If, however, games are mainl y coded as 
ch unks, interference and pair errors shou ld be more frequent , as an entire chunk 
may be incorrectly assigned to a game. Errors of omi ssion wo uld reflect more the 
difficulty of the task, and wou ld not differentiate between these two hypotheses. 
Figure 5.3 shows that errors of omission and en'ors of the same game are the more 
freq uent , thus supporting the presence of templates . 
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5.4.3. Discussion 
Five main results were found in the second experiment : (a) even though the 
ski ll difference between groups was reduced in comparison to the first experiment 
(from 308 to 260 in national rating) , there was a si gnificant Skill effect 
(expected ly, the effect was smaller) ; (b) in the contro l conditi on. masters 
performed 'Norse than in the same condition of Experiment 1 ; (c) in compari on to 
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experiment 1, the interaction Depth x Skill has disappeared; (d), there \vas an 
Interference effect: both Interference conditions differed from the control 
condition, but there was no difference between them; and (e) the presence of 
templates was supported by an analysis of the types of errors made during 
reconstructi on. 
The first finding has been already explained in the discussion of experiment 
1. The second finding is due to the fact that the reconstruction phase after lOp I y 
was eliminated. It is likely that the reconstruction at that stage helped participants 
to memorize the game, an opportunity that was not present in experiment 2. The 
lack of interaction can also be explained easily with the elimination of the 
reconstruction task at ply 10. Indeed, the pattern of results in experiment 2 for the 
reconstruction of the positions after 30 and 50 ply is similar to that in experiment 
1. 
The most important finding is that both interference conditions had a 
reliable effect, unlike in experiment 1. Somewhat surprisingly, the condition with 
only 5 different interference positions impaired performance as much as the 
condition with 50 different interference positions. These results support the second 
hypothesis -chess players use the board's percept as a perceptual aid to refresh 
the positions of the game they are following mentally. In the second experiment, 
unlike in the first, interference positions were varied enough to impair players' 
performance. It was hypothesised that the novelty of the irrelevant pieces would 
make it hard to avoid processing them. However, although novelty did cause a 
decrement in performance, larger amounts of novelty did not cause larger 
impairment. This result will be addressed in the general discussion. Finally, the 
analysis of errors provided direct support for the construct of templates. 
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5.4.4. Subjects' strategies and the role of study time 
Given the complexity of the task, it is likely that players developed 
strategies to memorize games. Infonnal comments indicate that there are several 
moments during which players engage in visual rehearsal. One such moment is 
after the presentation of each move, when, according to the template theory, the 
new position is updated in the mind's eye. Another such moment is before the 
shifting between the games. Reports also indicate that, as soon as the game moves 
further away from the initial position, it becomes harder to update. This is in line 
with template theory's prediction that middlegame positions are harder to 
categorize, and hence are less likely to activate a template. The difficulty in 
updating creates a time pressure: participants have to choose between either 
continuing rehearsing while the next move is presented, or quitting rehearsing and 
focusing on the next move. As a consequence, according to the template theory, 
the image in the mind's eye decays and becomes subject to errors. This general 
mechanism is also supported by the fact that, in the control condition of the second 
experiment, there was an impainnent in performance as compared with the control 
condition in the first experiment. The difference was that players had to reconstruct 
the position after 10 ply in the first experiment, but not in the second. After having 
reconstructed the position, participants spent additional time studying the position 
before moving to the reconstruction of the second game or to the continuation of 
the presentation of moves. I believe that this study time, not available in the second 
experiment, allowed players to consolidate the L TM encoding of the game, and 
hence to obtain a better recall later. This explanation is consistent with that given 
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by Gobet and Simon (2000) to account for the role of presentation time in a recall 
task. 
5.5. General Discussion 
In the introduction of this chapter, it was shown how the template theory, a 
general theory of expertise, explains most of the data on blindfold chess available 
in the literature. It was also noted that the mind's eye is still underspecified in the 
theory. In order to shed light on this issue, two experiments were carried out, 
where chess games were presented visually, move by move, on a board that 
contained irrelevant information; this background information was either static, 
semi-static positions, or updated after every move. These experiments had the 
novelty of presenting interference patterns in the context of the stimuli and opened 
questions about the convergence of images generated by external input and images 
generated by internal processes. 
While the two experiments emphasized memory and involved only a small 
amount of problem solving, they required players to engage mechanisms that lie at 
the core of their expertise: the processing of (sequences of) moves. The results 
were consistent with the template theory. It was found that additional time to 
process moves led to better recall, a direct (but not surprising) prediction of the 
model. Another less obvious prediction was that the number of errors of the 'same' 
game type should be higher than the other errors of commission. Finally, as 
expected, depth had a reliable impact. 
Evidence that changes in the background may affect perforn1ance was 
obtained, and it was proposed that novelty processing may be at the core of this 
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phenomenon. Specifically, results showed that irrelevant information affects chess 
masters only when it changes during the presentation of the target game. This 
suggests that novel information is used by the mind's eye in the process of 
selecting incoming visual information and separating 'figure' and 'ground'. In the 
conditions used in experiment 1, the lack of novelty of the interference stimuli may 
have led to their inhibition. However, in the interference conditions of experiment 
2, the positions were changed, leading novelty-detection mechanisms to process 
them automatically. 
Applied to the present experiments, the template theory predicts that, at the 
beginning of a game, all players are able to access a template of the initial position. 
When the initial moves are dictated, players can access other templates linked to the 
current one, without the need to generate a visual image in the visual buffer. 
However, when no templates are available, which happens earlier in experts 
than in masters, it becomes necessary to maintain an image in the visual buffer. 
How does this affect performance? In the first experiment, the irrelevant perceptual 
information, not being novel, does not attract attention and does not cause 
interference. However, in the second experiment, the irrelevant incoming 
perceptual information is indeed novel. This causes interference in the visual buffer 
between information coming from the retina and the image of the position coming 
from LTM. 
5.6. Conel usion 
This chapter was aimed at progressing one of the purposes of this thesis. 
which is the gathering of data towards a theory of expertise. The template theory. 
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which has been chosen as a starting point was refined in order to account for the 
data available in blindfold chess. Then, two experiments were carried out to 
elucidate the role of expert knowledge in imagery and their results were explained 
using the template theory. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the acquisition aspects of expertise. This chapter is the 
first step in the investigation of the cognitive system from a functional level. This 
enterprise will continue in the next three chapters in which a non very well known 
methodological technique was implemented. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Cross-tasks study (1) 
The role of practice revisited 
6.1. Introduction 
The present and the following two chapters deal with a study whose 
methodological approach has been explained in chapter 3 (section 3.3). Gobet and 
Ritter (2000) suggested that individual data analysis, combined with individual data 
modelling, is the best methodological approach to develop a unified theory of 
cognition. The main characteristic of this methodological approach is the study of 
one individual-or a small number of participants analysed individually-in 
several tasks, and the use of these data to set parameters of a computer model, that 
in tum should simulate the human data. 
One of the purposes of this thesis is contributing towards the generation of a 
general theory of expertise; for that reason, I decided to utilise this methodological 
approach to study three relevant phenomena: practice, expert memory and expert 
thinking. This chapter revisits the practice issue, using a similar questionnaire to 
that of chapter 4; in the present study, looking at the covariation of amount of 
practice and Elo rating. Hence, this chapter also tackles the thesis stated in the 
introduction regarding extended practice as a necessary condition to attain expert 
performance. Chapters 6 and 7 will deal with the thesis about the factors unrelated 
to practice within the field of expertise. 
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As pointed out in chapter 2, Masunaga and Hom (2000, 2001) gaye 263 GO 
players domain-specific tasks and general tests. Their results were quite 
straightforward: there was an expertise effect in GO tasks, but no expertise effect 
whatsoever in the general tasks. This is in accord with previous chess studies that 
investigated visuo-spatial abilities or general intelligence (Djakow, Petrowski & 
Rudik, 1927; Waters, Gobet & Leyden, 2002). The only exception is Doll and 
Mayr's (1987) study, which found general intelligence differences between chess 
experts and non-players (paradoxically, no visuo-spatial differences were found). 
In this study, the idea of using domain-specific and general tasks was 
followed. However-as opposed to Masunaga and Hom-only 6 subjects were 
recruited in order to adhere to Gobet and Ritter's (2000) paradigm. Despite being a 
quite impressive and very well developed study, Masunaga and Hom's (2000, 
2001) work has a caveat. The traditional technique of aggregating data of several 
individuals loses much relevant information. Analysing data individually-like in 
the present study-allows one to follow the performance of the same participant in 
several tasks. 
For instance, one expert could have performed very well at general memory 
tasks and badly at a general speed of processing task, and the reverse could be true 
for another expert. Aggregating these data will show no differences with the 
general popUlation. Nonetheless, if the first expert is better than the second one in 
domain-specific memory tasks and the second one is better in domain-specific 
speed of processing task, this would have important consequences for the 
construction of a theory. In this case, the same level of expertise is achieved with 
different abilities (good memory in the first expert, speed of processing in the 
second). Any general theory of expertise should be able to account for this 
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phenomenon, which cannot be found with the traditional methodology. By looking 
at the individual differences, the experimenter can set, for instance. different values 
for memory capacity and speed of processing in two different models. 
The next section (6.2) deals with the methodological issues concerning the 
whole study, the following section (6.3) shows descriptive data of the participants 
by using the same questionnaire as chapter 4; finally, section 6.4 analyses the time 
spent studying and playing chess, in a longitudinal way. 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
Six healthy right-handed participants signed a consent form and took part in 
the study (1 grandmaster, 1 international master, 1 expert, 1 class B player and 2 
non-chess players; the note in chapter 1, page 5 explains these classifications). The 
grandmaster (GM) had 2550 ELO and was 21 years of age, the international master 
(IM) had an ELO of2500 and his age was 22 (both of them were Spanish 
speakers). The expert (EX) was 19 years old and his ELO was 2100, the class B 
player (CB) was also 19 years old and he was internationally un-rated (for 
comparative purposes his national rating was transformed into 1750 ELO). One of 
the non-players (N1) was 22 years old and the other (N2) 21 years old. Both of 
them knew the laws of chess but they had never played seriously (the last four 
participants were English speakers). Not all of the participants performed all the 
tasks insofar as some tasks required chess knowledge in order to be performed 
(non-players did not participate in these tasks). Furthermore, the third f'vlRI 
experiment, which is part of this study, was can'ied out only by the two masters. 
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6.2.2. Tasks 
In this study, participants went through numerous tasks. In the following 
chapters memory and thinking tasks will be considered. This chapter deals with a 
questionnaire (similar to the one used in chapter 4) administered to the participants. 
The non-players only responded to questions not related to chess. Section 6.3 is 
devoted to the descriptive data and section 6.4 to the issue of practice. 
6.3. Descriptive data 
The 6 subjects filled in the questionnaire presented in chapter 4. There was 
a slight difference, however. In the study presented in chapter 4 the grid that the 
players filled in had the two following items: 'number of hours per week spent 
studying alone' and 'number of hours per week spent studying or playing with 
others'. In the present study the items were: 'number of hours per week studying' 
and 'number of hours per week playing'. The change in the questions was effected 
because an important number of the players that filled in the questionnaire in 
chapter 4 told the researcher that they considered the text 'studying alone' as 
'studying', and the text 'studying and playing with others' mostly as 'playing'. 
Obviously, the non-players only filled in the few questions not related to chess. 
Table 8.1 shows the descriptive data. 
Since most of the questions were related to chess, the data of the non-
players is not displayed in the table. N1 was a 22-year-old student and his score in 
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory was 46 (right-handed), whereas N2 was a 21-
year-old student who scored 50 (right-handed) in the same inventory. 
1 2 ~ ~
Table 6.1. Descriptive data 
GM 1M EX CB 
Age 21 22 19 19 
Profession chess player chess player student student 
Handedness Right (44) Right (46) Right (48) Right (43) 
Rating 2550 2500 2100 1750 
Starting age 6 8 8 8 
Seriously age 10 11 11 13 
Club age 12 11 11 17 
Individual coaching 5 5 0 0 
Group coaching 6 2 3 0 
Books 30 15 6 0 
Blindfold playing no no yes no 
Blindfold reading no no yes no 
Chess base yes yes yes no 
Chess program no no yes yes 
Rapid games 20 20 2 5 
Cumulative study 6890 7904 1872 416 
Cumulative play 7722 7072 2704 1326 
Cumulative study (19) 4550 4836 1872 416 
Cumulative play (19) 6006 4888 2704 1326 
Last year study 1144 728 52 52 
Last year play 884 936 208 104 
Note. In handedness the number between brackets indicates the score in the Edinburgh 
handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Starting age = age at which the players learnt how to 
play chess; Seriously age = age at which the chess player started to play seriously; Club age = 
age at which the chess player joined a chess club; Individual coaching and Group coaching = 
years of individual and group coaching received; Books = number of books owned; Blindfold 
playing = whether the player plays blindfold games; Blind reading = whether the player 
reads games without using the chessboard; Chess base = whether the player uses a chess base 
to study; Chess program = whether the player uses a chess software to play games against; 
Rapid game = number of rapid games per week played in the last year; Cumulative study = 
cumulative number of hours studied; Cumulative play = cumulative number of hours played: 
Cumulative study (19) = cumulative study until 19 years of age; Cumulative play (19) = 
cumulative play until 19 years of age; Last year study and Last year play = number of hours 
studying and playing in the last year. 
The data presented in table 8.1 is quite consistent with the results reported 
in chapter 4. Although the low number of subjects in this study does not allow the 
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use of correlation analysis (the number of subjects is lower than the number of 
variables to correlate), some of the variables show very marked differences 
between the top-class players and the intermediate players. Regarding the critical 
period measures, in chapter 4 the variable that explained most of the variance \\"as 
age of starting to play chess seriously. In this study, the data show the same 
tendency. In chapter 4, unlike Charness et al. (1996), it was found that coaching 
was indeed important. The present study shows exactly the same result; altogether, 
masters clearly spent more years being coached than the intermediate players, \\'ith 
individual coaching being the most important of the two variables. As in Charness 
et al. (1996) and in chapter 4, the number of books owned is a good predictor of 
chess skill. Surprisingly, the number of books owned is quite low in the top-class 
players, especially the international master (possibly, chess data bases are replacing 
books as the means to acquire relevant information). 
Consistent with the data of chapter 4, the masters in this study reported 
neither blindfold playing nor blindfold reading. Since chapter 5 directly measured 
skill differences in a blindfold chess task, an attempt to link the two results can be 
employed. In chapter 5, the masters performed better than the experts; however, 
neither in the questionnaire of chapter 4 nor in the present one was there a skill 
effect in using blindfold training techniques. A possible explanation is that the 
ability to play blindfold chess or to perform blindfold chess tasks is acquired 
implicitly through the practice of plain-view chess. This does not rule out the 
possibility of developing specific techniques to improve blindfold chess playing 
(see Fine, 1965). The same rationale can be applied to the well-established skill 
effect in the reconstruction of chess game positions (see chapter 2, sub-section 
2.3.1.2.3); in short, this skill is not acquired by deliberate practice of reconstructing 
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positions, but implicitly as the masters play chess. As with blindfold chess, the skill 
in reconstructing positions could be specifically trained (see Gobet & Jackson. 
2001; Gobet & Simon, 1996a). 
The masters' use of software follows the same pattern as in chapter 4. Top-
class players use computers to study via chess bases; however, they do not use 
software to play games. The number of rapid chess games played in the last year is 
proportional to chess skill. 
The pattern of cumulative hours of studying and playing followed the same 
pattern as in chapter 4. The change in the questions from 'studying alone' to 
'studying' and from 'studying and playing with others' to 'playing' did not cause 
differences with the results obtained in chapter 4. Taking this into account, I think 
that the way the questions were asked in this chapter is the correct one for further 
research. The reason why the table shows the cumulative hours of studying and 
playing until 19 is to control for the different age of the participants. This allows 
one to compare the time of dedication to chess in the same period of time. The 
results in this study are consistent with the data reported in chapter 4: there is a 
strong correlation between dedication to chess and chess rating, and both studying 
and playing are equally important. Finally, the time spent studying and playing in 
the last year is quite a good predictor of cumulative study or practice, as also found 
by Charness et al. (1996). Hence, for a quick screening this question could be 
revealing. 
6.4. Time spent playing and studying chess 
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The advantage of asking players their time spent studying and playing chess 
as a function of age is that it allows one to compare the time of dedication to chess 
of each player with their chess rating curve, which could also be reported as a 
function of age. Plotting these variables together, gives the possibility to observe 
patterns of covariation. Unfortunately, I did not have access to reliable national 
ratings; hence, only international rating (Elo) was used. This does not allow to 
inspection of the progress of chess skill in the early steps of the chess career. 
because international rating has a cut-off threshold. 
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Figure 6.1. Hours of playing as a function of age. 
Figure 6.1 plots the number of hours per week playing chess as a function 
of age. At the beginning (7 to 11 years of age), the amount of hours playing 
differentiates CB from the others, the former playing less than the latter. At the age 
of 12, the two masters increased their time playing, and at the age of 16 the 
difference with EX is quite remarkable. 1M displays a plateau from 15 to 2U: to a 
lesser extent the same applies for the GM (15 to 17). After that period, the latter 
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started to moderately increase playing chess until the present day. IM showed a 
large increase at the age of 21 and 22. 
Figure 6.2 depicts the number of hours studying chess as a function of age. 
The differentiation between the top-class players and EX in terms of playing 
behaviour started at the age of 12. In studying behaviour, at the same age. GM IS 
studying very little and at the same level as EX; whereas CB is not studying at all. 
GM begins to increase studying at the age of 15, reaching the level of 1M one year 
after. From 15 to 20 years of age, IM repeats the plateau of playing. On the other 
hand, GM regularly increases from 4 hours at the age of 14 to more than 20 hours 
at the age of 21. Finally, IM performs a large jump at the age of 21, repeating the 
pattern of playing; and at 22 he decreased the number of hours studying. 
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Figure 6.2. Hours of studying as a function of age. 
Figure 6.3 plots the chess rating curve as a function of age. As the earlier 
cut-off threshold used to be 2200, it is not possible to track the progress in chess 
skill before this level. The cut-off threshold has changed to 2000 and. last year. 
changed again to 1800. 1M entered the Elo rating \-ery high - 2350 - at the le\'el of a 
FIDE master (2300). In the following 3 years he lost 45 points. but in following 
two years he gained enough points to pass the international master !c\"el (1'+UO). 
reaching 2430, gaining about 45 points more in the following 3 years. G\1 entered 
the international rating at the same age as 1M (14 years old). with a lower ratinG 
b 
(2240). The pattern of progression is remarkably different from IM, inasmuch as 
his progress is quite linear, without a plateau. 
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Figure 6.3. Elo as a function of age. 
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Figure 6.4 shows the three sets of data presented in the three earlier figures, 
for the two top-class players. The left axis contains the Elo rating scales and the 
right axis shows the hours per week spent either studying or playing chess. The 
purpose of plotting the data this way is that it allows one to compare the relation of 
the variations of practising behaviour with that of the skill level. The patterns 
displayed by the two masters differ in some respects, but also share other features. 
From very early (10 years of age), 1M distributes his time approximately 
equally to playing and studying chess. At 13 years of age his studying time slightly 
1 "' "' 
.'. ' 
overtook his playing time, and both remain very close to each other for 9 years. 
with the exception of the age of 21 when IM tripled his study time. On the other 
hand, GM for a long time spent more time playing than studying. It was only at the 
age of 16 when something interesting happened. 
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Figure 6.4. Elo and practice time as a function of age. 
First, he equalised the time spent studying with that of playing, he also matched the 
studying time of 1M, and the same is true for their international rating. An 
interesting pattern emerges when comparing GM's increase in hours of studying 
with his international rating variation. From 14 years of age to 21 these t\yO 
variables appear to vary at the same rate. 
Clearly these two players show a quite different pattern of progress, \\ith 
GM playing much more than studying in his early ages and 1M studying as much as 
playing. Apparently, in order to reach 2200 (master leycl), it is not necessary to 
spend too much time studying, as playing seems the most important. Howe\-er. in 
order to cross the hurdle of 2300, studying seems vital. GM only crossed 2300 
when he studied more than 15 hours a week. Besides, IM reached international 
rating at 14 years of age with more than 2300 and by that time he was already 
studying 10 hours per week. 
It is worth noting that with the data presented in this chapter no causal 
directions can be assessed. Some open questions remain unanswered; for instance, 
regarding the striking correspondence of increase in chess skill and increase in 
study time in GM. Is the improvement in chess skill caused by augmenting the 
study time? or, is it that the increase of international rating is a positive re\yard that 
causes more time studying? In any case, it is not necessary to answer these 
questions in order to progress towards a general theory of expertise. The data 
gathered here is useful to insert parameters into the theory (chapter 11 tackles this 
issue). 
Summing up, as in chapter 4, the data gathered in this chapter comes from 
the administration of a questionnaire, and both sets of information are consistent 
with each other. Once again, extended time spent studying and playing chess seem 
to be a necessary condition to achieve high levels of expertise; whereas it does not 
seem to be a sufficient condition. Ericsson et al.'s (1993) deliberate practice 
framework cannot explain why at the age of 14 EX, with similar cumulative time 
of dedication to that of GM, did not reach the same level of GM. They might argue 
that EX's practice was not really deliberate, but in that case, deliberate practice 
could become a circular concept, impossible to falsify. 
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This chapter is the first part of the study carried out with the same 
participants. The following two chapters will move from the general aspects. and 
undertake the investigation of cognitive processes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Cross-tasks (2) 
Expert memory 
The previous chapter commenced the series of chapters which describe the 
studies carried out with two top-class chess players, two intennediate players, and 
two non-players. The present chapter and the following are related to the purpose 
of contributing towards a general theory of expertise. Besides, the thesis regarding 
the individual differences in non-practice factors that influence the acquisition of 
expert perfonnance, is also tackled. Essentially, in this chapter I inyestigated 
whether there are individual differences of perfonnance in general memory tasks, 
and whether these differences are replicated in domain-specific tasks. Furthennore, 
in the following chapter, it will be consider if a difference in general memory 
processes influences thinking processes. Ultimately, in chapter 11 the results of this 
chapter will be used in order to set quantitative parameters to a theory of 
expertise-CHRES T. 
As seen in chapter 2 (section 2.3.1.2.3), one of the most important findings 
in the chess psychology literature is the poor perfonnance of chess masters in the 
reconstruction of random positions from memory (see, Gobet 1996b for a meta-
analysis). This finding led to the conclusion that the skill of chess experts is quite 
modular and only related to the domain of expertise. In this chapter this issue is 
further investigated by analysing the results of chess players and non-chess players 
in a number of memory tasks with chess stimuli and non-chess stimuli. The results 
are analysed by looking at differences between chess players and non-chess 
1 ,-, _, i 
players, using an analysis which also takes into consideration indiYidual differences 
and the performance of the same participant in different tasks. 
The results are presented in three sections. The first (7.1) \\'ill be dedicated 
to 'delayed recall' tasks, the second (7.2) will be devoted to 'immediate recall' tasks 
, 
and the third (7.3) will deal with memory for sequences. The first two sections 
present tasks with static stimuli (e.g., chess game positions), as opposed to the third 
section, which deals with sequences (e.g., chess game moves). The usual 
segregation of short-term and long-term memory tasks is not used here, because, 
sometimes (if not always), tasks that require immediate recall are performed with 
the use of long-term storages. A common mistake in cognitive psychology is to 
confound the type of task with the cognitive structure thought to be engaged in that 
task. Therefore, in this chapter the labels 'short-term' and 'long-term' are used for 
hypothesised memory structures, and 'immediate recall' and 'delayed recall' are 
used for the type of tasks. 
7.1. Delayed recall 
In this section data are reported from tasks that required the recall of 
information after a delay of at least 30 minutes 1. The first subsection (7,1.1 ) 
presents a study in which the participants viewed a list of 250 stimuli and then went 
through 4 recognition test sessions (2 minutes after presentation, 6 hours after, 2.+ 
hours after, and 6 days after). The second subsection (7.l.2) deals with a delayed 
I In the first test of the first experiment, 30 minutes is a rough estimation, The first test \yas carried 
out two minutes after the presentation of the 250 stimuli. Since this presentation lasted about 50 
minutes, some of the stimuli in the test phase \\'ere Yle\wd less than 30 minutes before the test and 
others were presented more than 30 minutes before the test. 
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recall fMRI study, whose methodological detail will be discussed in chapter 9. In 
this chapter, the results of this study are considered in terms ofindiyidual 
differences and also for comparing the performance of the same participants in 
different tasks. 
7. 1. 1. Recognition of pictures and chess positions 
As mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2), the long-term memory capacity 
for visual stimuli, measured by recognition tasks, is very high. Indeed, Standing 
(1973) proposed that it is unlimited, based on the high performance of his 
participants in a recognition task of 10,000 pictures. On the other hand, Franken 
and Rowland (1979) showed a decrease in recall over time. Although in chess the 
most widely used way of measuring memory was the reconstruction task, some 
recognition experiments were also carried out by Goldin (1978, 1979). She found 
skill effects for the recognition of chess positions. 
In the present experiments, the six participants of the study were tested with 
pictures and chess positions in several sessions. The rationale of this investigation 
was to identify whether there is a relation in the chess players between their 
performance in recognition of pictures and that of recognition of chess positions. 
Moreover, the relation between chess skill and memory performance is considered. 
7.1.1.1 Procedure 
139 
This task had two sections, the first one for pictures and the second one for 
chess positions. In both sections there was a presentation phase in \\-hich 250 
pictures or chess positions were shown for 5 seconds. There were also 4 test 
sessions. In each test session 100 stimuli were presented, and for each one the 
participants had to decide whether the stimulus presented was part of the original 
list of 250 or not (50 old stimuli and 50 new stimuli were presented). 
The pictures were obtained on a website: www.freefoto.com and their size 
was 19.5 cm horizontal x 12.5 cm vertical. They were presented on a computer 
screen at a distance of 35 cm. Pictures were not explicitly selected to avoid 
similarities; however, a few very similar pictures were discarded. The size of the 
chess positions was 10 cm x 10 cm and they were also presented on a computer 
screen at a distance of 35 cm. All the positions were middle game positions 
In the case of pictures there were some technical problems that changed the 
number of pictures presented and the ratio old/new. In the presentation section 231 
pictures were presented, and the ratio old/new in the test sessions were 48/47 for 
test 1, 46/46 test 2, 49/47 test 3, and 42/52 for test 4. In the test phase subjects did 
not have a time limit. The first test session was performed two minutes after 
finishing the presentation session, test 2 was carried out 6 hours after the 
presentation, test 3 was executed 24 hours after presentation, and test 4 was carried 
out 6 days after presentation. 
7.1.1.2 Results 
Figure 7.1 shows the performance of the six participants in the recognition 
of pictures. Fifty per cent correct is performing at chance. Supporting Franken and 
1.+0 
Rowland's (1979) results, a clear impairment in performance could be observed in 
the present study. The average of the six participants was 86.49% in the first test 
, 
80.97% in the second, 77.08% in the third, dropping to 69.11 % in the last one. It is 
also interesting that GM performed better than the rest of the participants. The gap 
between GM and the others was 6.10% in the first test (91.57% to 85.47%),15% in 
the second (93.47% to 78.47%), 12.5% in the third (87.5% to 75%) and 11.53° ° in 
the last one (78.72 to 67.19%). Regarding IM, he performed at an average [eye!. 
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Figure 7.1. Accuracy for pictures. Test 1 = 2 minutes after the encoding 
phase test 2 = 6 hours after the encoding phase, test 3 = 24 hours after the 
encoding phase, test 4 = 6 days after the encoding phase. 50% is chance. 
It is interesting to investigate whether GM advantage over 1M in memory 
for pictures is also apparent for chess positions. Figure 7.2 plots the perfomlance 
for recognition of chess positions in terms of accuracy. 
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after the encoding phase, test 4 = 6 days after the encoding phase. 50% is 
chance. 
It is evident that non-chess players were not able to maintain in memory 
any chess position and the same applies for CB. All of them performed around 
chance. EX performed slightly better than chance around 60%. Even for the two 
top-class players the recognition of chess positions was difficult, and, in some of 
the sessions was even lower than that of the pictures. Table 7.1 shows a 
comparison between the performance for pictures and that of chess positions in 
GM and 1M. 
Table 7.1. Differences in accuracy between pictures and chess positions. 
1 2 3 4 
GM -0.43 6.47 5.5 11.72 
1M -5.69 -5 4.95 8.27 
Note. Negative sign means that accuracy for chess positions was higher than that for pictures. 
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IM's perfonnance is similar for chess positions and pictures. He did better 
for chess positions immediately and after 6 hours, but he was better for pictures 
after 24 hours delay and after 6 days. GM perfonned equally in the first test, being 
slightly better for pictures in trials 2 and 3, increasing this ad\"antage in the last 
trial. Ifwe took the scores for pictures as the limit of the memory system, it could 
be said that GM is not perfonning at his ceiling for chess positions and there is 
scope for him to improve his perfonnance. 
Table 7.2 depicts the differences between GM and IM for chess and 
pictures across the tests. GM and IM perfonn similarly immediately after the 
presentation session (probably a slight difference for pictures), GM does better in 
trial 2, much better in trial 3, and the difference diminishes in trial 4. It seems that 
GM's decrease in perfonnance is more moderate and starts later than that of 1M. 
Table 7.2. Differences in accuracy between GM vs. 1M. 
1 2 3 4 
Chess 1 7 13 4 
Pictures 5.26 18.47 13.55 7.45 
7.1.1.3 Discussion 
A number of results were uncovered in this experiment. First, a drop in 
accuracy was observed for all the participants in both conditions. Second, the 
perfonnance for pictures is much better than that for chess positions for the non-
players and the intennediate players, and moderately better in top-class players. 
Third, GM perfonned better than the rest of participants in pictures recognition, 
whereas IM perfonnance is quite standard. Fourth, GM perfonned better than 1\ f 
for chess positions after 6 and 24 hours delay but not immediately or after 6 days. 
The first result is in accord with Franken and Rowland's (1979) study in 
which there was a drop in perfonnance as a function of time. Regarding the second 
result, the better perfonnance for pictures than for chess positions in top-c lass 
players is not surprising insofar as they are not only experts in chess but also in the 
recognition of everyday objects; indeed, they are more experts in the latter than in 
the fonner. This argument will be expanded in chapter 10 (section 10.1) where I 
will discuss the proposal of Gauthier et al. (1999), who consider that the activation 
in the 'fusifonn face area' is not specific for faces but is due to the expertise that the 
lay person has in recognising faces. 
The third finding is revealing and is one of the aims of this set of 
experiments. GM showed a clear advantage over all the players. His performance is 
very good, although it is not exceptional. Following the innate talent vs deliberate 
practice debate of chapter 4, I suggest that in some cases the individual differences 
might exist not at differentiating between levels of expertise, but within the same 
level of expertise. GM's difference from 1M in tenns of chess rating is not high 
(about 50 points; also, they came joint first in their country's national tournament 
the same year as the experiment), although the perfonnance in this non-domain-
specific task was quite different. 
In chapter 11, I will address a different position on how the analysis of 
individual differences could be done. Essentially, it may be more informative to 
use the infonnation of the individual differences to set parameters, predict 
outcomes in experiments and model data using those parameters (s('c Gobet 8:. 
Ritter, 2000). In this case, a different decay rate of memory for each player should 
be set. 1M starting a steep decay somewhere between 30 minutes and 6 hours, and 
GM doing so somewhere between 1 and 6 days. 
7.1.2. Recognition of one's own and others' game positions 
The two top-class players participated in an fMRI study that had two 
purposes: first, investigating autobiographical memory, and second, finding 
individual differences in these two players in terms of behavioural and neural 
measures of memory. All the methodological details and the topic of 
autobiographical memory will be presented in chapter 9. In this section, the focus is 
on individual differences in behavioural performance and brain activity patterns. 
Briefly, the players went through a scanning session in which they saw 
positions belonging to their own games, positions belonging to other players' 
games and a control condition. The players were informed that they had to 
remember the positions because they would be tested on them at some point in the 
day, after the scanning session. After 4 hours they went through a recall task in 
which they were required to give information of the games they saw during the 
scanning session. An hour later, they performed a recognition/ownership task, in 
which new and old positions were presented and they had to decide for each 
position whether it was new or old and whether it was a position from one of their 
own games or not. 
7.1.2.1 Behavioural results 
1..+5 
In the recall task, GM recalled 83.58% of the total game positions presented 
in the scanning session four hours earlier. 1M also performed reasonably \\'ell 
- , 
though slightly worse than GM: 69.69%. In the recognition task, GM performed at 
97.74% (99.74% for own positions; 93.75% for other's positions); 1M performed 
again slightly worse at 94.28% (96.06% own; 89.58 others). Both players did \'cry 
well in assigning ownership; again GM did better: GM, 97.17% and 1M 89.140 ~ ) , ,
Since Standing (1973) used both recognition and recall measures, it was 
thought to be valuable to compare his results to the ones presented in this section. 
Standing (1973) compared recognition with recall of pictures shO\ving a 93.75% of 
accuracy in recognition and only 25.8% accuracy in recall. Several issues are worth 
noting. First, the recognition of positions of other players in the present experiment 
followed a similar pattern to that of Standing's (1973) participants. Second, the 
recognition of own positions in the present study was better than that of other 
players' positions. Third, the performance in the recall task was much higher in this 
study (25.8% in Standing, 1973; 83.58% and 69.69% in the top-class players). 
Thus, the first-hand experience with the stimuli increases the recall performance 
three-fold, closing the gap to the performance in recognition. The latter result is in 
agreement with Goldin (1978) who found that the level of processing of the to-be-
remembered chess stimuli affected performance (i.e., the deeper the processing the 
better the performance) 
The task in the present fMRI experiment was very similar to the one 
discussed in section 7.1.1 (5 seconds presentation of stimuli for later recall), The 
recognition test was performed five hours after the presentation (similar to the six 
hours delay in the first test of previous section). However, the perfonnancc \\'3S 
higher in the fMRI experiment. This could be easily explained by t\\'O factors. First. 
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the list of to-be-remembered stimuli in the fMRI study was smaller (around 90) and 
included quite familiar stimuli. Second, there was a large inter-stimulus interval in 
the fMRI experiment ( 13 seconds) that might have allowed the participants to 
engage in rehearsal. 
Despite these different paradigms, the differences between GM and 11\1 
remained intact. After 4 hours there is a clear difference in recall and 1 hour later 
there is a slight difference in recognition. 
7.1.2.2 Brain imaging results 
The voxel analysis in chapter 9 was carried out in order to find common 
patterns between the players; thus individual differences were not taken into 
account. In this section individual differences are considered. Interestingly, there 
are some differences in the number ofvoxels activated. GM displayed an activation 
of2702, 2190 and 771 voxels for the contrasts own> control, others> control, and 
own> others, respectively. 1M showed the following figures for the same contrasts: 
5138,2221, and 1237. It is apparent that 1M required more brain activity (and 
probably more effort2) than GM to perform 'own', but not for 'others'. 
7.1.2.3 Discussion 
Behavioural data in the fMRI experiment are in accord with the delayed-
recall study in section 7.1.1. GM performed better than 1M after .+ and 5 hours in 
the recall and recognition tasks respectively. A hint is provided that this difference 
2 Chapter 10 will address the issue of effort in terms of brain actiyity. 
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could have a neural correlate in the number ofvoxels activated for 'o\\"n'. This 
proposal is in agreement with the fMRI experiments in chapter 10, in \vhich chess 
players required less brain activity than non-chess players to perfonn the same task 
(i.e., the higher the effort, the greater amount of brain activity). 
7.2. Immediate recall 
Section 7.1 discussed memory experiments in which the test phase occurred 
at least 30 minutes after the presentation of the to-be-remembered stimuli. In this 
section, the focus moves to experiments in which the test phase follows 
immediately after the presentation of the stimulus or stimuli to be remembered. 
Both chess-related tasks and general memory tests will be considered. 
The first sub-section (7.2.1) deals with the popular reconstruction 
experiments that started with De Groot's (1946/1978) seminal work. Following the 
general idea of the present study, the reconstruction of nonnal positions is 
compared with the same task with stimuli in which the chess expertise is not 
involved. The standard random positions were used, but also in this study 'shape' 
positions were introduced (a similar version of this task was used in Schneider et 
aI., 1993). In the second section the opposite was done. A set of well-known 
memory tests - span of digits and letters - were carried out and the same task with 
chess stimuli was created. As was mentioned earlier, one goal of this study is to 
provide data in order to generate a general theory of expertise. Two important 
questions arise here: Do the patterns observed in delayed recall remain constant in 
an immediate recall task? Does perfonnance of players and non-players differ 
between chess stimuli and non-chess stimuli? 
7.2. 1. Reconstruction task 
Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.3.1.23), showed the relevance of the 
reconstruction task in psychology of expertise. As indicated earlier, a robust 
finding in the literature is that chess masters outperform chess novices in the 
reconstruction from memory of a game position. It was also mentioned that this 
effect almost disappears when random positions are presented instead. In this 
section the reconstruction task was presented in three versions: 'game', 'random' 
and 'shape'. 
7.2.1.1. Procedure 
Participants were presented with a chess position for 5 seconds, then the 
position disappeared, leaving a black screen; then, after a delay of 2 seconds, the 
participants had to reconstruct the position previously seen ('game' condition). The 
second condition is to present a position in which the location of the pieces of a 
game position is randomly assigned (,random' condition). 
The third condition was especially designed for this experiment; instead of 
using chess pieces, different types of shapes were utilised (e.g .. triangles, circles, 
rectangles), and with this type of presentation both random and normal positions 
were created ('shape-game' and 'shape-random' conditions). The positions for these 
conditions were prepared as follows: first, either a game position \yas chosen from 
a data base or a random position was generated, and then the chess pieces of the 
position were replaced by shapes in a way that it was not possible to match a 
particular shape to a particular chess piece (although black pieces \yere replaced by 
black shapes and white pieces by white shapes). For instance. there were more than 
one type of shapes that appeared 3 times (e.g., three triangles, and three squares), 
which is almost impossible in a chess position. 
In this study, accuracy and eye movements were recorded (though the evc 
movement data is not discussed in this thesis). Some of the trials within each 
condition were carried out with the eye-tracker, and some others without the eye-
tracker. Since the performance did not differ between the two research settings, the 
data were pooled together. 
There were 5 categories within the game condition: 'quiet', 'complex', 
'standard', 'gm' and 'im'. In the quiet positions, it is more likely to find familiar 
structures than in standard positions, and in these ones more than in thc complex 
positions; therefore, better performance is expected in the quiet condition, then in 
the standard condition and then in the complex condition. 'Gm' and 'im' positions 
belonged to games of each of the top players. As could be seen in section 7.l.2, the 
recognition of one's own games in the fMRI experiment was slightly better than the 
recognition of positions of other players. It is expected that the same pattern will 
appear here. 
The size of the chessboards in all the conditions \vas 10 em x 10 cm. and 
the stimuli were presented on a computer screen at a distance of 35 cm. The stimuli 
that were presented during the eye-tracking session, were bigger (13 cm x 13 cm) 
and the distance was also larger-50 em-leading to both settings being displayed 
at a similar visual angle (about 16° and 15° respecti\"ely'). The second column of 
lSI) 
table 8.4 shows the number of pieces used in the positions, and the second column 
of table 8.5 depicts the number of positions used in each condition. 
7.2.1.2 Results 
Table 7.3 shows the results as percentage correct. In accord with the 
literature, top-class players performed very well in the game condition (both 
players above 80%). Also, EX and CB performed according to their level (54°0 and 
47% respectively). Non-chess players performed below 20% as expected. Within 
the game category the results were as predicted. All the players reconstructed quiet 
positions better than the complex. GM recalled his positions better than 1M's 
positions and the contrary was also true for 1M. 
Regarding random positions, once again, the results matched those in the 
literature. Masters dropped from above 80% to just above 20%, but slightly better 
than the intermediate players (around 17%). This result is predicted by CHREST 
and consistent with the previous data (see Gobet & Simon, 1996b for a meta-
analysis). In the shape condition the expertise effect totally vanished, with the 
exception ofN2 who performed quite badly. 
Table 7.4 shows the same data but presented as total number of pieces 
correctly recalled, which is important because of the aim of setting parameters for 
cognitive functions. 
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Table 7.3. Reconstruction task. Percentage of pieces correctly placed in all 
the conditions. 
# pieces GM 1M EX CB N1 N2 
M (sd) M (sd) M (sd) M 
, .. -.. ~ , " " ... 
(sd) M (sd) M (sd) M (sd) 
Game 
25.47 (1.2) 83.17 (15.2) 85.04 (14.5) 54.39 (15.3) 46.91 (12.7) 18.13 (8.52) 13.83 (5.89) 
Quiet 
26 (0) 89.42 (8.52) 95.19 (3.68) 69.23 (17 .48) 59.62 (4.96) 19.23 (7.02) 15.38 (7.69) 
Complex 25.5 (0.57) 68.81 (20.34) 65.88 (14.45) 44.23 (8.84) 36.35 (13.25) 14.73 (3.9) 12.81 (5.98) 
Gm 
26 (0) 88.46 (11.32) 78.85 (8) 44.23 (11.1) 48.08 (10.18) 19.23 (8.3) 10.58 (1.92) 
1m 25.75 (0.5) 80.62 (9.85) 94.23 (9.15) 57.46 (13.26) 43.38 (14.92) 15.5 (4.31) 12.69 (8.1) 
Standard 24.4 (2.19) 87.7 (17.99) 90.16 (12.95) 48.36 (14.59) 46.72 (11.07) 21.31 (15.41) 17.21 (5.32) 
Random 25.11 (2.66) 21.7 (5.97) 19 (7.09) 17.7 (5.66) 15.5 (5.42) 11.9 (6.57) 13.7 (4.02) 
Shape 25.87 (0.35) 15.9 (3.83) 15.5 (10.1) 15 (8.12) 15 (5.6) 14.5 (4.48) 9.16 (5.8) 
Game 26 (0) 18.27 (3.65) 11.54 (13.65) 15.38 (3.11) 19.23 (3.11) 15.38 (5.42) 10.58 (4.8) 
Random 26.25 (0.5) 13.33 (2.17) 19.05 (3.08) 14.29 (11.77) 10.48 (3.61) 13.33 (3.81) 7.61 (7.04) 
Total 25.47 (1.55) 54.42 (34.43) 54.73 (36.2) 37.38 (22.65) 32.74 (18.85) 15.9 (7.73) 12.8 (5.65) 
Note. The second column represents the mean number of pieces with their 
standard deviations between brackets. M = Mean, (sd) = standard deviation. 
The reconstruction of around 4 pieces in the shape condition is in accord 
with the estimation of 4 items as the normal limit of visual short-term memory 
capacity (Cowan, 2000; Zhang & Simon). Masters' expert knowledge allO\\s them 
to increase capacity to around 5 items in the random task. over the intem1ediate 
players who still perform at around 4. In the game condition, both masters and 
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intermediate overcome the normal limit: above 20 items for the masters, around 1.3 
items for the intermediate players. 
Table 7.4: ~ e c o n s t r u c t i o n n task. Number of pieces correctly placed in all 
the condItIons. 
GM 1M EX CB N1 N2 
#pieces m sd M sd m sd m sd m sd m Sd 
Game 21 21.19 3.86 21.66 3.69 13.85 3.9 11.95 3.24 4.61 2.17 3.52 1.5 
Quiet 4 23.25 2.21 24.75 0.95 18 4.54 15.5 1.29 5 1.82 4 2 
Complex 4 17.5 5.06 16.75 3.4 11.25 2.06 9.25 3.3 3.750.953.25 1.5 
Gm 4 23 2.94 20.5 2.08 14 3.16 12.5 2.64 5 2.162.75 0.5 
1m 4 20.75 2.5 24.25 2.21 14.75 3.09 11.25 3.59 4 1.153.252.06 
Standard 5 21.4 4.39 22 3.16 11.8 3.56 11.4 2.7 5.2 3.76 4.2 1.3 
Random 9 5.44 1.5 4.77 1.78 4.44 1.42 3.88 1.36 3 1.65 3.44 1.01 
Shape 8 4.12 0.99 4 2.61 3.87 2.1 3.87 1.453.751.162.37 1.5 
Game 4 4.75 0.95 3 3.55 4 0.81 5 0.81 4 1.412.751.25 
Random 4 3.5 0.57 5 0.81 3.75 3.09 2.75 0.95 3.5 1 2 1.85 
Overall 38 13.86 8.77 13.94 9.22 9.52 5.77 8.34 4.8 4.05 1.97 3.26 1.44 
7.2.2. Measures of memory span 
The previous sub-section (7.2.1 ), replicated several results in the literature. 
A strong skill effect was found for the reconstruction of normal game positions, 
almost no differences between masters and intermediate players were found in the 
random condition, and no differences in any of the shape conditions. \loreover, no 
individual differences were detected between the two masters. The logical 
extension taken was to use general memory measures. Taking into account the 
previous results, there should not be a skill effect in the general memory measures 
either. 
In this section four measures of memory span were used: 'digit', 'letter', 
'chess' and 'spatial'. As pointed out in chapter 2 (see sub-section 2.3.1.2.1), digit 
and letter memory spans are extensively used in memory research, and they are 
part of intelligence tests (e.g. W AIS, Wechsler, 1939). For instance, it has been 
shown that the skill effect extant in the reconstruction of chess positions disappears 
when general memory measures are carried out (see Chi, 1978: Schneider et aI., 
1993). For this study, a spatial span was created, similar to the Corsi test (see Corsi, 
1972). Additionally, a memory span of chess symbols was also used. The four 
measures of memory span were of visual nature and two versions were presented: 
sequential and spatial. 
7.2.2.1 Procedure 
In this section a series of memory span measures were taken: 'letters', 
'digits', 'spatial' and 'chess'. For each type, a sequential and a simultaneous span 
were obtained. In all the measures a series of 2 items was presented; when the 
series finished, the participants had to say out loud or write down (see below) the 
sequence in the same order of presentation (in all the sequential spans), or from left 
to right (in all the simultaneous spans, except the spatial one). The items were 
visually presented on a computer screen at a rate of 1 item per second. For each 
participant a span was calculated as follows. If the participant gaye the correct 
sequence for the two-items list a new series of t\\'o items \\'as giycn. Ifhe did it 
correctly again, two series of three items were presented, then the number of items 
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increased until the participant failed to provide the correct sequence. In that case, 
the number of items of the previous sequence was that subject's memory span. An 
explanation of each measure is given below. 
Digit sequential. A sequence of digits was presented on a computer screen at a 
rate of 1 per second, starting with two items and then increasing until the 
participant failed. The participants had to say out loud the series of numbers in the 
same order as seen before. They were not allowed to give a group of numbers as a 
response (e.g., two hundred and eighty two was incorrect; two-eight-two was 
correct). 
Digit simultaneous. A string of digits was displayed on a computer screen for a 
time that varied as a function of the number of items in the string (one second for 
each item). When the display disappeared, the participants had to say out loud the 
string of numbers from beginning to end. The participants were not allowed to give 
a group of numbers as a response. 
Letter sequential. Same procedure as with digits sequential; the participants had to 
give the name of each letter individually. 
Letter simultaneous. Same procedure as with digit simultaneous; the participants 
had to give the name of each letter individually. 
Chess sequential. Same procedure as with letters sequential. Instead of letters, the 
symbol of chess pieces was presented on an empty background (i.e., no chessboard 
was displayed). The participants had to say out loud the name and colour of each 
piece. The non-players knew the names of the pieces. 
Chess simultaneous. Same procedure as in letter simultaneous. 
Spatial sequential. Spatial span consisted of a 5 x 5 grid in \\'hich a red square \\'as 
presented for one second in one of the cells of the grid. and then the square mO\'ed 
to another cell in which it stayed for one second, and so on. Each location of the 
square was in a different column, row and diagonal from the previous location. 
After the sequence was presented the participants had to write down a series of 
numbers on a blank grid. The cell in which the number was put indicated the 
location, and the actual number indicated the order. The task was to indicate the 
correct location and order of the squares shown in the sequence. 
Spatial simultaneous. A grid with sequential numbers (i.e., 1,2,3,4, ... ) \yas 
presented for the number of seconds equal to the number of digits on the grid. The 
task was to correctly place on a blank grid the digits displayed earlier. 
7.2.2.2 Results 
Figures 7.3 plots the results for the sequential span and figure 7.4 depicts 
the data for the simultaneous span. The perfonnance in the simultaneous span is 
better than that of the sequential spans for all the participants. In tenns of 
comparisons across levels of expertise no clear patterns of any effect could be 
found. All the participants look quite irregular across tasks; for that reason no 
strong effects are observed. 
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Figure 7.4. Simultaneous spans 
Probab ly, the only condition which showed a difference between chess 
p layers and non-chess players is the spatial task in both the sequenti al and the 
simultaneous versions. However, within chess players the directi on of the 
difference is not clear. In spatial sequential masters were slight ly better than 
intennedi ates, and the opposite is true for spatial simultaneous. 
A caveat of the study should be pointed out here. The t\\'O masters were 
Spanish speakers and the rest of participants were English speakers. Baddeley 
(1996) proposed that the capacity limit of working memory is specified by the 
number of items capable of being rehearsed within two seconds. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the number of syllables of the letters, digits and name of 
chess pieces presented in the tasks. The names of 11 out of 26 letters of the 
alphabet used have one more syllable in Spanish than in English, fiye out of the ten 
digits have one more syllable in Spanish, and three of the six chess pieces haye one 
more syllable in Spanish than in English. In the latter case the words for 'white' and 
'black'-which the participants had to say out loud for every chess piece- are also 
one syllable longer in Spanish. 
Therefore, it might be the case that the memory span of the chess masters 
were underestimated. Nonetheless, it does not seem that the digit and letter span 
would be higher in the masters than in the other participants, even controlling for 
this problem. On the other hand, it could considerably increase the span for chess 
pieces and equalise the intermediates in the simultaneous spatial span. 
7.2.3 Memory. Immediate recall. Conclusions 
Two popular tasks were used in this study. One is a well known paradigm 
to measure expert memory - the reconstruction task - and the other is a \yell 
established test to measure memory span. The results gathered in the chess 
literature were replicated, i. e., chess experts performed remarkably better than 
inten11ediate players in the game condition and the difference among them 
significantly reduced in the random condition. Nevertheless, there was still a small 
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difference in that case, as predicted by CHREST. This study also used the 
reconstruction of shapes, showing a lack of an expertise effect, eyen \\hen the 
shapes replaced game positions. The memory span task showed a yery irregular 
pattern, without consistent and clear differences. 
Overall, the results in the immediate recall experiments are in agreement 
with mainstream chess psychology: chess expertise is domain-specific (e.g., De 
Groot, 1946; Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1996a). It could be useful to 
investigate more deeply the spatial task to find out whether the expertise effect 
shown here is robust or not. 
7.3. Memory for chess game move sequences 
The previous sections (7.1 and 7.2) mainly discussed memory experiments 
with static stimuli: different types of chess stimuli, pictures, letters, digits and chess 
pieces. The non-static type of stimuli-in the task that measured sequential spatial 
span-was the only non-domain specific task which showed a tendency in favour 
of the chess players. A logical extension of these findings is to investigate memory 
for non-static stimuli in chess. There is no more natural material for a chess players 
than a sequence of chess game moves. Surprisingly, very little research has been 
done with chess game moves. In chapter 2 (section 2.3.1.2.3), only a handful of 
studies that presented sequences of moves could be found. Chase and Simon (1973) 
found a skill effect both for real games and random games. Furthermore, 
Saariluoma (1991) and Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) found the same effect in 
game and random legal moves presented blindfold, but not for random ilkgal 
moves. 
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In the present study, I investigated the perfonnance in memory for moYe 
sequences. Once again, a familiar condition for chess players was used, as well as 
two less familiar conditions. The participants were submitted to three conditions: 
'chess', 'draughts' and 'GO'. The three board games have in common the sequential 
aspect, i.e., white plays a move, which is followed by a black move, then a \\"hite 
one, and so on. Chess and draughts differ from GO in that the fonner two games 
start with an initial display of pieces on the board which changes gradually as the 
players move the pieces. In GO, the game starts with an empty board and players 
alternatively add pieces (called 'stones') to the board. Chess diverges from draughts 
in that there are six types of pieces with different movements, whereas in draughts 
there is only one type of piece. 
7.3.1. Procedure 
A sequence often chess moves (i.e., 10 white and 10 black; i.e., 20 plies), 
10 draughts moves, and 10 moves of a GO-like game were designed for this 
experiment. The chess moves were reproduced on a chessboard displayed on a 
computer screen at a rate of 7 seconds per move. After the sequence was fully 
presented, the participants had to reconstruct the sequence on a wooden 
chessboard. If they failed to reconstruct the whole sequence perfectly. the sequence 
was presented once again until they were able to perfonn the task correctly'. E\'en 
if the pmiicipants did not complete the full correct sequence after 6 trials the 
experiment was over. The chess moves sequence consisted of a \'ery odd opening. 
which is not in the repertoire of any serious player. 
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In the draughts condition the same procedure as chess \\as fo ll O\wd: 
draughts pieces were displayed on a chessboard on a computer screen and an odd 
opening was reproduced. The GO condition consisted of an empty chess board in 
which white and black circles were added sequentiall y (it should be pointed out 
that GO is not played on a chessboard, but in a 19 x 19 grid). The participants had 
to reconstruct on the chessboard the location of the circles in the correct order. 
For the p31iicipants the order of the tasks was: chess. draughts. and GO. 
After the participants went through the three conditions. the experimenter asked 
them for a description of how they performed the task and took notes of their 
comments. 
Figure 7.5. Examples of positions in each task. From left to right, 'chess', 
'draughts' and 'GO'. 
7.3.2. Results 
The scores for the three conditions were obtained as follows. The 
reconstruction of the correct move in the correct order was considered 0 erro rs: a 
correct move in an incorrect order was considered 1 error. and no 111 0\'e or an 
. twas COlls1'del"ed 2 errors The total poss ible num ber of errors \\ as -to ll1correc move . 
(i .e. , 2 x 20 moves). 
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Table 7.5 shows the number of trials needed by each participant in order to 
reconstruct the sequence perfectly. Figures 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8 plot the number of 
errors per trial in the chess, the draughts and the GO conditions respecti\·ely. 
Table 7.5. Trials to learn the sequence 
Chess Draughts Go 
GM 2 3 3 
1M 2 2 3 
EX 4 3 5 
CB 2 3 5 
N1 4 6 6 
N2 >6 >6 >6 
The results are somewhat surprising. The chess condition clearly 
differentiated chess players from non-chess players, but the difference between 
masters and intermediates is not so clear. There are clear differences between the 
top-class players and EX but no clear differences with CB were found. 
Figure 7.6. Errors per trial ill chess (111axi11111111=40) 
In the draughts condition there was again an expertise effect. Chess players 
are clearly better than non-chess players and a small difference could be obseryed 
between masters and intermediate players, especially in the number of errors of the 
first trial (see figure 7.7) 
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Figure 7.7. Errors per trial in draughts (max=40) 
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Figure 7.B. Errors per trial in GO (max=40) 
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Interestingly, in the GO condition the chess masters were better by far than 
the rest of the participants. Intermediate players were better than N2 but "ery slight 
differences could be observed with N1. 
7.3.3. Discussion 
The difference between chess players and non-chess players in memory for 
chess sequences is in no way surprising. The most likely explanation is that the 
experience of the chess players with this environment makes the task easier for 
them. CHREST predicts small differences in performance within chess players of 
different levels, since the sequence of moves presented is not logical (although 
legal) and no memory storage of this sequence is expected to exist in masters. 
However, as is the case in random positions, some significant moves and sequences 
of moves could have happened by chance, and that would put chess masters in a 
better position to perform the task. This is in agreement with Chase and Simon 
(1973) and Saariluoma (1991) who showed a skill effect with the presentation of 
real and random games. 
One possible explanation is that the knowledge of the topology of the board 
and the experience with a display of pieces changing location would lead to 
differences between chess players and non-chess players. This is what may have 
happened in draughts, although the differences were quite remarkable. Indeed, the 
difference between masters and non-players was larger in the draughts sequence 
than with the chess sequence (which is unexpected). The lack of knowledge of the 
topology of the board of the non-players also existed in chess. \\"hy did they do 
worse in the draughts condition? Non-players said that chess was easier because of 
the variation of pieces, whereas chess players mentioned they transformed the 
draughts moves into chess moves. 
In the GO condition, the overall performance was the worst of the three 
conditions. Surprisingly, the largest expertise effect was found in this task. which is 
the least domain-specific one. The four chess players stated they drew chess 
patten1s (e. g., knight moves), however the masters were much better than the 
intermediate. Non-players did not use a chess-like strategy. 
One possibility to explain these results is in terms of mnemonics. Chess 
players may have used their chess knowledge in order to store information in a 
more efficient way. For instance, Gobet and Simon (1 996a) trained an international 
master to improve his memory for multiple chess positions using the names of 
chess world champions as retrieval structures. 
Another possibility is that chess masters have an advantage in sequences 
displayed in space. This explanation is in agreement with the possible expertise 
effect in the only non-static, non-domain specific task considered in the previous 
section: sequential spatial span. The latter task was, indeed, very similar to the GO 
condition. However, there were no differences between masters and intermediate 
players in spatial span, but there were differences in the GO condition. 
Another important factor to take into account is time. Gobet and Simon 
(2000) showed that with an increase from 1 second to 10 seconds in presentation 
time, the performance in a reconstruction task reaches the highest expertise effect. 
This is apparent with chess game positions, but there is also a slight increase \\"ith 
random positions. The small difference observed in spatial span, which had a rate 
of 1 item per second, might increase if more time were allowed. In the present task 
there were 7 seconds per move; therefore, this additional time might have allm,-ed 
the expertise effect to arise. 
7.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter several memory tasks were presented. In the delayed recall 
tasks, GM showed a more moderate decay rate in the recognition of pictures than 
the rest of participants; this pattern was also observed for chess positions. This 
general memory advantage could be fundamental in the learning of chess openings. 
The immediate recall tasks did not show individual differences between masters. 
The reconstruction of chess game and random positions replicated the skill effect 
observed in previous studies. The lack of expertise effect in the reconstruction of 
shapes and digit and memory span is also consistent with previous literature. The 
only non-static, non-domain specific task-i.e., spatial sequential span-showed a 
tendency towards expertise effect. This result could be linked to the remarkable 
skill effect observed in the GO condition. 
In the search for individual differences in factors not related to domain-
specific practice, the methodological paradigm used in this study proved to be 
fruitful. Long-term memory forgetting rate seems to be smoother in GM than in the 
other participants. Furthermore, a tendency of the chess players to have a larger 
spatial memory span than that of the non-chess players has been also found. These 
results will be taken up again in chapter 11, when the estimation of \'alues for some 
parameters of a theory of expertise-CHREST-will be executed. 
CHAPTER 8 
Cross-tasks study (3) 
Expert thinking 
The previous chapter was devoted to memory aspects of the cross-tasks 
study. GM showed an advantage in the recognition of pictures, which is a general 
memory task. Would that give him an advantage in his thinking processes? The 
present chapter is dedicated to thinking and, at the end, an answer to this question 
will be given. Since thinking in chess requires a high level of chess knowledge, 
only the chess players participated in most of the tasks of this chapter. Therefore, 
the comparisons will be made between chess levels (masters vs intennediates), or 
between the two masters. 
In chapter 2 (sub-section 2.3.1.3) a brief introduction to problem solving 
was given, as well as a more thorough discussion of the studies concentrating on 
thinking processes in chess. Two approaches to studying thinking processes in 
chess were used. One group of researchers asked chess players to analyse a 
position, allowing them long thinking times (Chamess, 1981; De Groot, 
1946/1978; Holding, 1985; Newell & Simon, 1972). Another approach consisted of 
asking players to solve a problem giving them a short reflection time (e.g., 
Chamess et aI., 2001). A false contradiction arose in this field: search vs. pattern 
recognition. For instance, Holding (1985, 1992) stated that chunking theory 
overemphasised the role of pattern-recognition and that a theory stressing search 
processes was necessary. Gobet and Simon (1998) have already shown that both 
aspects are important and that, in fact, both are part of chm1king and template 
theory. 
In this chapter both pattern recognition and search are considered; in order 
to do so, four experiments were carried out. The first one (section 8.1) is an 
experiment especially designed for this study-'search'-in which eye mm"ement 
recordings and standard behavioural measures were obtained. This design allmys 
one to investigate the maintenance of information during looking-ahead search. 
The following section (8.2) is concerned with two experiments: quick problem 
solving and simple reaction times. The first one consists in giving the correct first 
move of a complex chess problem, in no more than 10 seconds; basically, pattern 
recognition is more important than search in this task, because no time for 
searching deeply is allowed (see, Calderwood et aI., 1988; Gobet & Simon, 1996c). 
The simple reaction time measure was obtained in order to find out whether the 
differences in performance in the quick problem solving task can be partly 
explained by general speed of information processing. In section 8.3 a series of 
think aloud protocols during a 30-minutes problem solving task was obtained. 
Depth of search, speed of search and the quantity of information generated were 
the variables investigated in this task. 
8.1. Search and maintenance 
There are some difficulties for the study of look-ahead search in chess. For 
instance, there is little control over the output produced by the participant and it is 
very difficult to design controlled experiments. The use of think out loud protocols 
is a very useful technique which provides valuable data (indeed, it occupies a large 
part of this chapter; see section 8.3); however, there is no control oyer the number 
of moves analysed by the player, his/her depth of search, the number of episodes 
investigated, and other variables. An attempt is made in this section to in\'estigate 
one aspect of look-ahead search: maintenance of the intermediate positions. 
In so doing, a new paradigm was introduced, which allows the experimenter 
to manipulate the depth of search, and measures the ability to maintain a position in 
mind. The pattern recognition processes of chess players operate not only over the 
percept, but also over positions maintained in the mind's eye (see Gobet, 1998b). It 
follows naturally that the maintenance of a chess position while looking-ahead is 
crucial, in order for the pattern recognition processes to operate over that 
information. 
With standard behavioural measures and eye movement data it was possible 
to measure the ability to maintain information in the mind. 
8. 1.1. Procedure 
The stimuli used in the experiment were presented on a computer screen. 
Two conditions were used: 'chess' and 'shape', and three games were presented per 
condition. Within each game there were three different phases: initial inspection, 
move presentation and test. The first one occurred at the beginning and it was 
clearly differentiated from the other phases. Move presentation and test phases 
were intermingled. Before explaining each phase, a description of the most 
important visual display of the experiment is provided. I will explain the chess 
condition and at the end I will mention the differences between it and the shape 
condition. 
Visual display. (see figure 8.1). Three objects were part of the visual display: (a) a 
chessboard displaying a position of a chess game (1-1-° x 1-1-° of \'isual angle), (b) a 
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grid of 16 columns x 9 rows, on the bottom of the screen (41 () hori zontal x 11 () 
vertical of visual angle) , and (c) a bluish 'test box' on the left-hand side (6° x 6° of 
visual angle). During each game, the chessboard always remai ned fix ed, onl y the 
infonnation presented on the grid and on the test box side squared \'ari ed . The 
numbers on the columns of the grid indicated the move number and the numbers of 
the rows identified the branch number (see below) . Within one branch there was a 
row for white moves and another for black moves. 
Initial inspection phase. Each game stm1ed with a text indicating the number of 
position (1 , 2, or 3) and the type of tri al ('chess' or 'shape'); this tex t was presented 
for 5 seconds ; after that, a fixation cross was presented for 5 seconds. 
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Figure 8.1. Display of the Search experiment (game conditio1l). Tlze grid 
(bottom) displayed the moves in algebraic notation. The positio11 (ce1ltre) 
remained static, which forced the players to follow the game me1ltally. Tlze 
square (left) was used for the test session. 
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Then, the visual display appeared and remained static for 20 seconds, which 
allowed the participants to inspect the chess game position displayed on the 
chessboard. 
Move presentation phase. When that 20-seconds period of time elapsed, a 
sequence of chess moves was presented on the grid in algebraic notation I . Each 
move was shown for three seconds. White moves were presented in red and bl ack 
moves in black. Since the position on the chessboard remained static , the players 
had to follow the sequence of moves in their mind . 
ITEST I 
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Figure 8.2. Test session. The grid becomes bluish and the square shows 
names of board squares. The players had to say out loud which piece was 
located in that square. 
I In the algebraic notation all the squares of the board have a name . This name is formed by a le tter 
followed by a number. The letter conesponds to the column (in figure 8.1, co luITm 'a' is the fir st 
starting from the left, and co lunm 'h' is the first starting from the right) , and the number indicates 
the row ('1' is the bottom ro w, '8' is the top row). The move is indicated by lI1cluding the symbol of 
the chess piece (e .g., cp for the queen ; alternative ly, the initial letter of the name of the pIece can be 
used- in this case: 'Q' for queen) fo llowed by the name of the origin square (e.g .. b2 ) and then the 
name of the destination square (e.g ., b7); a ll together : cp b2-b7, or Qb2-b7. Usua ll y. players use the 
sho rt form, which includes onl y the de stination square ( in thi s case. Qb7) . II the partIcipants in 
this s tud y were fa mili ar with the algebraic notatio n. 
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Test phase. At some point in the sequence of moves , the grid changed to a blui sh 
colour, indicating that a test phase had commenced (see figure 8.2) . In the test 
phase a series of six square names (e.g., 'd4') was presented on the 'test box' for 
three seconds. The players had to say out loud the name and colour of the piece (if 
any) they thought was on the square displayed in the 'test box'. In order to complete 
this task accurately they had to follow the sequence of moves presented on the grid 
(note that the position on the chess board remained static and did not displ ay the 
changes according to the moves displayed on the grid). Once the test phase 
finished, more moves were presented on the grid, star1ing from the latest stage. 
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Figure 8.3. Going backwards. Once they had reached positioll after move 
12, players had to come back to the position after move 6. Tlzey had to 
reconstruct that position (backwards), or a new brallclz started from there 
(backwards-forward). 
Forward, backward and new branch. These are not phases of the ex periment l2.fI 
se, they are part of the move presentation phase, but they also affect the tes t phase; 
that is why they are presented separately. The sequence of moves begins go ing 
forward from move 1, and a test phase happens as explained earlier (,forward test'). 
In some cases, an arrow indicated a shift to a previous position (figure 8.3 sho\\'s a 
shift from move 12 to move 6). Hence, the player had to 'mentally' go backwards to 
the position after move 6. In those situations two things could have happened: (a) a 
test phase started ('backward test') or (b) a new branch started. When (b) happened, 
a new sequence of moves-going forward again-was presented on the two rows 
underneath the ones that were used for the previous sequence. After a number of 
moves were presented, another test phase turned up ('new branch' test). 
Shape condition. The shape trials had the same structure as the chess trials (see 
figure 8.2 for a chessboard displaying a 'shape' position). There were two important 
differences. First, the pieces of a chess position were replaced by shapes which did 
not match the chess pieces. This was achieved by two means: using different 
frequencies for the shapes (e.g. among other shapes, 3 squares, and 3 circles of the 
same colour; it is not possible to find this frequency of types in almost any chess 
position, since the only type of piece with more than two is the pawn), and 
replacing the pieces in a random fashion (however, the colour was maintained). 
Second, in the move presentation phase, the moves were displayed in algebraic 
notation replacing a chess piece by a shape in the first term. Third, the moves 
represented were random moves and not chess legal moves; however, the length of 
the move (measured as the number of squares) matched the length of the chess 
moves on average. 
Eye fixations and shifts analyses. When analysing eye movements, the eye 
fixations during the initial inspection phase were eliminated. 
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8.1.2. Results 
8.1.2.1. Percentage correct 
Table 8.1 displays the overall data. Very revealing results emerged. First, as 
expected, the performance for chess is much better than that for shapes. Second, 
there is a clear expertise effect for chess. Third, the effect remained for shapes, but 
hugely diminished. Fourth, GM performed clearly better than IM. 
Table 8.1. Percentage correct. 
Chess Shape Total 
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
GM 84.38 22.33 34.38 28.85 59.38 37.01 
1M 67.71 33.04 26.04 28.52 46.88 35.91 
EX 42.71 31.60 19.79 13.90 31.25 26.69 
CB 23.96 21.05 21.88 19.92 22.92 20.19 
Note. sd = standard deviation. 
Figure 8.4 depicts the performance of the players in all the conditions. 
Except from CB, who performed at the same level in both conditions, in the chess 
condition, 'forward' was the test in which they performed better. However, in the 
shape condition there was not a clear advantage of any of the conditions. 1M 
displayed a symmetrical pattern for chess and shapes. In both tasks he performed 
worse in the backward condition. The players mentioned that in the new branch 
condition, sometimes they totally lost the position, but they memorised the last 
moves. This strategy improved their performance because some of the tests 
necessarily probed squares involved in the last movements. It is likely, then, that 
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the performance in the new branch condition was due to an artifact and that it does 
not reflect the maintenance of the image, which had been lost earlier. 
In the shape condition, both masters were better than the intermediate 
players in the forward tests . On the other hand, in shape-backward , 1M perfol1l1ed 
worse than the other players, and GM did not change his performance in 
comparison to chess- forward. 
1M had difficulties when he had to reinstate an image of a previo us step in 
the search path. On the other hand, GM seemed not to have troubles doing so. This 
difference could be related with the difference detected in the delayed recall tasks . 
An interesting comparison is whether 1M shows the same difficulty in the think 
aloud protocols (section 8.3) 
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Figure 8.4. Performance in all conditions. 
8.1.2.2. Eye-lTIOVement data 
I was interested in the number of eye shifts from the grid to the chessboard 
(vertical shifts) and the number of shifts from the bluish square to the chessboard 
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(horizontal shifts). The rationale is to investi gate whether the players needed to 
look at the board when the moves were displayed on the grid or they just follo\\ 'ed 
the game without using the board. The same rationale appli es for the horizonta l 
movements. 
Figure 8.5 depicts the horizontal (chessboard-test box) shi fts and the 
vertical (chessboard-grid) shifts for the game tri als. Figure 8.6 shows the same data 
for shapes. The number of shifts is independent of the number of fixations. A shi ft 
is considered when a participant is fixating on one of the three elements and after a 
non-detem1ined number of fixations the player stalis fixatin g on another element. 
The number of fixations that occur between the two objects does not matter for thi s 
analysis . 
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Figure 8.5. Vertical and horizonta l eye-movements in the chess c01lditioJl. 
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Figure 8.6. Vertical and horizontal eye movements ill the shape cO lufitioll. 
The purpose of the shift analyses depicted on fi gures 8.5 and 8.6 was to link 
this experiment to those of chapter 5 (see below). However, it is also interesting to 
analyse these results in another way. Comparing figures 8.5 and 8.6, the masters 
increased the number of shifts overall (53 8 to 74 1 for GM, and 762 to 93 1 to 1M); 
whereas the intenl1ediate players, if any, this showed a decrease (655 to 636 [or 
EX, and 553 to 488 for CB). It may be the case that masters , in the shape condition, 
tried to keep track of all the moves, and for that they perfomled more shifts to the 
board , because they were losing the position more than in the game condition . 
Whereas intemlediate players may have decided to focus on a handful on moves, 
so they fixated longer on each obj ect without wOITing about missing some moves. 
Table 8.2 shows the ratio shifts/tri als . This rati o is calculated in order to 
know how many shifts per trial are performed. In chapter 5, which showed two 
blindfold chess experiments, two hypotheses were put forward . First. pat1icipants 
needed to use the board to pick up the relevant in fom1ation but they did not usc it 
as an aid to follow the game in mind. Second, players looked at the board for both 
collecting the relevant information and as an aid to follow the game in their mind. 
In the present experiment the information to follow the game is gathered outside 
the chessboard (i.e., on the grid). Therefore, it is possible to disentangle the t\\'o 
hypotheses. If the players do not use the board as an aid to follow the game in 
mind, then no shifts (or only a few) grid-board are expected. Should they use the 
chessboard to follow the game, numerous shifts would be observed. 
Table 8.2. Ratio shifts/trials. 
Chess Shapes 
Board-square Board-grid Board-square Board-grid 
GM 1.35 1.18 1.57 1.86 
1M 1.86 1.71 2.29 2.08 
EX 1.57 1.50 1.34 1.60 
CB 1.43 1.18 1.61 0.75 
Note. The number of trials for board-square was 118 moves and the number trials of board-
grid was 96 tests. The ratio was calculated by this formula: Ratio = Shifts/(2*trials). If there is 
a shift from the grid to the board, there is a necessary shift from the board to the grid to carry 
on doing the task, that is why the division by 2 was performed. board-square = board to 
square shift, board-grid = board to grid shift. 
As can be seen in table 8.2 all the players carried out more than one shift 
per move. This result supports the hypothesis chosen in chapter 5, i. e., chess 
players use the chessboard to follow the game. The only clear pattern of this table 
is that more shifts are needed for shapes than for chess. 
Figure 8.7 plots the relationship between the total number of eye fixations 
throughout the whole experiment and the performance. 
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Figure S.S. Tota l number of fixations and errors in chess and shapes. 
The ski ll effect observed in the perfonnance (i . e. , perfonnance is a function 
of chess rating) is also apparent in the total number of fi xations. The more the total 
number of fixations , the higher the enor rate. Figure 8.8 discriminates chess tri als 
from shape trials. This figure clearly shows that there is an almost perfect linear 
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relation between number of fixations and performance in chess trials. In shapes 
there is also a clear relation between number of fixations and performance up to an 
80% error rate. Probably, there is a ceiling effect at an 80% error rate (i.e., paying 
attention only to the last moves allows participants to give correct responses to 
some of the tests). It is evident that players carried out nearly the same number of 
fixations for chess and shape, though the performance varied across tasks. 
Reingold et al. (2001) found fewer fixations in experts in comparison to 
novices in a simple check detection task, in which the former performed better than 
the latter. In the same article, Reingold et al. measured visual span. Chess experts 
showed a much higher visual span than intermediates and novices for chess game 
positions. However, in random positions the advantage totally disappeared. De 
Groot and Gobet (1996) and Reingold et al. (2001) proposed that experts acquire 
more information than novices within each fixation. In the present study, the fewer 
the fixations the better the performance. 
Previous studies have used only chessboards as stimuli, so if one wants to 
compare the number of fixations in this study to that of the previous ones, it is 
necessary to segregate the chessboard fixations from fixations outside it. 
Figure 8.9 plots the distribution of fixations throughout the three relevant 
elements (i.e., chessboard, grid, square) and the blank areas. Figure 8.10 illustrates 
the distribution of time fixating in each area. It is conspicuous that the fewer the 
total number of fixations, the fewer the fixations on the chessboard and the less the 
time spent fixating on the chessboard. This is true when we exclude CB from the 
analysis. It could be the case that CB was quite lost during the task (his overall 
performance and the lack of difference between chess and shape perfom1ances may 
reflect this), and thus was doing random eye-moyements at some periods. 
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The 'search and maintenance' experiment uncovered the following results. 
First, the performance on the task showed a remarkable skill effect in chess and a , 
small one in shape. Second, the ratio shifts/moves was higher than 1, suggesting 
that players used the chessboard to follow the game. Third, the total number of eye 
fixations in chess explains almost all of the variance of the performance. Fourth, in 
three of the four players fewer total fixations meant fewer errors and less time 
fixating on the chessboard. 
The first result was totally expected and is in agreement with CHREST and 
all the chess memory literature, which show a strong skill effect for game positions 
and a small effect for random positions. This result was obtained even though the 
shape task in the present study is not totally equivalent to a random position. In 
fact, the pattern of pieces corresponds to a chess game position. However, the 
grammar of chess is destroyed by changing the symbols used (geometrical shapes 
instead of chess-pieces symbols), as well as the frequency of types of symbols, 
randomising the location of shapes throughout the game pattern, and performing 
non-legal chess moves. The mere change of symbol did not cause impairment in 
performance in previous studies (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973; Saariluoma & 
Kalakoski, 1998), but the legality of the moves did (Saariluoma, 1991). In the 
second fMRI study of chapter 10, the role of the meaning triggered by the symbols 
that represent chess pieces is investigated. 
The second result sheds light on an open question from chapter 5 (first 
experiment). Do the players use the chessboard as an aid to follow a game 
mentally? It was proposed that they do, and some support was obtained with the 
results of the second experiment. The present study gives much stronger support to 
this hypothesis. All the players carried out more than 1 shift from the grid to the 
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board per move presented in the grid. This is good evidence that the participants 
made a shift to the board in each move; hence, they needed the board to follow the 
game in mind. 
The third and fourth findings are striking. Almost all of the variance in the 
game condition performance is explained by the number of fixations during the 
task (and to a lesser degree by chess rating). In this study no absolute fixation time 
measures were obtained (although relative time fixating has been presented in 
figure 8.10); however, the length of the experiment was the same for all 
participants. Hence, fewer fixations means higher fixation durations. De Groot and 
Gobet (1996) found shorter fixation durations in masters in a memory task. On the 
other hand, Reingold et al. (2001) and Chamess et al. (2001) found equal fixation 
durations for experts and novices in a check detection and a choose-the-best-move 
tasks respectively. 
Apparently, there is a disagreement in these studies and more confusion is 
added with the present result. However, in all the experiments, different tasks were 
used, in which different problems had to be solved. In the memory task, a short 
fixation is enough for the master to pick up the relevant information, so (s )he 
saccades to another location in order to cover the whole board. Time to cover the 
whole board is the main factor of this task, which otherwise is simple. Novices do 
longer fixations because they need more time to encode a chunk of chess pieces, 
causing the lack of coverage of the whole board (see coverage measures in De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996). 
In Reingold et al. (2001) players performed a check detection task in a :3 x 3 
square chessboard with only three pieces. Experts needed very few fixations 
(sometimes only the fixation in the centre of the board was sufficient) to co\'er the 
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whole board (in agreement with the finding that chess players have a larger visual 
span for chess position, Chamess et aI., 2001). Novices fixated on only one piece, 
used the same fixation time as experts and then fixated on another piece. In this 
task, experts did not need to hurry to cover the whole board, because one fixation 
was enough. Novices did not have time problems either, but with one fixation they 
did not obtain as much information as experts, therefore they had more fixations. 
The present study is the most complex of the three. Players had 20 seconds 
to inspect the initial position (this time was not included in the fixation analysis), 
then they had to pay attention to the sequence of moves on the grid and update the 
position. It was shown that the better the performance (and the chess level) the 
fewer the number of fixations on the chessboard. It is reasonable to think that, on 
occasions, the increasing number of fixations and time fixating on the board makes 
the participant miss some moves that are being presented on the grid; so the 
performance decreases. Since spending too much time fixating on the chessboard 
leads to a worse performance, why do participants do it? I propose that they need to 
do it because the memory of the previous position decays. The additional fixations 
are done to refresh the location of the pieces of the previous positions. When this 
fading does not occur (most of the time in GM) fewer fixations are needed on the 
board and the player comes back to the grid and spends more time there. 
8.2. Quick problem solving and reaction time 
The previous section (8.1) looked at one component of look-ahead search in 
chess: the maintenance of information. It showed a strong skill effect for a chess 
condition and a weaker skill effect for a shape condition. This section and the 
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following (8.3) are devoted to chess problem solving tasks in which a skill effect is 
expected. The present section focuses on another component of search: pattern 
recognition. Chess players had to solve a complex chess problem and they were 
allowed only 10 seconds for looking at the position and decide the best mo\'e. No 
time for deep search was available; therefore, pattern recognition procedures were 
the key to the task. 
In chapter 2 (section 2.3.1.3) it was stated that reducing reflection time 
impairs chess skill only slightly (see Calderwood et al., 1988; Gobet & Simon, 
1996c). Chamess et al. (2001) showed that experts were faster than novices at 
solving a simple chess problem and that the former performed fewer eye fixations 
than the latter. In this case, the problems used were quite simple, and they required 
only a few nodes to be solved. 
In the present experiment, complex chess problems from real chess games 
were obtained in Livshitz (1988). The rationale was to investigate how well the 
players do when the time constraints do not allow them to investigate the number 
of nodes required to solve the task. 
Following this experiment, a simple reaction time test was performed in 
order to identify whether the differences in quick problem solving are related to 
differences in general speed of processing. In a similar approach, Masunaga and 
Hom (2000,2001) found a skill effect in speed and reasoning in domain specific 
tasks but not in general ones. 
8.2. 1. Procedure 
Eye movements and accuracy were recorded in this task (the eye movement 
data are not reported in this thesis). A fixation cross was displayed on a computer 
screen for 1 second, then a position was presented for 5 seconds, followed by a 5 
second black screen before starting the next cycle. The positions presented were 
taken from real games and presented a typical chess problem 'white moves and 
wins', for which the players had to provide the correct first move out loud. The 
positions required some look-ahead search to be performed accurately. The limited 
time (5 seconds presentation of the position plus 5 seconds black screen) did not 
allow the players to perform serious look-ahead search; hence, pattern recognition 
procedures are vital. Forty-nine chess problems were selected from Livshitz 
(1988). This book entitled 'Test your chess IQ' contains different typical tactical 
themes; each of the positions selected corresponded to a different tactical theme. 
In the simple reaction time task, volunteers were presented with either a red 
or a yellow circle on a computer screen. They had to press the right button for red 
and the left button for yellow as fast and accurately as possible. Four blocks of 50 
trials were recorded. 
8.2.2. Results 
It was not surprising to find that performance showed a clear skill effect. 
GM gave the correct move in 23 of the 49 problems (46.94%), 1M followed with 
18 correct solutions (36.94%), EX with 4 correct (8.16%), and CB 2 correct 
(4.080/0). This result is in agreement with CHREST, which predicts strong skill 
effects when search mechanisms are minimal. 
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In the simple reaction time task (see table 8.3), no large differences could 
be found among the six participants. However, it is interesting to investigate 
whether the 30 ms difference in mean reaction time between GM and IM is robust. 
A two tailed t test using the 200 trials was performed, and the difference is highly 
significant (t(398) = 4.32; P < 0.001). For instance, in a 4-hour game a disparity of 
30 ms to perform a 400 ms process makes a 18 minutes difference in thinking time. 
In ten seconds (time allowed in the fast problem solving task) there are 750 ms 
differences in thinking time. 
Table 8.3. Reaction time (in milliseconds). 
S1 S2 S3 S4 Mean SD Accuracy 
GM 376 315 344 323 339 70 0.96 
1M 349 392 371 362 369 66 0.99 
EX 417 356 339 317 357 61 0.98 
CB 371 352 315 333 343 75 0.94 
N1 314 340 309 363 332 66 0.90 
N2 372 376 380 358 372 66 0.98 
Note. S1 to S4 = Session 1 to 4. 
It is worth noting that reaction times did not explain the strong skill effect 
observed in the quick problem-solving task. It is apparent that EX and CB's 
reaction times are slightly faster than IM's; however, IM performed far better than 
the intermediate players in the problem-solving task. Nonetheless, once again it is 
crucial to look at individual differences within the same level of expertise (GM \·s. 
1M). The slight, but significant, difference in mean reaction time between GM and 
1M might be related to the slight difference in the quick problem-solving task. In a 
few words, the long-ten11 memory patterns stored in long-tern1 memory \·ia 
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deliberate practice (e.g., similar number of hours were reported by GM and 1\1. and 
both of them largely differed from the other players; see chapter 6) might explain 
the large skill effects between levels of expertise, and speed of processing 
differences might explain small effects within the same level of expertise. 
8.2.3. Discussion 
The result obtained in the quick problem-solving experiment is in 
agreement with CHREST. Strong skill effects are observed even though the time 
available for searching ahead is minimal. With this time restriction, pattern-
recognition processes play the key role. Gobet and Simon (1996c) showed that 
world champion Garry Kasparov, whilst playing simultaneous games, maintained a 
strong grandmaster level, diminishing his strength very little. Given that this kind 
of playing condition hugely decreased the time available for looking-ahead search, 
Gobet and Simon (1996c) took this result as an important support of pattern 
recognition processes in chess playing. Furthermore, Calderwood et al. (1988) did 
not find large differences in the level of moves of games played on regular thinking 
conditions (2.25 min per move, on average) and rapid games (5 minutes for the 
whole game, or 6 seconds per move on average). 
Gobet and Jansen (in press) proposed that to increase depth of search in 
chess problem solving, it is better to increase the knowledge base than to increase 
the speed of search. The present reaction time results seem to agree with that 
proposal. There are apparently no differences in reaction times in the sample 
studied (43 ms was the gap between the fastest and the slowest). MoremTr, within 
the chess players there is no relation between reaction times and accuracy. It 
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follows that the largest difference in problem solving in this study (masters "s 
intermediates) is more related to their long-term memory patterns than to their 
speed. Nevertheless, assuming that faster reaction time leads to faster search, the 
small difference in performance in problem solving between GM and 1M, might be 
explained by the small difference observed in reaction times. In chapter 11 general 
speed of processing will be considered as a parameter to vary in a theory of 
expertise. 
B.3. Thinking aloud protocols 
In the previous section (8.2) chess problems with very little time for their 
solution were used. This type of situation happens in a real game when players are 
reaching the time limit and they have to play very fast, otherwise they would lose 
on time. Moreover, there is a discipline within chess--called 'blitz'-in which the 
time for the whole game is 10 minutes; hence, all the game is played under time 
pressure. However, in tournament games the normal thinking time is currently two 
hours per player for the whole game. Under the tournament time limit, during an 
important part of the game, players do not have to think under time pressure. 
In this section three problems were presented to the players and they had 30 
minutes to decide the move they would play should they be in a real game. During 
this reflection time, players had to say out loud their thoughts, and they were tape-
recorded. It is interesting to find out whether the individual differences observed in 
preceding experiments are reflected in a more naturalistic task. 
A review of this area of research has been already presented in chapter 2. 
One controversial issue in this field is depth of search. De Groot (19'+C) 1975) found 
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no reliable differences between the best grandmasters of the world and intermediate 
players in depth of search. Charness (1981) found a linear relati on between chess 
ski II and depth of search (0.5 ply) in mean depth of search and 1.5 plies in 
maximal depth, for each standard deviation of chess rating - i.e., 200 flO poi nts.) 
until the expert level. Saariluoma's (1990) data suggest that intelll ational masters 
and grandmasters sometimes search less than masters . Gobet (1 998b) using one of 
De Groot's positions found a 0.6 ply increase in mean depth of search per standard 
deviation. 
a) Black moves. b) White moves and wins . c) White moves and w in s. 
Figure 8.11. Positions used in the thinking out loud task. Position A was 
used by De Groot (1946) and corresponds to a position from the game 
Pannekoek-De Groot (1935). Position B is a problem created by Kasparyan 
(1939) and was presented in Roycroft (1972), and position C was obtained 
from Nunn (1999) and displays a position of the game Polugaevsky-Torre 
(1984). 
Gobet's (1998c) position, which is the position A in De Groot (1 94611978), 
needs only 9 ply to be solved. Therefore, the lack of the small skill effect in depth 
of search could be due to a ceiling effect. In the present study, three pos itions were 
chosen (see figure 8.11). The first was De Groot's position C, the second was an 
endgame, and the third was a middle-game position. De Groot's posit ion was 
chosen in order to make comparisons with his data . The endgame and middle-game 
190 
positions were especially chosen because they require deep search ahead to be 
solved. The fonner needs mainly wide search and the latter mainly deep search. 
Gobet (1997) presented a canonical model for search---called 'SEARCH'-
based on CHREST. SEARCH used some parameters based on CHREST, others 
were inferred from data, and other parameters were set arbitrarily. The model 
predicted that depth of search is a power function of the number of chunks in long-
tenn memory. Since the number of chunks in long-term memory is a good 
predictor of chess skill (see Gobet & Simon, 2000 for a comparison of CHREST 
with humans), depth of search might be a power function of chess skill. In the 
present study this prediction could be tested since there is a range of players from 
class B to grandmaster. 
8.3.1. Procedure 
In this experiment, think aloud protocols were obtained using a tape 
recorder. Three complex chess situations, which required a considerable amount of 
looking-ahead search and evaluation, were displayed to the players. They were 
required to put themselves in a tournament situation as if they were to move. Thirty 
minutes were allowed as maximum reflection time for each position. When the 
players had reached a decision, they had to literally play the move on the 
chessboard. Importantly, they were required to say out loud every thought that 
came to their mind while they were thinking (i.e., moves, plans, evaluations, or 
whatever they were thinking at the moment). 
The instructions for position A were different from those of the other 
positions. Since the first position used was the same as De Groot's (1946) position 
191 
C, and some comparisons were made between his protocols and those of this thesis 
, 
the same instruction as De Groot was used. Basically, the players were asked to say 
out loud their thoughts as if they were playing a game and it was their tum. They 
were encouraged not to inhibit thoughts that were irrelevant for the solution of the 
problem. Additionally, I asked the participants to give precise locations of the 
movements (e.g., instead of saying: 'rook moves there', players were encouraged to 
indicate the precise location: 'rook moves to e7'). 
Since this instruction might have obscured the differences in depth of 
search (i.e., players might chose a decent move but not try hard to find the best 
move), the two other positions were chosen because they have a unique solution 
that requires deep and wide search. In order to encourage the players to find that 
solution, I told them that there was a unique solution that they had to find. 
Although this addendum to De Groot's instructions causes a slight loss of 
ecological validity, it is advantageous inasmuch as it allows one to assess properly 
both depth of search and the size of exploration tree. 
Once the tapes with the protocols were obtained, they were transcribed and 
both problem behaviour graphs (see figure 8.12) and exploration tree graphs (see 
figure 8.13) were generated for each protocol, following Newell and Simon (1972). 
Three variables were of interest in this study: depth of search, speed of search, and 
quantity of information generated. Other variables were also considered, but less 
attention was paid to them. Below there is an explanation of each variable. 
Variables. a) Quality of move: Based on the annotations provided in the literature 
and my chess knowledge (Elo 2200) I gave a value from 1 (bad move) to 5 (the 
best move), to the moves chosen. b) Total time: time used until the move was 
played on the board. c) Number of nodes visited: in the problem beha\'iour is the 
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total number of plies generated; in the exploratory tree is the total number of plies 
generated without taking into account the repetitions. d) Number of nodes/minute: 
in both graphs is number of nodes visited divided by total time. e) Maximal depth 
(plies): number of plies of the largest episode's branch. d) Mean depth (plies): in 
the problem behaviour graph, sum of the depth of all the episodes divided by the 
number of episodes; in the exploration tree, sum of the depth of all the branches 
divided by the number of branches. e) Number of episodes: number of sequences 
of plies generated from a base of move. An episode con contain one or more 
branches. f) Number of base moves: number of first moves. g) Base moves per 
minute: number of base moves divided by total time. h) Immediate reinvestigation: 
generation of an episode with the same base move of the immediately precedent 
episode. i) Non-immediate reinvestigation: generation of an episode with the same 
base move of a previous episode (but not the immediately preceding one). j) Total 
reinvestigations: Non-immediate plus immediate reinvestigations. k) Branches: 
number of sequences generated from a ply which is not the base move, within an 
episode. 1) Branches per episode: Branches divided by number of episodes. m) 
Nodes per episode: number of nodes visited divided by number of episodes. n) 
Branches per minute: Branches divided total time. 
8.3.2. Results 
Figure 8.12 depicts an example of a protocol tree. Each number in the first 
column indicates an episode. The numbers in the rest of the columns are the moyes 
(grey columns = black moves; white columns = white moves). The mm"es are 
displayed in algebraic notation. Base moves are all the mo\'es in the first column. 
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1 1 ? 
1 Bxb4 Rxf6 
2 Bxb4 Rxf6 Rd3 
3 
4 f7 Rf6 
Ro1+ 
b3 
5 Bxb4 R01+ + 
Kb3 Be7 + 
Rxf6 Rd3 Rc6+ 
Rf1+ 
? 3 4 4 5 5 
Rc6+ Bc3 Kb3 -
6 Bxb4 Rxf6 Kc2 
7 Bxb4 Rxf6 Kc2 Rf2+ Bd2 
8 Bxb4 Rxf6 Kc2 Rf2+ Bd2 
9 Rf5 Ro1+ 
b3 
Kb3 Rf3+ + 
Rq1+Be1 Rxe1+Kd2 Re8 f7 Rf8 -
10 Rf5 Rq1 + Kc2 b3+ Kc3 
Kd3 
Kc3 b2 
11 Rf5 Rq1+ Kc2 b3+ Kd3 b2 
12 Bq5 b3 
Roe 
13 Bo5 b3 f7 
Rd2+ 
14 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka3 
Ka1 
b2 Rxb2+ + 
15 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 Rxq5 f8=Q Rq1 + Rd1 b2 Kd2 
Kc2 
16 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 Rxq5 
a3 
b2 + 
f7 Rxo5· f8=Q b2+ + 
Ro1 + Rd1 b2 Kc2 
17 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 b2 Rxb2 Rxo5 f8=Q Ro1+ Kd2 
18 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 f8=Q b2+ K b1=Q+ -
Rxb2 axb2+ Kd2 
19 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 Rc6+ + 
20 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 f8=Q b2+ Kd2 b1=N+ Kc2 
21 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 f8=Q b2+ Rxb2 axb2+ Kd2 
22 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 f8=Q b2+ Kd1 b1=Q Ke2 
23 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 Rd1 Rc6+ 
b2+ 
Rxo5 f8=Q + 
24 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 .. f7 a3 Rd1 b2+ Kc2 Ka2 f8=Q 
fi 
25 Bo5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 Rd1 Rc6+.Kd2+ Rd6+ [illeoal] 
Rc8 [illeoal] 
Rc6+ Kd2+ Ka2 f8=Q 
26 805 Ro8 
27 Bo5 b3 f7 
Rd2+ b2 + 
Ka3 f7 + 
28 805 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 :f7 Rc6+ 
b2+ Rxb2 
a3 Rd1 Ka2 ~ ~millel b2+ Kc2 
29 805 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 Rd1 Ka2 .f8=Q + 
30 805 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 Rc6+ Kd1 RcB 8f6+ Kb1 
b2 xb2 
Kb1 Rb2+ 
31 805 b3 + 
32 805 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 
Rc6+ Kd1 + 
33 Bo5 Ro8 Bh6 
34 805 Ro8 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 
35 805 ROB Rd2+ Ka3 + 
36 Bo5 ROB Rd2+ Ka1 f7 
Rc8 
37 805 Ro8 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 Rc8+ Rc2 Rf8 Bf6+ + 
Rxc2 Kxc2 b3 Kd2 
38 Bo5 Ro8 Rd2+ Ka3 
Kb3 
Ka3 
39 Bo5 RQB Rd2+ Ka3 f7 Rc8+ 
Rf8 Rf2 + 
f7 Rc8+ Rc2 + 
40 Bo5 Ro8 Rd2+ Kb3 f7 Rc8+ Kb1 83 £ 
,,-1"'. I / ~ " " " __ r'\. I/L. ... 
6 7 7 8 8 9 9 
Rxd1+ 
Rxd1 Qa3++ 
b1=Q Rxb1 Rxb1 Qa3+ 
+ 
Ro2+ + 
b1=Q 
Rxo5 Qa8+ + 
b1=Q Qa3+ Qa2+ 
8f6 Rxf6 (Qxf6+) Qb2+ = 
Rc6+ Kd2 Rd6+ + 
+ 
(Ka1) Rxb3+ + 
b2 Bf6+ Ka2 Bxb2 Kxb2 f8=Q a3 + 
19.+ 
a3 
42 Bq5 Rq8 Rd2+ Kb3 f7 
43 Bq5 Rq8 Rd2+ Kb3 f7 
RcS+ Kb1 RhS Bh6+ Rxh6 Rd3+ Kc4 Rf3 Rh1 + Kc2 b3+ Kd2 + 
Rc8+ Kb1 Rh8 Rd3+ Kc4 Rd1 a3 Rf1 + 
play Bq5 
Figure 8.12. Problem behaviour graph of 1M during position 2. '+' stands for 
'white is better', '-' stands for 'black is better', '£' stands for 'complex 
position', and '=' stands for 'equal position'. 
Every episode starts when a base move is visited. Sometimes, as in episode 
3, moves were not generated; that means that the player was performing a general 
evaluation of the position without mentioning any particular move. At the end of 
each branch, the players sometimes gave an evaluation of the position, which is 
represented by the signs "+", "_", "=", "£". They stand for 'white is better', 'black is 
better', 'equal position' and 'complex position', respectively. 
1 1 2 ? 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 >l >l 
1 Bq5 b3 Rd2+ Ka1 f7 a3 f8-0 b2+ Rxb2 axb2+ Kd2 b1-0 Bf6 Rxf6 (Oxf6+) Ob2+ -
2 Oa3+ Oa2+ 
3 Kd2 b1=N+ Kc2 Rxq5 Oa8+ + 
4 K b1=0+ -
5 Rd1 b2+ Kc2 Ka2 f8=0 Rc6+ Kd2 Rd6+ + 
6 Rc6+ Kd2+ Ka2 f8=0 + 
7 Rd6+ [illeqall 
8 Rc8 [illeqall 
9 Rxq5 f8=0 + 
10 Ka2 f8=0 + 
11 f7(ill) b2+ Kc2 
12 Rxq5 f8=0 Rq1 + Rd1 b2+ Kc2 Rxd1 Oa3++ 
13 b1=0 Rxb1 Rxb1 Oa3+ 
14 Kd2 Rxd1+ 
15 b2+ + 
16 b2 Rxb2 Rxq5 f8=0 Rq1+ Kd2 Rq2+ + 
17 Rc6+ Kd1 Rc8 Bf6+ Kb1 Rb2+ (Ka1) Rxb3+ + 
18 b2 xb2 
19 Ka3 .f7 + 
20 b2 Rxb2+ + 
21 Rq8 Rd2+ Kb3 ,f7 Rc8+ Kb1 Rh8 Bh6 Rxh6 Rd3+ Kc4 Rf3 Rh1+ Kc2 b3+ Kd2 
22 Rd3+ Kc4 Rd1 a3 Rf1 + 
23 Rf3 + 
24 a3 £ 
25 . Rc2 + 
26 Rf8 Rf2 + 
27 Ka1 f7 Rc8+ Rc2 Rxc2 Kxc2 b3 Kd2 b2 Bf6+ Ka2 Bxb2 Kxb2 f8=0 a3 + 
28 Rf8 Bf6+ + 
29 Bh6 
30 Bxb4 Rxf6 Kc2 Rf2+ Bd2 -
31 Rd3 Rc6+ Bc3 Kb3 
32 Rf1+ 
33 Kb3 Be7 + 
34 Rq1+ + 
35 Rf5 Rq1+ Kc2 b3+ Kd3 b2 
36 Kc3 b2 
37 Be1 Rxe1+ Kd2 ReS f7 Rf8 -
38 Kb3 Rf3+ + 
39 b3 
40 f7 b3 
41 Rq1+ 
42 Rf6 
Figure 8.13. Exploration tree of 1M in position 2. 
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Another way of generating a tree protocol is shown in figure 8.13 
('exploratory tree' in Newell & Simon, 1972). In this case, all the repetitions of 
moves were eliminated and the tree does not follow the temporal order of the 
protocol. With the exploratory tree, it is possible to analyse the real size of the tree 
generated by the player. 
Table 8.4. Performance of the four players in each position using the 
problem behaviour graph. 
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3* 
gm im ex cb gm im ex cb gm im ex 
Quality of moves 3 4 2 4 5 5 5 2 5 5 2 
Total time (min) 30 30 25.7 27.9 30 30 23 30 30 30 18.9 
#nodes visited 310 374 144 90 313 385 186 86 487 456 128 
Nodes/minute 10.33 12.46 5.61 3.22 10.4 12.8 8.09 2.87 16.2 15.2 6.78 
Maximal depth (plies) 17 25 12 12 19 18 21 9 39 28 20 
Mean depth (plies) 4.82 7.29 4.63 2.96 8.53 7.85 10.23 2.68 19 16.3 7.23 
#episodes 57 41 30 28 32 43 17 31 14 20 17 
#base moves 13 9 8 9 4 4 2 14 4 1 6 
Base moves/min 0.5 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.47 0.13 0.03 0.32 
Immediate reinvestig. 27 29 15 8 26 37 15 2 8 19 6 
Non-immed. reinvest. 15 3 5 11 2 1 0 11 2 0 5 
Total reinvestigations 42 32 20 19 28 38 15 13 10 19 11 
Branches 81 104 34 37 53 83 29 34 71 77 21 
Branches/episode 1.42 2.53 1.13 1.32 1.65 1.97 1.7 1.17 5.07 3.85 1.23 
Nodes/episode 5.44 9.12 4.8 3.21 9.78 8.95 10.9 2.77 34.8 22.8 7.53 
Note. *Due to a technical problem, CB's data for third position is not taken into account. 
Table 8.4 gives an overview of the results for each player in each position, 
using the problem behaviour graph as reference. The dependent variables that are 
of most interest in this thesis are depth (maximum, mean), speed of search (nodes 
per minute), and quantity of information generated (number of nodes visited, 
branches). 
Table 8.5. Performance using the exploratory tree. 
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3* 
gm im ex cb gm im ex cb gm im ex 
#branches 49 47 18 21 29 42 20 20 53 41 16 
#nodes visited 176 152 83 56 149 160 121 61 221 173 88 
Mean depth (plies) 6.18 9.91 6.38 3.71 9.48 8.4 11.2 3.55 21 15.3 8.18 
#branches/minute 1.63 1.57 0.7 0.75 0.97 1.4 0.87 0.67 1.77 1.37 0.85 
#nodes/minute 5.87 5.07 3.23 2 4.97 5.33 5.26 2.03 7.37 5.77 4.66 
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Table 8.5 offers another way of looking at the data. After eliminating all the 
moves repeated in the problem behaviour graph, an exploratory tree was generated 
(see figure 8.13). Some of the variables- e.g., mean depth- are more accurately 
measured using the exploratory tree. This kind of tree was used by Newell and 
Simon (1972) and informally by Kotov (1978). 
Table 8.6. Averaged performance of participants using the problem 
behaviour graph. 
qm im ex cb 
m sd m sd m sd m sd 
Quality of moves 4.33 1.15 4.66 0.57 3 1.73 3 1.41 
Total time (min) 30 0 30 0 22.51 3.41 28.95 1.48 
#nodes visited 370 101.3 405 44.51 152.7 29.96 88 2.82 
Nodes/min 12.33 4.1 13.5 1.67 6.77 1.23 3.16 0.25 
Max. depth (in plies) 25 12.17 23.67 5.13 17.67 4.93 10.5 2.12 
Mean depth (in plies) 13.77 7.4 10.48 5.04 7.36 2.8 2.82 0.19 
# of episodes 34.33 21.59 34.67 12.74 21.33 7.5 29.5 2.12 
# of base moves 7 5.19 4.66 4.04 5.33 3.05 11.5 3.53 
Base moves/min 0.13 0 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.39 0.1 
Immediate reinvestig. 20.33 10.69 28.33 9.01 12 5.19 5 4.24 
Non-immed reinvest. 6.33 7.5 1.33 1.52 3.33 2.88 11 0 
Total reinvestigations 26.67 16.04 29.67 9.71 15.33 4.5 16 4.24 
Branches 68.33 14.19 88 14.18 28 6.55 35.5 2.12 
Branches/episode 3.36 2.41 2.78 0.96 1.35 0.3 1.24 0.1 
Nodes/episode 16.67 15.84 13.63 7.94 7.75 3.07 2.99 0.3 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show the overview of the variables calculated from the 
problem behaviour graph and the exploratory tree, respectively. In both tables, the 
average of the three games is considered. 
Table 8.7. Averaged performance using the exploration tree. 
qm im ex cb 
m sd m sd m sd m sd 
Branches (non rep.) 43.67 12.86 43.33 3.21 18 2 20.5 0.7 
Nodes (non rep.) 182 36.37 161.7 10.6 97.33 20.65 58.5 3.53 
Mean depth (no rep.) 12.22 7.78 11.21 3.63 8.57 2.4 3.63 0.11 
Branches per minute 1.45 0.42 1.44 0.1 0.8 0.09 0.7 0.05 
Nodes per minute 6.06 1.21 5.38 0.35 4.38 1.04 2.01 0.02 
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8.3.2.1. Depth of search 
In all measures of depth there was a very strong linear relation with chess 
rating. Figure 8.14 shows the scatter-plots of mean depth of search and maximal 
depth of search as a function of chess rating showing the 11 data points. 
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Figure 8.14. Depth of search as a function of chess rating (all data 
points).A)Maximal depth (in plies); B) Mean depth (in plies). 
In order to compare the results of this study with those of Chamess (1981 ) 
and Gobet (1998b), mean depth and maximal depth were put into a regression 
formula. In both cases chess rating was used as predictor. The following linear 
relation was obtained predicting mean depth from chess rating: Mean depth = -
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18.23 + 0.012 * E10 (the coefficient for Elo is significant at .029 le\"el and the r2 
was .94). Mean depth of search increases 2.4 plies for each standard deviation of 
chess skill (200 Elo points). Linear relations of 0.5 and 0.6 plies per standard 
deviation were obtained by Charness (1981) and Gobet (1998b) respectively. 
However, Saariluoma (1990) found that international masters searched shallower 
than master players. The range ofElo in those studies was 1284 to 2004 in 
Charness (1981),1600 to 2450 in Gobet (1998b) and 1900 to 2500 in Saariluoma 
(1990). In the present study the range was 1750 to 2550. Chamess (1981) 
suggested that there might be a linear relation until the expert level and after that 
level there would not be any increase. Similarly, Gobet (1997) suggested that 
mean depth is a power law of chess skill, and the reason why linear relations were 
found was that the whole range of chess skill was not measured in the same 
experiment. Gobet (1997) tested this hypothesis with SEARCH and found a power 
function. 
The present study did not measure the whole range-as required by Gobet 
(1997)-but the linear relation obtained was much higher than that of the previous 
studies. Therefore, the present data suggest a linear relation between Elo and mean 
depth of search. 
Moreover, maximal depth showed even a stronger linear relation. The data 
was analysed in two ways. First, the maximal depth of each player was obtained 
(i.e., the maximal depth of search showed in any of the three games). With these 
data the following formula was obtained: Maximal depth = -38.45 + 0.028* Elo; r2 
= .88, P < 0.06. This implies a 5.6 plies increase per standard deviation. The higher 
value was obtained by GM with 39 plies. Although the relation is quite high it is 
not significant. However, taking the mean maximal depth of search of the three 
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positions the equation achieved was: Maximal depth = -19.96 + .017* Elo: r2 = .99, 
significant at 0.003 level). In this case the increase per standard deviation dropped 
to 3.4 plies. This is the way previous studies calculated maximal depth; Chamess 
(1981) found a l.5 ply increase per standard deviation and Gobet (1998b) did not 
find any skill effect. 
8.3.2.2. Speed of search 
There is also a strong skill effect in speed of search, measured by nodes 
generated per minute. Table 8.6 shows that GM generated 12.33 nodes per minute; 
1M 13.5; EX 6.77; and CB 3.16. Figure 8.15 depicts a scatter-plot with nodes per 
minute as a function of chess rating. De Groot (1946) and Gobet (1998b) found that 
masters searched faster than experts, and Gobet (1997) showed that the rate of 
search is a power function of the number of nodes in CHREST's long-term 
memory. On the other hand, Chamess (1981) did not find a skill effect. In those 
studies players did not search faster than 6 nodes per minute. However, Scurrah 
and Wagner's (1971) participant searched at around 10 nodes per minute. In the 
case of speed of search, the higher values of SEARCH are in agreement with GM 
and 1M speed, and EX and CB data are not very far from those predicted by 
SEARCH. Predicting chess rating from nodes per minute yields the following 
formula: Elo = 1664 + Nodes per minute*63.88 (r2 = .82, P < .001). 
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Figure 8.15. Speed of search (nodes per minute) as a function of chess rating 
(all data points). The data of the three positions are presented. CB's data 
points correspond to 1750 in the x-axis, EX's to 2100, 1M's to 2500, and 
GM's to 2550. 
8.3.2.3. Quantity of information generated 
Once again, a linear relation between total number of nodes visited and 
chess skill was found (GM 370 nodes; IM 405; EX 153; and CB 88). Figure 8.16 
depicts the scatter-plot of the data points of all the positions. In previous studies the 
number of nodes is usually smaller than those of the present thesis. There is only 
one exception, Scurrah and Wagner's (1971) class C player2 visited 328 nodes in 
one of the positions. The small number of nodes visited in De Groot (1946/1978) 
could be an artifact of the fact that he took notes to record players' protocols. 
However, Gobet (1998b) used a tape recorder and the values were similar to those 
of De Groot. The main reason for differences seems to be the type of position used. 
De Groot's position A requires only 9 plies to be solved, reducing the need to 
search longer. In the present study, two positions were specially selected because 
they required long trees of variations to be solved. 
2 Later it was discovered that this player was an expert (see Holding, 1985). 
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Figure 8.16. Quantity of information generated (number of nodes visited) as 
a function of chess rating. 
A difficulty arises when one wants to measure width of search from the 
problem behaviour graph. On the one hand, if one uses the number of episodes as a 
measure of width, the following could happen. A grandmaster could chose only 
one base move and search ahead from that move. He could spend the whole trial 
analysing this episode generating numerous branches, and never coming back to 
the base move; hence, there would have been only one episode, and his width 
would be low. However, this does not reflect the master's behaviour (i.e., he 
generated numerous branches and only one episode, which will be taken as his 
measure of width). On the other hand, if one uses number of branches as a measure 
of width, a weak player may produce several branches of the same move because 
he needs to come back to the initial position very often, so he would show a very 
wide tree of analysis, when in fact he is not searching wide at all. For these reasons, 
a tree without repetitions was designed (see the exploratory tree of figure 8.13 for 
an example). From the exploratory tree, a table with new data was obtained (see 
table 8.7). Masters generated more branches than the intennediate players. The 
number of nodes show the same effect as the one explained earlier (i.e., a strong 
skill effect). 
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8.3.2.4. Comparison with De Groot's (1946) position C. 
The first position of this study is De Groot's (1946) position C. Gobet 
(1998b) replicated the results obtained in De Groot's position A. It is interesting to 
find out if the results could be replicated in a more complex position. Basically, 
position C-unlike position A-does not have a unique solution. From the 
information provided in De Groot's book, I worked out the maximal depth, nodes 
per minutes, and the number of nodes visited, to have a measure of the three 
aspects analysed in the present study (depth of search, speed of search and quantity 
of information generated). Table 8.8 shows the data. Protocols from five players 
were obtained by De Groot: Euwe ('GMl', world champion, higher level than GM), 
Tartakower ('GM2', slightly better than GM), Cortlever ('1M 1 " same level as IM), 
Van Scheltinga ('1M2', same level as 1M), Roodzant (1938 Women's champion of 
The Netherlands; difficult to measure the level, probably somewhere between EX 
and 1M). 
Table 8.8. De Groot's position C data. 
Minutes Nodes visited Maximal depth Nodes per minute 
GM I 7 25 6 3.57 
GM 2 15 45 9 3 
1M 1 30 203 15 6.76 
1M2 21 88 14 4.l9 
Roodzant 20 24 4 1.2 
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There are clear differences between the data presented in table 8.8 and the 
data of the players of the present study (see table 8.4, position 1). All the players in 
this study spent more than 25 minutes. GM and 1M used the whole 30 minutes 
allowed and they would have continued if they have had more time. GM 1 and 
GM2 either did not try as hard as they could or they did not need more time to 
203 
reach a decision. Regarding the number of nodes, except from 1Ml, all the players 
visited less nodes than CB. In maximal depth there was an advantage for the 
players in the present study; GM and IM searched deeper than all the players in De 
Groot's study. Nodes per minute shows a similar pattern. Overall, players in this 
study searched more, deeper and faster than those of De Groot's study. 
Inspecting the protocols gives a hint that players in De Groot's study had 
difficulties in putting themselves in a tournament situation. In two of the five 
protocols, De Groot reminded the participants that they had to do so. Furthermore, 
there were many important factors of the position that were taken into account by 
GM and 1M that the players in De Groot's study did not notice. Even, M1 
overlooked a very rudimentary threat during the whole protocol. 
8.3.3. Discussion 
This study showed a linear relation between chess skill and depth of search, 
speed of search and quantity of information generated. Charness (1981) and Gobet 
(1998b) found a weak linear relation between chess skill and mean depth. Charness 
(1981) proposed that the linear function observed might be seen up to the expert 
level, and that beyond that level no increase in depth of search would be found. 
Gobet (1997) suggested that if the whole range of chess levels is tested a power 
function would be found. The latter presented a computer model which predicted a 
power function as well. The present data does not support the model inasmuch as a 
linear relation was found. 
Regarding speed of search (nodes visited per minute), SEARCH (Gobet, 
1997) predicts values similar to the ones found in the present study, especially at 
the higher levels. In comparison with the other human studies, the present one 
showed a stronger linear relation between speed of generation of moves \vith chess 
skill. Concerning the quantity of moves, a linear relation was also found, in 
contrast to previous studies. 
A relatively novel way of looking at the data was used in this study, i. e., 
the exclusion of the repeated moves in order to create an exploratory tree as 
opposed to a temporal one. No important changes in the patterns were found. The 
advantage of this procedure is that a good measure of width of search could be 
taken. In this study, a non-linear skill effect was found. 
De Groot's study was a pioneering one and emphasis was put on the 
qualitative analysis of the data, which is quite rich. Paradoxically-as mentioned 
by Gobet et al (in press)- most importance was given by later researchers to his 
quantitative analysis. The comparison in this sub-section shows that perhaps more 
caution should be observed when using De Groot's quantitative data. The 
conditions in which the protocols were obtained (some on a ship, others in a 
laboratory) might have affected the results obtained. 
It is worth noting that power functions fit the data obtained, even better 
than linear regression. However, that function is similar to the linear function and it 
does not reach an asymptote. Looking at the graphs in Gobet (1997, p. 307), it is 
evident that a power function with asymptote-and not any power function-was 
what Gobet proposed. 
8.4. General discussion 
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In the search task GM showed an advantage over 1M. That task measured 
maintenance of information during search. Not only did GM perform better than 
1M, but also 1M needed more grid-board eye shifts and more fixations over the 
chessboard than GM, which suggests a better maintenance ability for GM. Is that 
advantage apparent also in the think aloud problem solving tasks in which 
maintenance during search is vital? If this were the case, more reinvestigations in 
1M would be expected and higher depth in GM would be found. Briefly, if GM is 
better than 1M at maintaining the positions generated, then he is less likely to lose 
the positions generated; thus, he can carryon generating more positions. Regarding 
the reinvestigations, if 1M has problems at maintaining a position, then he is more 
likely to lose positions that were generated; hence, he needs to restart the variation 
from the base move. 
Indeed, GM had a higher mean depth (13.77 plies compared to 10.48 plies) 
and the maximal depth found was also much higher for GM ( 39 plies to 28 plies). 
However 1M did not show more reinvestigations than GM. It was apparent during 
the analysis of the protocols that 1M used a strategy suggested by the strong 
grandmaster Kotov (1978) in an influential book about chess training. 1M proposed 
to himself the candidate moves and then started analysing them one at a time. 
When he finished analysing one candidate move, he passed to a new one. This is 
also evident insofar as the ratio of immediate reinvestigations to non-immediate 
reinvestigations was much higher in 1M (21.3 to 3.21). GM acknowledged during 
the analysis of one of the positions that he was very disorganised. This better 
organisation of thinking 1M compensated GM's maintenance advantage, so 1M was 
slightly faster than GM. 
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8.5 Conclusions of the cross-tasks study 
A great variety of tasks and different techniques with a low number of 
participants were used in this study. This methodology was suggested by Gobet and 
Ritter (2000), who proposed to gather data and then to estimate parameters which 
would be useful to design computer models in order to test theories. In this chapter 
the data gathering was carried out, followed by the report and interpretation of the 
results. Furthermore, numerous connections among studies were done in order to 
explain one set of data in the light of previous results. 
The second step-estimation of values for some parameters-will be one of 
the sections of the general discussion in chapter 11. The third step-modelling the 
data-is beyond the scope of the present work. 
Table 8.9 gives a summary of all the experiments of chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
The information is summarised in three comparisons: GM vs 1M, masters vs 
intermediates, and chess players vs non-chess players. The information presented 
in the table will be used in conjunction with the previous experiments in order to 
estimate the value of some parameters of a general theory of expertise. As 
mentioned earlier, Template/CHREST will be used as a starting point. 
There was clear agreement in the psychology literature about the existence 
of a skill effect in the reconstruction paradigm and the decrease in the advantage 
between experts and novices in the reconstruction of random positions. On the 
other hand, De Groot (1946) failed to provide any difference in the macro-structure 
of a more natural chess tasks-think-aloud problem solving. In this study, I 
replicated previous findings in the reconstruction paradigm, and also I found a 
strong linear relation in all the parameters in the think-aloud problem solving task. 
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Table 8.9. Summary of cross-tasks study (chapters 6.7 and 8). Differences 
GM vs 1M, Masters vs Intermediate and Chess players vs Non-chess 
players. 
---, - - - - - - - - - - T ~ G M M ~ ~ M a s t - ; ; r ~ - ; ' s s-- --Chess players" "on 
Intermediate players 
1M started studying Hours playing, studying, 
earlier books. 
-Delayed recall GM better for pictures, only differences in chess only differences in chess 
and to a lesser extent in 
chess. 
slightly better at 
Strong effect for games, 
recognition 
-Immediate ~ o o differences 
recall. 
---I S",;;go,!;" foc .,m", 
small effect for random, small effect for random, no 
I Reconstruction. 
1----- ................. ~ J J___ .. I -Immediate 
I 
I no effect for shape. effect for shape. 
No differences Only spatial. 
-biff,;:en";in ,he;;;:- ----Ldif!;reno" io ,h,,,, 
recall. Span. 
l 
.............. \ .......... . .... _ ............. + ...... . I no differences Leaming 
! I draughts and GO T h i ; ~ k i ; ~ g H H I ~ S ; ; ~ ~ h h task ---t GM better performanc-;---I Better performance in 
! in both, fewer shifts and I both, fewer shifts and 
." .. ·-f- .. " .. " .. - ~ - - ~ - ~ - - ~ ~
-Quick problem 
solving/RT. 
L_ protocols. 
fixation on chessboard 
i GM advantage in 
j 
i performance. Only 30 
ms. faster in RT. 
nodes, slightly faster and 
better organised; = width. 
fixation on chessboard. 
Advantage in 
performance. No 
differences RT 
deeper, more nodes, 
faster, wider 
draughts and GO. 
No differences RT 
It was hypothesised that GM's better perfonnance in long-tenn memory for 
pictures may be reflected in other tasks. He also perfonned better than 1M in 
208 
recognition and recall of chess positions. In the search task and the quick problem 
solving, GM performed better than IM; and the same was true in the simple 
reaction task. However, no differences were found in the reconstruction paradigm. 
This could lead to a link between speed of processing and long-term memory (fast 
problem solving and delayed recall task) but not with immediate recall task. 
The advantage of GM in the search task was also reflected in the depth of 
search in the think out loud task. However, the better organisation of IM thinking 
made him slightly faster in the generation of moves, and equalised GM in the width 
of search. These results will be used to set values to parameters of memory, 
learning rates, fading of information in long-term memory-all of them primary 
cognitive processes-but also to meta-cognitive processes like organisation of 
thinking. 
In the next chapter, an fMRI study in which GM and 1M were the 
participants, is presented (a small part of the analysis was presented in the 
preceding chapter; sub-section 7.1.2). The aim of next chapter's study is to show 
how chess as a task environment is a powerful tool to investigate the phenomenon 
of autobiographical memory. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Brain imaging (1) 
Autobiographical memory 
Thus far, the studies reported in this thesis have investigated the cognitive 
aspects of expertise, imagery, memory and thinking. Studies in expertise have at 
least two purposes: the investigation of expertise per se, and the study of other 
psychological phenomena. The preceding experiments put more emphasis on the 
expertise side, while the experiments in this and the following chapter put more 
emphasis on the study of psychological phenomena. 
This chapter discusses the topic of autobiographical memory. As part of the 
cross-tasks study reported in chapters 6 to 8, GM and IM went through an fMRI 
experiment (see methodological issues in chapter 3, section 3.1). Part of the 
results-the ones focused on individual differences-were discussed on chapter 7. 
This chapter deals with the issues related to autobiographical memory and its 
neural basis. This study is a clear example of the use of expertise in order to study a 
psychological phenomenon; and, in so doing, it will be shown that chess is a 
powerful tool to study neural basis of autobiographical memory. The expertise 
issue will not be analysed in the whole chapter. 
In chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.2) a review of the theories, behavioural and brain 
imaging studies about autobiographical memory, has been provided. Only a 
handful of brain imaging studies was found, suggesting that the probing of this 
phenomenon using brain imaging techniques has enormous difficulties. In this 
chapter, a solution to these difficulties is presented using the chess masters' own 
uames as stimuli. The general methodological fMRI procedures have been 
b 
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extensively discussed in the methods chapter (section 3.1); hence, in this and the 
following chapter, I will only present the specific methodological aspects of each 
experiment. In this chapter and the following the interest is in the neural basis of 
memory and expertise. 
9.1 Overview of the experiment 
One of the problems in all of the autobiographical memory studies reviewed 
is that the researchers had to interview the participants in order to obtain 
infonnation about their lives (e.g., Fink et aI., 1996; Maguire & Mummery, 1999). 
With this procedure, the memory that has been investigated might have been 
affected, since it was rehearsed during the interview, therefore making the claims 
about memory age unsound. Alternatively, Conway's team (Conway et aI., 1999; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) used a cue word and asked participants to 
generate a memory of a personal event. The problem in this approach resides in the 
fact that sometimes the subjects could not retrieve any memory. Another caveat is 
that the manipulation of the memory age under the control of the participants, not 
the experimenter. 
There is no doubt that the studies reviewed above are an important 
contribution to memory research inasmuch as real-world memories - rather than 
laboratory-generated memories - were used, improving the ecological validity of 
the domain. For instance, it is already known that the correlation between clinical 
memory tests in patients with their every-day memory problems is rather low 
(Kapur & Pearson, 1983). Hence, efforts made in order to study more ecological 
.:: 1 1 
memories should be applauded. On the other hand, a usual caveat of improying 
ecological validity is the loss of control. 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the autobiographical memory 
experiments just reviewed, chess was used as a task environment in the present 
study. The advantages of using chess as a research setting were discussed earlier in 
the thesis (see chapter 1) and in many articles (e.g., Gobet & Simon, 2000). 
For this study, the use of Chess Base was fundamental. Two high-level 
chess players (one international grandmaster-GM-and one international 
master-1M) agreed to take part of this experiment as part of a series of 
experiments (see chapters 6 to 8). Once the participation of the players was agreed, 
I searched for their games on the data base. Chess Base provides numerous games 
of international players, with the name of the tournament, year, name of the 
opponent, and, of course, the moves of the game. This facility allowed me to 
generate stimuli from selected years using games that the two participants had 
played. Consequently, no previous interview was needed in order to generate the 
autobiographical stimuli. Moreover, the age of the memories was easily 
manipulated by choosing games played in different years. 
This study is aimed at finding the location of autobiographical memory 
processes in the brain, as well as attempting to find differential activation of 
memories of different ages. In so doing, the high ecological validity that 
characterises this field was maintained, and more control over the variables studied 
was obtained. 
9.2. Methods 
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9.2.1. Participants 
Two chess players took part in this experiment. One grandmaster of 2550 
ELO and 21 years of age and an international master of 2500 ELO and 22 years of 
age. Both of them were right-handed, and signed an informed consent and a safety 
form. Ethical regulations of the School of Psychology University ethical committee 
were followed in the experiment. 
9.2.2. Procedure 
Once the participants agreed to participate in the experiment, a set of games 
that they played in official tournaments (available in Chess Base) were chosen. 
With these games 67 stimuli were generated for the grandmaster and 66 for the 
international master (hereafter these position will be called 'own'). The stimuli 
consisted of chess positions with 26 +/-1 pieces on the board. The age of the games 
was manipulated in three groups: games played in the current year (2002), games 
played in 1999 and 2000, and games played in 1997 and 1996. Also, the result of 
the games (games won and games lost) and the colour with which they played 
(black or white) were manipulated. Twenty-four games played by grandmasters 
were also selected (henceforth, these positions will be called 'others'), and one 
stimulus of26 +/-1 pieces was generated for every game. Finally, a control 
stimulus ('control') was generated and was presented 24 times. Figure 9.1 depicts 
an example of each condition. 
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Figure 9.1. Stimuli used in the experiment. The first and secolld are 
examples of stimuli generated from games of the participallts or other 
players' games. The third is the control stimulus. It is evidellt that the 01ll1/ 
difference between the first type and second type of stimllii is the fact that 
one belongs to the participants' own games and the otlzer does HOt. 
9.2.3. Design 
During the scanning session, the participants saw chess positions which 
were on screen for 5 seconds, after viewing a fixation cross that was presented for 
13 seconds. Immediately before the scanning session, they were infoJl11ed th at at 
some time after the scanning session they would have to fill in a form with the 
gam es that they were able to remember, indicating opponent, year, tOllm ament. 
result and next move. Additionally, after the recall test they would ha\'e a 
recognition test in which they would have to detennine two things: if the po It1011 
presented was seen in the scanner and whether or not it is an own position . 
There were three phases in the study: presentation, recall test and 
recognition test. The presentation phase took place during the scanning session, and 
the other two phases occurred 4 and 5 hours after the end of the scanning session. 
In the presentation session, GM was presented with 115 positions (67 own, 24 
others, 24 control), and 1M with 114 positions (66 own. 24 others, 24 control). 
Table 9.1 shows the number of own positions used in each variable for each player 
during the scanning session. 
Table 9.1. Number of positions used in each variable. Left hand side = 
GM. Right hand side = 1M. 
/ , , . " : ' ; W . w ' « / , / / ~ W N » " / h " , 7 / # " ' ' ' ' ~ / _ ' ' ' . w . « W . - » w . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' / / ' ' ' ' / # ' ' ' / ' ' · » Y < · Y ' ' ' ' ' / ' ' · ' ' ' . « w / . , , 0 " / . . , , . .. . ,,..,,.«=_" 
Age Colour Result Number Age Colour Result Number 
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New White Win 6 New White Win 6 
Loss 3 Loss 4 
Black Win 6 Black Win 6 
Loss 5 Loss 6 
Total 20 Total ." 
Intermediate. White Win 6 Intermediate. White Win 6 
Loss 5 Loss 2 
Black Win 6 Black Win 6 
Loss 6 Loss 6 
Total 23 Total 20 
Old White Win 6 Old White Win 6 
Loss 6 Loss 6 
Black Win 6 Black Win 6 
Loss 6 Loss 6 
Total 24 Total 2-1. 
Subtotal White 32 SubTotal White 30 
Black 35 Black 36 
Win 36 Win 36 
Loss 31 Loss 30 
Total 67 Total . ~ , _ . . 6? 
N ~ t ; : N ~ ; " p ~ ; i t i ~ ~ s s ='2002'; I ~ t ~ ; ~ ; d ' i ' ; t · ; I ) O ~ i t i o ~ · ; · : 2 0 0 0 0 ~ a n d d 1999; ()ld positions = 1997 and 
1996. 
The recall session took place 4 hours after the scanning session and the 
recognition phase was 1 hour after starting the recall session. No time limit \\3S 
given to any of these sessions. In the recognition session all the positions (own and 
others) presented in the scanner were shown again; additionally, 24 new 'others' 
positions and a number of 'own' positions were presented. In total the grandmaster 
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saw 225 positions (115 old and 110 new) and the international master saw 221 
positions (114 old and 107 new). 
9.2.4. Scanning procedure 
The experiment was carried out at the University of Nottingham Magnetic 
Resonance Centre in a 3 T scanner (see detailed specifications in Methods section 
in chapter 3). T2* weighted functional images were obtained during the experiment 
as well as a set of structural images straight after the end of the experiment. Twenty 
two coronal slices were obtained per volume; the TR (time between the acquisition 
of the first slice of one volume and the first slice of the following volume) was set 
at 3 seconds. The speed of slice acquisition was 136 ms per slice. 
Standard procedures were followed in SPM 99, including realignment, 
normalisation and smoothing. In the latter case, a kernel of 12 x 12 x 12 mm was 
used. 
9.2.5. Statistical analysis 
This was a combination of blocked and event-related designs, having the 
characteristic of an event-related design inasmuch as only one trial is the unit of 
analysis. However, the events in an event-related design usually last less than 2 
seconds. In this design the stimuli were presented for 5 seconds. Additionally, a 
spacing of 13 seconds was used in order for the hemodynamic response function to 
settle down, which is not usually the case in event-related designs. Furthermore. the 
trials were modelled as blocks with a box-car function convol\"ed \\"ith the 
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hemodynamic response function. The merit of this design is that it possesses the 
statistical power of the blocked designs and all the good features of event-related 
designs. The time limitations that usually plague trial based designs were solved by 
making the participants respond outside the scanner. 
In all the contrasts a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was 
performed and a threshold ofp = 0.05 was used, except for the own> others 
contrast in which uncorrected values were used and the threshold was p = 0.001. 
9.3. Results 
9.3.1. Behavioural performance 
9.3.1.1. Recall task 
In the recall session the grandmaster gave at least one cue that allowed to 
identify the game in 83.58 % of the total games shown during the scanning session. 
The international master's performance was 69.69%. In both cases they gave 
correct cues in almost all the games items (opponent, tournament, year and result) 
excepting next move. In the latter the grandmaster performed outstandingly 
remembering 31 correct moves (after seeing the position for only 5 seconds 4 hours 
earlier!), the international master gave 8 correct moves. 
9.3.1.2. Recognition task 
In the recognition phase the grandmaster correctly recognised as previously' 
seen or new 99.22% of the positions of his own games and 93.75% of the 'others' 
positions (mean 97.74%). The performance of the international master \vas similar: 
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96.06% own, 89.58% others (mean 94.28%). Additionally, in the recognition 
session, the players had to indicate whether the position presented was one of their 
own games or someone else's game. The grandmaster assigned ownership correctly 
to 97.17% of the positions. The international master perfonned at 89.14%. 
9.3.2. Brain imaging results 
The high accuracy of the players in both recognition and ownership did not 
allow me to perfonn any analysis comparing the brain activity at encoding of 
correct to incorrect positions. 
9.3.2.1. Age of acquisition, result and colour 
In both players no activations emerged neither when the contrasts among 
the different ages of the games (new, old, intennediate) were perfonned, nor the 
results contrast (win, lost), nor the colour (white, black). Therefore, all the games 
were grouped to gether. 
9.3.2.2. Own> control and others> control contrasts 
The first type of contrasts were aimed at finding brain areas responsible for 
the encoding of infonnation that would be needed afterwards. The brain activity for 
the control condition was subtracted from that of own condition (own> control) 
and from that of others (others> control). Table 9.2 shows the Talairach 
coordinates of the brain areas activated in the own> control, others> control, and 
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own> others contrasts for the grandmaster, and Table 9.3 displays the same 
information for the international master. 
9.3.2.3. Own> others contrast 
The most important contrast is own> others, for it gives the information of 
brain areas involved in autobiographical memory. Essentially, both conditions have 
the same visual information, and they also share the chess semantics. They only 
differ in that own positions may activate autobiographical memories of the 
participants, which may not happen with the 'others' positions. Table 9.2 also 
shows this information. 
It is striking that most of the activations in the own> control contrast are 
bilateral and are the same in both players, with the only difference being the 
number ofvoxels activated (see figure 9.2). The activity is concentrated bilaterally 
in the following areas: middle occipital gyri, superior parietal lobes, posterior 
cingulate, medial temporal areas (parahippocampal gyri and fusiform gyri) and 
inferior frontal gyri. 
In others> control, the majority of the activations are also bilaterally 
distributed in both players. In the grandmaster the middle occipital gyri and medial 
temporal areas (parahippocampal and fusiform gyri) contain most of the total 
activity. The international master had activations in the two regions mentioned 
above and also the superior parietal lobules and inferior frontal gyri. Figures 9.3 
shows the brain activity displayed in structural images. 
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Table 9.2. Talairach coordinates of the grandmaster in all the contrasts of 
interest. 
Contrast Vox. Hem. Brain region 
Own> 346 
Control 726 
20 
22 
529 
238 
627 
21 
27 
101 
45 
L Middle Dccioital avrus 
R Middle occipital gyrus 
R Post cingulate/Parahippocampal g. 
R Parahippocampal gyrus 
L Superior parietal lobule 
R Superior parietal lobule 
L Fusiform gyrus 
L Posterior cingulate 
L Cerebellum 
R Precentral gyrus 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 
L I nferior frontal gyrus 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 
L Medial frontal gyrus 
R Superior frontal gyrus 
Others> 1142 R Middle occipital gyrus 
Control R Parahippocampal gyrus 
R Cerebellum 
932 L Middle occipital gyrus 
L Fusiform gyrus 
L Fusiform gyrus 
14 L Superior parietal lobule 
20 L Posterior cingulate 
20 L Precentral gyrus 
8 
7 
6 
41 
Own> 37 
Others 281 
341 
R Precentral gyrus 
L Insula 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 
R Superior frontal gyrus 
L Precuneus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
L Inferior parietal lobule 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 
L Middle frontal gyrus 
BA t-value Z-value Talairach 
18 769 
18 6.25 
37/30 6.4 
19 8.29 
19 5.18 
7 5.04 
37 7.13 
30 6.25 
5.38 
4 6.11 
46 5.45 
47 4.67 
45 6.96 
45 6.77 
47 4.86 
11 4.67 
6 5.88 
6 5.02 
18 6.03 
19 8.19 
6.3 
18 8.05 
37 7.06 
19 5.91 
7 4.71 
30 5.02 
6 4.67 
4 4.55 
13 4.62 
47 4.4 
6 4.97 
31 3.63 
22 3.77 
39 3.76 
40 3.73 
45 4.03 
8 3.82 
736 
6.07 
6.21 
>7.8 
5.07 
4.95 
6.86 
6.07 
5.26 
5.94 
5.33 
4.59 
6.71 
6.54 
4.77 
4.59 
5.73 
4.92 
5.86 
7.79 
6.12 
7.68 
6.8 
5.76 
4.63 
4.92 
4.59 
4.47 
4.55 
4.34 
4.88 
3.59 
3.73 
3.72 
3.68 
3.97 
3.77 
x y z 
-36 -90 5 
30 -90 16 
21 -49 8 
27 -47 -5 
-21 -79 45 
24 -70 53 
-30 -53 -10 
-24 -61 9 
-42 -74 -16 
50 9 11 
56 30 10 
50 47 -2 
-36 27 15 
-39 19 21 
30 29 -1 
-30 32 -9 
-24 -7 42 
21 5 44 
33 -84 10 
27 -47 -5 
45 -54 -23 
-36 -90 5 
-30 -53 -10 
-42 -76 -14 
-21 -58 55 
-24 -58 8 
-24 -7 42 
50 7 13 
-33 7 16 
33 29 -4 
21 5 44 
-9 -48 36 
-62 -52 16 
-56 -57 25 
-50 -50 44 
-56 27 10 
-36 16 38 
L Middle frontal gyrus 9 3.78 3.73 -45 33 29 
54 L Superior frontal gyrus 9 4.05 4 -18 51 20 
25 L Superior frontal gyrus 6 3.72 3.68 -12 15 60 
33 L Superior frontal gyrus 8 3.54 3.5 -6 37 45 
Note. In the first two contrasts Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was 
performed, establishing the threshold at p<O.OS (t=3.12). In own> others no correction was 
carried out, and the threshold was established at p<O.OOl. Talairach coordinates, Brodmann 
areas, t and z values, and number of voxels activated that belong to clusters of more than 5 
voxels are displayed. 
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Table 9.3. Talairach coordinates of the international master in all the 
contrasts of interest. 
Contrast Vox. 
Own> 
Control 
1757 
1212 
95 
416 
66 
121 
834 
470 
124 
30 
13 
Others> 901 
Control 
Own> 
Others 
836 
39 
158 
55 
164 
128 
518 
626 
61 
Hem. Brain region 
L 
L 
L 
R 
R 
R 
R 
L 
L 
R 
R 
L 
L 
L 
R 
L 
L 
R 
L 
L 
L 
R 
R 
R 
R 
L 
R 
R 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Middle occioital avrus 
Superior parietal lobule 
Posterior cingulate 
Middle occipital gyrus 
Superior parietal lobule 
Posterior cingulate 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
Parahippocampal gyrus 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
Parahippocampal gyrus 
Fusiform gyrus 
Inferior frontal gyurs 
Inferior frontal gyurs 
Inferior frontal gyurs 
Inferior frontal gyurs 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Orbitofrontal gyrus 
Cerebellum 
Middle occipital gyrus 
Superior parietal lobule 
Middle occipital gyrus 
Superior parietal lobule 
Superior parietal lobule 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
Fusiform gyrus 
Parahippocampal gyrus 
Inferior frontal gyrus 
Inferior frontal gyrus 
Inferior parietal lobule 
Superior parietal lobule 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Medial frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
BA t-value Z-value Talairach coordinates 
19 10.37 >7.8 
7 9.37 >7.8 
31 5.81 5.66 
19 9.48 >7.8 
7 8.95 >7.8 
30 5.41 5.29 
20 7.67 7.35 
35 7.2 6.92 
37 6.15 5.97 
35 5.86 5.71 
37 4.77 4.69 
44 9.04 >7.8 
46 5.7 5.55 
47 4.56 4.49 
44 8.32 >7.8 
6 6.11 5.94 
6 5.98 5.82 
11 5.88 5.72 
4.74 4.66 
18 8.93 
7 7.66 
19 7.51 
7 7 
7 5.94 
20 5.95 
36 5.62 
36 4.97 
45 6.36 
44 5.77 
40 5 
7 3.96 
6 4.72 
46 4.19 
6 4 
10 3.91 
10 3.73 
10 3.34 
>7.8 
7.34 
7.2 
6.74 
5.78 
5.79 
5.48 
4.87 
6.17 
5.62 
4.9 
3.91 
4.64 
4.13 
3.95 
3.86 
3.69 
3.31 
x y 
-30 -87 
-24 -64 
-15 -58 
39 -78 
27 -59 
21 -54 
53 -53 
-24 -39 
-59 -53 
27 -38 
33 -42 
-42 7 
-48 41 
-39 40 
39 16 
-21 2 
-24 12 
30 37 
-21 -46 
-30 -87 
-24 -67 
39 -78 
27 -56 
33 -72 
53 -56 
-27 -36 
33 -33 
39 19 
-48 7 
-42 -45 
-36 -43 
-21 14 
-42 39 
-27 10 
-18 58 
-30 55 
-39 43 
z 
15 
53 
14 
12 
53 
22 
-12 
-13 
-7 
-3 
-18 
27 
6 
-15 
21 
50 
60 
-20 
-41 
13 
53 
9 
53 
26 
-12 
-16 
-14 
21 
25 
41 
63 
49 
15 
33 
-3 
-10 
-12 
24 R Middle frontal gyrus 6 3.76 3.72 42 11 55 
8 L Cerebellum 3.39 3.36 -6 -48 -28 
Note. In the first two contrasts Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was 
p e r f o r m e d ~ ~ establishing the threshold at p<O.05 (t=3.12). In own> others no correction was 
carried out and the threshold was established at p<O.OOl. Talairach coordinates, Brodmann 
areas, t and z v a l u e s ~ ~ and number of voxels activated of clusters of more than 5 voxels are 
displayed. 
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A) 
B) 
Figure 9.2. Contrast own> control. Brain areas acti7Hlted displnyed ill 
structural images obtained after the rea lisa t ioll of the experime1lt. 11) Glvl. 
b) 1M. 
II 1 
A) 
B) 
Figure 9.3. Contrast others > control. Brain areas activated displayed ill 
structural images obtailled after the realisation of the experiment. a) GJ1. h) /.\1. 
The own > others cont rast showed a strikingl y similar pattern ill both 
pl aye rs and in both players this was left lateralised. Thi:-. pattern included a 
posteri or area in the supramarginal gyrus (in GM somewhat 1110re dor-...al tn t h ~ l t t ()r 
the 1M, inc lud ing poste rior tempora l and parietal area:-. in the rnrlller. alld inkri()r 
parietal and superior parietal in the latter). Fi £urc 9 -+ di"'pla\'\ tIle t .... l· ·' l' 11 '1 ' to ' t' L • ' . ' IU ~ C l \ d l l ) n , ,
in a template 3D brain . 
A) 
Figure 9.4. Contrast own> others. Brail1 areas activated displayed ill 
structural inzages obtained after the realisation of the experimen t. a) GM. 
b) 1M. 
The graph in figure 9.5 displays the distribution of the number of \'oxeb 
activated throughout the brain both in GM and IM . The pattern is quite \imilar in 
both players. The contribution of frontal areas in the others> control contra\t i, 
quite low. This is in agreement with brain imaging studies that show decrea\ed 
frontal activity in memory tasks after practice (e.g .. Van Horn et al.. 1998). Thi, 
result is also in agreement with the finding of the first experiment in charter 1 () of 
this thesi s in which chess players needed a \'ery low contribution of the frontal 
cortices in a memory task . 
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Figure 9.5. Distribution of voxels in frontal and 11011-fr01ltal areas ill all the 
contrasts in both players. 
CI) 100% 
QJ 
.... 
QJ 90% 
.J::. 
a. 
CI) 80% 
E 
QJ 
.J::. 70% 
QJ 
.J::. 
...... 60% 
c 
CI) 50% 
QJ 
x 
0 40% > 
-0 30% c 
0 
:z 20% :::J 
.c 
.;:: 
10% ...... CI) 
0 
0% 
I 
I 
frontal 
GM 
other areas frontal other areas 
1M 
• Right 
o Left 
Figure 9.6. Distribution of voxels in terms of hemispheres ill the cOlltrns t 
o ~ u n n > contro l. 
In the own > control contrast the contribution of the fro ntal areas is hi gher 
in both players (higher in GM than in IM). Accordingly, in the own > others 
contrast, the contribution of the frontal lobe is about 60% in both pl aye r . ince the 
activation in this contrast is almost totally in the left-hemisphere, a plot (figure 9.6) 
with the distribution of the voxels acti vated accordi ng to hemispheres in the o\\n > 
contro l contrast was performed. 
As expected, there were more left frontal areas than right fro ntal areas 
activated in this contrast, exp laining the left lateralised pattem in own > others. 
Figure 9.7 shows the same data in the others > control contrast. In thi s contrast the 
fronta l areas distribution are not very relevant because the number of voxels 
activated was low . The figure shows that the proportion of voxels activated in non-
frontal areas (which correspond to a high percentage of the total act ivation) is abo ut 
equal in the others > control contrast. This shows that in own > contro l increase of 
number of voxels activated in frontal areas with a hi gh bias to the left hemi sphere 
explains most of the left-lateralised pattem . 
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Figure 9.7. Distribution of voxels per hemisphere in the others > cOJltrol 
task 
9.4. Discussion 
The resemblance of the results of this study to those ofCo!1\\,ay et al. 
(1999) is outstanding. Both studi es showed two hi ghly differenti ated regions 
activated: one posterior region at or near the supramarginal gyrus (BA 39) and a 
pattern of a number of frontal areas with a totally left lateralised pattern. The 
autobiographical memory study of Maguire and Mummery (1999) also shares \\ith 
these studies the almost completely lateralised pattern, the activation of the 
supramarginal gyrus and some left medial frontal areas. However, Fink et a1. 
(1996) displays a completely different pattern in autobiographical memory: total 
right lateralisation. Indeed, Fink et a1.'s study is an agreement with most of the 
studies carried out on episodic memory retrieval (see Cabeza, 2000 for a revic\\) 
Conway et a1. (1999) suggested that the left frontal activations in their study 
correspond to the working-self execution of a generative search, and the 
supramarginal gyrus activation to the ESK activation. They explained the 
dissimilarity with the Fink et a1. (1996) study by saying that in the latter there was 
no need for generative retrieval, hence, participants engaged in direct retrieval 
without the participation of the working-self (which is supposed to be situated in 
the left prefrontal cortex (Damasio, 1994)). They explained the posterior right 
network activation in Fink et a1. as activation of the ESK. However, the lack of 
activation of right posterior areas in Conway et a1. (1999) and the high activation of 
frontal areas in Fink et a1. (1996) is not satisfactorily explained. The low right 
frontal activity and right posterior activity in Conway et a1. (2001) are just non-
existent in Conway et a1. (1999). 
Maguire and Mummery's (1999) theoretical proposal is critical in 
explaining these results. They argued that autobiographical memories could be 
either episodic (autobiographical event) or semantic (autobiographical fact): 
moreover, non-autobiographical memories could also be either episodic (public 
event) or semantic (general knowledge). Typically, autobiographical memories 
were considered only a type of episodic memories, while Maguire and Mummery 
suggest that personal relevance is a factor independent from the existence or not of 
a temporal context. 
Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) review of brain imaging studies analysed the 
assumptions of the HERA model (Nyberg et aI, 1996; Tulving et aI., 1994). This 
model proposes that, first, semantic retrieval recruits left prefrontal areas· second , , 
encoding information into episodic memory occurs in the left prefrontal cortex and, 
third, the right prefrontal cortex is differentially more involved than the left 
hemisphere in episodic memory retrieval. In their review Cabeza and Nyberg found 
support for the first and third hypotheses of the HERA model, but they found some 
studies with bilateral activation during episodic memory encoding. 
Taking into account the Maguire and Mummery (1999) proposal and the 
Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) review, it is possible to explain the results of the present 
study and previous ones. In the contrast own> others of the present study, retrieval 
of autobiographical memories is expected. Following Maguire and Mummery 
(1999), the critical question is: did the chess players recollect autobiographical 
events or autobiographical facts? The masters were told that after the scanner they 
would be asked about the name of the opponent and the tournament, the year and 
the result of each game, as well as the next move of the game. Clearly most of 
those data are autobiographical facts (i.e., semantic autobiographical memories)-
although retrieval of autobiographical events may be contiguous and cannot be 
ruled out. Therefore, the left frontal activation in this study is in accordance \\'ith 
the HERA model in the sense that semantic retrieval occurs in the left frontal 
cortex. As pointed out by Niki and Luo (2002) the truth judgement task used by 
22S 
Maguire and Mummery (1999) could have diminished the richness in the 
recollection of episodic events. 
Fink et al.'s (1996) study differs from the other three studies: Maguire and 
Mummery (1999), Conway (1999) and the present study in that the researchers 
explicitly asked the participants to imagine themselves in the situation. This could 
have biased participants to recall more episodic autobiographical memories than in 
the other three studies and, accordingly, to activate more right frontal areas, as 
expected by the HERA model. The activation of the left supramarginal gyrus found 
here is puzzling. On the one hand, the Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) review shows 
that the left supramarginal gyrus activity occurs in semantic and language studies, 
suggesting that the activation of this area is related to semantic retrieval; on the 
other hand, Maguire and Mummery (1999) found that this area is related to 
autobiography regardless of the existence of temporal context. Other theoretical 
approaches (e.g., Kosslyn, 1994) attribute a role of associative memory to this area. 
In the others> control contrast in which autobiographical memory is not 
involved and episodic encoding is expected to be the most important process, a 
very low activation in the frontal lobes was found. This is in agreement with the 
first fMRI study of the following chapter in this thesis, in which chess players 
showed reduced activity of the frontal lobes, in contrast to the high activity 
displayed by the non-chess players. A similar finding was shown in Van Hom 
(1996) in a maze task in which a reduction in frontal lobe activity after creating the 
memory of the maze was apparent. The present study exhibited a parietal. occipital 
and temporal bilateral pattern with equally distributed activation of voxels in the 
right and left hemispheres, as the Cabeza and Nyberg (2002) analysis of episodic 
retrieval showed. 
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Regarding the age of memory results, in accordance with COll\\'ay et al. 
(1999), the present study has not found differences. Stark and Squire (2000) began 
studying the age of memories in brain imaging studies using memories of half an 
hour, one day and one week, and they did not find differences in the medial 
temporal lobe. Maguire et al. (2001) parametrically analysed autobiographical 
memories ranging from weeks to 20 years of age and failed to find differences in 
the medial temporal lobes, but found increased activity for recent memories in the 
right ventro-Iateral prefrontal cortex. Niki and Luo (2002) found differences in the 
medial temporal lobe (recent memories produced more activation than remote 
memories) in memories of less than two years of age in comparison with more than 
7 year old memories (although it was outside of their interest, they also found 
differences in a huge amount of brain areas both in recent> remote and remote> 
recent). The only reason that could have caused the lack of differences in the 
present study is that the window of one year in the recent chess game positions was 
probably large. However, Niki and Luo (2002) found differences with a similar 
time window. One explanation could be that chess players analyse their own games 
and consolidate the memories of the games more quickly than other memories. If 
this is the case, a methodological improvement could be to make the players play 
several games the day of the scanning session without allowing them to analyse 
them and to generate stimuli from those games for the 'new' condition. 
To recapitulate, the use of chess to study autobiographical memory proved 
to be successful, insofar as it replicated the findings of a previous study. This 
experiment is also a methodological improvement inasmuch as no PIT\·ious 
interview was required in order to generate the stimuli and the manipulation of the 
memory age was in the control of the experimenter and not in that of the 
participants. Finally, a combination of HERA model and the proposal of \ laguire 
and Mummery (1999) was put forward, reconciling results of previous studies. 
This study showed that chess could be used as a research settin g in fM:RL 
with fruitful results. Once again, the versatility and power of chess as a task 
environment was demonstrated, supporting one of theses stated in chapter 1. The 
next chapter will focus on the comparison of chess players with non-chess players 
in memory tasks. The interest is both in expertise and in the neural basis of 
cognitive processes such as long-term memory storage and maintenance of 
information. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Brain imaging (2) 
Expertise and memory 
Chapter 9 introduced a paradigm with chess experts by which it is possible 
to study autobiographical memory. The present chapter focuses on the relationship 
between patterns stored in long-term memory and in working memory. 1 Chess 
players and non-chess players participated in a scanning session in order to 
compare their brain activities in a recognition task with and without chess stimuli 
(see section 10.1). The second experiment (section 10.2)-a follow up of the first 
one-aimed at further understanding the principal aspects of the brain activations 
observed in experiment 1. The idea was to unconfound two variables: perceptual 
aspects of the stimuli (chess vs scenes) and structure of the stimuli (game vs 
random). 
The brain imaging literature review of chess, expertise and practice 
discussed in chapter 2 (see sub-section 2.3.2.1) is fundamental for the experiments 
in this chapter. In section 10.1 and 10.2, I will centre my discussion on the rationale 
of the experiments based on that review. 
10.1 Experiment 1. Working memory efficiency and long-term 
memory activation in experts 
1 Working memory is a rather vague concept used \\"ith different meanings by different researchers. 
However because it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this problem, I sull use thIS term. 
for it is p ~ p u l a r . . In the thesis, 'working memory' means 'on-line' memory. as opposed to 'archiv\? 
memory' (see Izquierdo, 1999). 
In the preliminary review of brain imaging studies in experts and practice 
effects (see section 2.8 ), two types of results were found: a) experts showed a 
reduction of activation in a particular area due to increase in efficiency. and b) 
experts used a brain area not used by non-experts. For instance. Pesenti et al (2001) 
found activation in brain areas in the expert not found in the non-experts. and 
Gauthier (1999,2000) and Tarr and Gauthier (2000) found increased activity in a 
brain area in experts or trained sUbjects. On the other hand, Krings et al. (2000) and 
Kassubek et al. (2001) found a reduction in activation in different brain regions. 
Van Hom et al. (1998) found reduction in frontal areas and increased acti\'ity in 
posterior areas. Finally, Berman et al. (1995) did not find any difference. 
These results may seem somehow contradictory. However, the pattern 
observed in Van Hom (1998) makes the two kinds of results complementary. The 
decrease in frontal lobes occur because of increased efficiency (i.e., participants 
require less effort to perform the task), whereas the increase in activation in 
posterior areas is due to the creation of a new memory. Since this memory does not 
exist in naIve participants, its location in the brain should be active only in the 
experts. 
10. 1. 1. Overview of the experiment 
CHREST (see section 2.1.2) has a long-term memory network of chunks 
and templates, the size of which is a function of the level of expertise (i.e., the 
higher the level the larger the network). In a memory task, CHREST automatically 
activates the chunks and/or templates stored in the network that match the ones that 
are present in the to-be-remembered stimulus. If this theory is correct, there should 
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be an area in the brain which is activated in chess players but not in non-chess 
players while dealing with chess stimuli. To test this proposal in the present 
experiment, chess players and non-chess players performed a recognition task \\ith 
chess stimuli - 'game' - and with non-chess stimuli - 'scene' - and the brain actiyit\, 
of 'scene' was subtracted from that of 'game' in order to identify the long-term 
memory network. 
Another prediction of CHREST is that the access to the long-term network 
is almost automatic and that the templates and/or chunks accessed in long-term 
memory are free from interference and decay; hence, minimal working memory 
processes would be needed in order to maintain them. A condition- 'dot' -was 
designed in order to test this hypothesis. 'Dot' stimuli were the same type as 'game', 
but in this condition, instead of doing a memory task, the participants performed a 
very simple perceptual task. The subtraction of the dot condition from the game 
condition should show brain activity due to the memory components of the game 
condition, cancelling out the perceptual aspects of the stimuli. If CHREST is 
correct, and minimal working memory processes are needed in experts, then less 
activity in working memory areas is expected in chess players in comparison to 
non-chess players. 
The introduction of random positions in chess psychology - and the poor 
performance of masters on memory tasks with this type of stimulus - led to the idea 
that chess expertise is domain-specific (see chapter 2, sub-section 2.3.1.2.3). To 
make comparisons with those studies using a new methodology, it would be 
advantageous to use 'random' positions in brain imaging studies. Therefore, a 
random condition was also included in the study. However, the predictions are not 
clear-cut in this case. On the one hand, one would expect more actiyity in long-
tenn memory areas in the game condition because the 'game' stimuli acti\'ate the 
long-tenn memory network and the 'random' stimuli do not. Howe\'er, it is possible 
that 'random' also activates the long-term network in a less specific way, 
Taking everything together, I expected that chess players would show a 
different pattern of activations than non-chess players. In the game> dot contrast, 
which emphasises the memory components of the task, chess players would require 
less effort; therefore, they would show less activity than the non-chess players. In 
the game> scene contrast, which emphasises the chess specific components of the 
task, it is expected that chess players would activate an area in which the long-term 
chess patterns are stored. Regarding brain locations, it is known that cells in area IT 
(inferior temporal cortex) in monkeys react to familiar stimuli (e. g. Gross, 1992, 
Logothetis et aI.,1995). Therefore, I would expect activations in this area in chess 
players in the chess stimuli tasks. I hypothesise also that there would be a reduction 
in chess players in their brain activity in frontal and parietal areas in comparison 
with non-chess players. There are many studies showing these areas involved in 
working memory processes (e.g., Fuster, 1998,2000). 
10.1.2. Methods 
10.1.2.1. Participants 
Twelve right-handed healthy volunteers with normal vision signed a 
consent fonn and participated in the experiment. Five of them were chess players 
and seven were non-playing university students (all of them knew the rules of chess 
but had never played seriously before). The mean age of the chess players was 24,() 
(sd = 7.98) and that of the non-chess players was 24.14 (sd = 4.C)3). The chess 
players were recruited from Nottingham chess clubs and from the UniYersitY of 
Nottingham chess club. Three of them have International rating (2200-master. 
2190 and 20S0-experts), and the other two were regular players of the uniYersity 
team. It is worth noting that originally seven chess players and nine non-players 
took part in the study; two of the chess players and two of the non-players \yere 
discarded because of failure to fulfil the motion criterion (see chapter 3, sub-section 
3.1.3.3.2). Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology, 
University of Nottingham ethics committee. 
10.1.2.2 Procedure 
All the blocks of all the conditions had the same structure (see figure 10.1). 
Each block started with a fixation cross which remained on screen for 12.S 
seconds. Following the fixation cross, a sample stimulus was presented for 6.S 
seconds. After a 2 second's, delay a series of 7 stimuli appeared sequentially. Each 
of the seven stimuli was presented for 3 seconds with an inter-stimulus interval of 1 
second. The task consisted of deciding whether the stimuli presented in the series 
matched the sample stimulus or not. They had to react within the 3 seconds during 
which the stimuli were on the screen. 
There were 4 conditions: game, random, scene and dot (see figure 10.2). In 
the three first conditions, the task was the one explained above, only the type of 
stimuli varied. Dot was a perceptual- motor control for game. In dot, the block 
structure was the same as that of the other conditions but the task was different. 
The sample stimulus consisted of a chess position with a black dot somewhere in 
the middle of the board. The stimuli in the series of 7 were also chess positions, 
some of them had a black dot and some others did not have the b lack dot. The task 
consisted of pressing the left button of the button box if there was a black dot and 
the right button if there was no black dot. In the game condition, the stimuli were 
the right half of a grey-scale chessboard (4 x 8 squares) with black and \\'hite chess 
pieces resembling a chess game position. The random condition was the same, but 
the pieces were randomly distributed throughout the board . 
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Figure 10.2. Stimuli used in the four conditions. From left to right: ga 11le, 
random, scene and dot. 
All the positions in both conditions contained 16 pi eces (8 +/- 1 white 
pieces and 8+/-1 black pieces). In the scene condition , the stimuli were a grey-scale 
background with ellipses and different types of black and white shapes (2 trian gles. 
2 squares , 2 rhombuses, and 2 circles). 
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10.1.2.3. Design 
Forty four blocks (11 blocks of each condition) were pseudo-randomly 
presented (i.e., there were 11 sets of 4 blocks, in which each condition was 
presented once. The order of the conditions within the set was randomly assigned.). 
On average, 3 of the 7 stimuli matched the sample. The number of test stimuli 
matching the sample within each block varied from 2 to 4. Twelve stimuli of each 
condition were used, each of them took place as sample stimulus only once. The 
chess positions consisted of middle game positions with familiar configurations of 
pIeces. 
10.1.2.4. Statistical analysis 
A box-car function convolved with a hemodynamic response function was 
used to model the data. I planned 3 contrasts in each group. Game> dot, game> 
scene and game> random. SPM maps oft values were obtained after Bonferroni 
correction ofp values, showing p < 0.05. Only the clusters of more than 5 voxels 
were reported. 
Game is the key condition, and the other three control for different aspects 
of the task. In the principal task, participants are supposed to perceive the stimulus; 
recognise it as a chess pattern; encode it; maintain a representation of it in memory 
during the delay and during the presentation of the test stimuli; match the test 
stimuli to this representation; decide whether they are the same or not; and finally 
press a button. In the dot condition, participants are required to carry out only the 
perceptual and motor aspects of the task explained above; therefore, the subtraction 
game> dot captures the memory components of the task. I assume that in chess 
players, while perfonning in the game condition, general memory processes and 
memory processes particular for such a familiar stimuli occur. In the scene 
condition, participants are required to carry out the same processes as in the game 
condition. However, the type of stimuli differs, which makes the subtraction 
suitable for identify both memory and perceptual components of the task that are 
specific of the chess positions. The random condition includes the same type of 
task and stimuli as game, but the meaningfulness and the typicality of the stimuli 
varied. The latter contrast afforded me the possibility of investigating the brain 
location of familiar patterns of chess pieces. 
10.1.3. Results 
10.1.3.1. Behavioural data 
The task, as expected, was easy for all the volunteers. Therefore, none of 
the differences between chess players and non-chess players in the brain imaging 
results can be explained in tenns of difference in perfonnance. In table 1, the 
means and standard deviations in accuracy are presented. I carried out a 2 x 4 
mixed ANOV A test with expertise (chess players and non-chess players) as a 
between subjects variable and condition (game, random, scene and dot) as within 
subjects variable. As expected, in tenns of accuracy, there was not a significant 
main effect of expertise (F(l,l) = 2.46; ns, MSE = 0.001). However, there was a 
main effect of condition (F(1,3) = 7.98; p<O.Ol, MSE = 0.004). The interaction 
expertise x condition was not significant (F(l ,3) = 1.44; ns, MSE = 0.0008) (see 
figure 10.3). 
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Figure 10.3. Percentage of correct responses in each condition for both 
groups. Error bars = standard error of the mean. 
Post-hoc pairwise comparison analysis showed that the pal1ic ipants 
perfonlled less accurately in game than in random : game > random = -0.048; 
p<O.O l , but no other differences were found . The interaction experti se x conditi on 
was not significant (F( 1 ,3) = 1.44; ns , MSE = 0.0008). 
Surprisingly, in temlS of response times non-chess players were faster than 
chess players in all the conditions. In figure 10.4 the means and standard error bars 
for response times are disp layed. A 2 x 4 mixed ANOV A test was carri ed out with 
expertise (chess p layers and non-chess players) as a between subjects va ri ab le and 
condition (game, random, scene and dot) as within subjects variabl e. There was a 
main effect of expe11ise (F(l , 1) = 10.3 ; p<O.O 1; MSE = 577,276) and condition ( 
F( l ,3) = 32.38; p<O.OO I ; MSE = 169,866). The post-hoc Scheffe analysis revealed 
a significant difference in mean reaction time in the following comparisons : game 
vs scene = 165; p<O.O 1, game vs dot = 292; p<O.OO 1, random vs dot = I 7 0 ~ ~ p<O.O 1 
and scene vs dot = 127; p<O.Ol. The interaction was not significant (F( 1,3) = 2.3 -L 
ns ; MSE = 12,296) . However, figure 10.4 suggests a trend in which the gap 
_-w 
between chess players and non-chess p layers is smaller in game than in any other 
condition. 
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Figure l OA. Reaction times in each condition for both groups. 
To summarise, the behavioural data showed that both chess players and 
non-chess players perf0I111ed the task accurately, and they did not differ in tel111S of 
perf01111ance . In the game condition both groups perfol111ed slightly but 
s ignificantly less accurately and this could also be seen in reaction time. In the 
latter dependent variab le, chess players were slower than the non-chess pl ayers in 
the fo ur conditions. However, the gap was reduced in the game conditi on. The dot 
condition was performed faster than any other, followed by the scene condition, 
which was solved faster than the random condition. The latter was also perfo mled 
more quickly than game. 
10.1.3.2. IInaging data 
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Table 10.1 and figure 10.5 show the activations of chess players and non-
chess players in the game> dot contrast. There is a striking difference in the 
number ofvoxels activated in the two groups. Chess players activated 576 yoxels 
in total, whereas non-chess players activated 8,780 for the same contrast. The dot 
condition consisted of the same stimuli as the game condition but no memory \\as 
required for the task. Therefore, this contrast shows the activations due to the 
memory component of the game condition. Activations in the chess players group 
were found in BA37 (left occipital and bilateral temporal fusiform gyri). BA19 
(bilateral superior occipital gyri), BA7 (bilateral precunei and right superior 
parietal lobule ). In the frontal lobes the activations were in BA46 (left middle 
frontal gyrus), BA45 (right middle frontal gyrus) and BA9 (inferior frontal gyrus). 
Table 10.2 and figure 10.6 show the activations of both groups in the game 
> scene contrast. Again, non-chess players displayed a greater amount of activation 
(3391 vs 839 voxels), though the difference is smaller than that of the previous 
contrast. This result is somewhat unexpected, since this contrast shows the chess 
components of the game condition. The scene condition was designed to be the 
same memory task as game, except for the different type of stimuli. 
The activations of chess players were in BA 7 (bilateral precunei), a cluster 
including right posterior cingulated (BA30/31) and left lingual gyrus (BAI8). 
BA39 (posterior middle temporal gyrus), BA37 (right temporal fusiform gyrus. 
right inferior temporal gyrus and left parahippocampal gyrus) and BA36 (right 
parahippocampal gyrus). 
Table 10.1. Foci of activation in Game> Dot and Dot> Game contrasts. 
Contrasts & 
expertise 
Game> Dot 
Chess players 
Non-chess players 
Dot> Game 
Chess players 
Vox. Hem. Brain region 
28 
36 
149 
243 
7 
6 
107 
115 
L Occipital fusiform gyrus 
R Superior occipital gyrus 
L Superior occipital gyrus 
L Precuneus 
L Precuneus 
R Superior parietal lobule 
R Precuneus 
L Temporal fusiform gyrus 
R Temporal fusiform gyrus 
L Middle frontal gyrus 
R Middle frontal gyrus 
R I nferior frontal gyrus 
4709 R Precuneus 
R Superior parietal lobe 
R Precuneus 
38 R Postcentral gyrus 
23 R Middle temporal gyrus 
R Inferior temporal gyrus 
2885 R Middle frontal gyrus 
R Medial frontal gyrus 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 
738 L Middle frontal gyrus 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 
L Middle frontal gyrus 
246 L Superior frontal gyrus 
141 L Superior frontal gyrus 
L Middle frontal gyrus 
L Middle frontal gyrus 
20 R Thalamus 
no voxels showing contrast 
Non-chess players 175 L Posterior cingulate gyrus 
42 
234 
22 
454 
120 
17 
67 
244 
R Medial cingulate gyrus 
R Insula 
R Superior temporal gyrus 
R Superior temporal gyrus 
R Middle temporal gyrus 
R Middle temporal gyrus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
L Middle temporal gyrus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
L Middle temporal gyrus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
L Superior temporal gyrus 
R Medial frontal gyrus 
L Superior frontal gyrus 
L Medial frontal gyrus 
L Superior frontal gyrus 
BA t-value Talairach coordinates 
37 5.88 
19 5.56 
19 5.91 
7 5.48 
7 5.3 
7 7.49 
7 6.38 
37 5.24 
37 4.85 
46 6.07 
45 6.76 
9 6.19 
19 14.95 
7 14.54 
7 14.26 
3 6.46 
21 5.27 
20 5.02 
9 14.28 
6 12.73 
45 12.46 
45 10.12 
47 8.6 
9 8.55 
6 9.43 
10 7.92 
10 6.76 
10 6.71 
5.15 
31 8.22 
24 5.53 
13 8.12 
22 5.2 
22 4.98 
21 6.37 
21 5.64 
42 7.39 
21 6.91 
22 4.9 
39 6.88 
39 6.34 
22 5.42 
11 7.94 
9 8.26 
10 6.31 
10 5.97 
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Figure 10.5. Activations in the Game > Dot contrast. The l)Qxels show1l are 
significant at p<O.OS after Bonferroni correctio1l. a) Chess players, b) N01l-
chess players. Left column (top to bottom): left hemisphere medial v iew, 
whole brain back view, right hemisphere lateral view, and whole brai1l 
bottom view. Right column (top to bottom): right hemisphere mediallJiew, 
whole brain front view, left hemisphere lateral view, and whole braill top 
VIeW. 
Table 10.3 shows the areas corresponding to the contrast game> random . 
Thi s contrast is interesting onl y in the chess playe rs group. since no di fkrence'-. 
were predic ted in the non-chess players group. H OWCH:r. BA20 (right in fcrior 
temporal gyrus) and a set of mostly right hemisphere frontal areas were acti\"e in 
the non-chess players. Chess players showed a small cluster of 16 voxels in the left 
parahippocampal gyrus (BA37). 
Table 10.2. Foci of activation in Game> Scene and Scene> Game 
contrasts. 
Contrasts & Vox. Hem. Brain region BA t-value Talairach coordinates 
expertise x y z 
Game> scene 
Chess players 
313 R Precuneus 7 7.4 8 -61 55 
R Precuneus 7 6.06 6 -44 52 
L Precuneus 7 5.66 -6 -53 52 
349 R Posterior cingulate 31 6.88 15 -48 19 
R Posterior cingulate 30 5.99 9 -49 11 
L Lingual gyrus 18 6.09 -12 -52 5 
7 R Temporal fusiform gyrus 37 5.14 47 -50 -13 
7 R Inferior temporal gyrus 37 4.79 50 -47 -5 
113 R Middle temporal gyrus 39 7.8 44 -75 23 
50 R Parahippocampal gyrus 36 6.92 27 -38 -6 
174 L Parahippocampal gyrus 37 10.44 -29 -44 -8 
Non-chess 
35 R Inferior occipital gyrus 18 7.03 30 -87 -3 
346 L Occipital fusiform gyrus 19 9.36 -24 -79 -14 
L Cerebellum 8.67 -39 -68 -17 
1445 R Middle temporal gyrus 39 8.05 36 -75 23 
L Middle occipital gyrus 19 8.28 -30 -80 21 
R Precuneus 7 9.37 18 -64 50 
12 R Precuneus 7 5.54 15 -66 25 
13 L Paracentral lobule 5 4.87 -18 -24 45 
6 R Superior frontal gyrus 6 4.7 12 12 66 
672 R Middle frontal gyrus 8 8.61 41 24 24 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 9 7.35 50 10 30 
R Middle frontal gyrus 46 7.29 53 36 15 
484 R Middle frontal gyrus 6 7.55 24 2 44 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 7.44 27 5 52 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 6.96 30 14 54 
73 R Postcentral gyrus 2 7.17 62 -13 25 
22 L Superior frontal gyrus 8 5.76 -30 11 52 
41 L Inferior frontal gyrus 47 6.27 -30 26 -9 
226 L Inferior frontal gyrus 45 6.26 -41 30 12 
L Middle frontal gyrus 9 5.8 -53 13 32 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.25 -50 27 21 
16 R Thalamus (medial dorsal 5.16 9 -20 6 
9 R Midbrain 5.03 6 -33 -18 
L Midbrain 4.61 0 -30 -14 
Scene> game 
Chess players No voxels showing contrast 
Non-chess 
9 25 R Insula 13 5.36 44 -8 
Figure 10.6. Activations in the game> scelle con trast. Th e voxels showen 
are significant at p<0.05 after Bonferrol1i correctio11. A) Chess players, B) 
Non -chess players. Left column (top to bottom): left hemisphere 111enial 
view, whole brain back view, right hemisphere lateral view, ann wlzole 
brain bottom view. Right column (top to bottom): right hemisphere 111enial 
view, whole brain front view, left hemisphere lateral view, mIn whole 
brain top view. 
Table 10.3. Foci of activation in Game> Random and Random> Game 
contrasts. 
Contrasts & Vox. Hem. Brain region BA Talairach coordinates 
expertise 
x y z Game> Random 
Chess players 
16 L Parahippocampal gyrus 37 
Non-chess players 
5.31 
-29 -44 
-7 
152 R Inferior temporal gyrus 20 7.43 44 
-9 -15 
R Inferior temporal gyrus 20 6.34 39 
-1 -25 
102 R Middle frontal gyrus 9 5.84 44 22 26 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 8 5.48 47 7 33 
57 R Medial frontal gyrus 11 5.8 33 35 -2 
120 R Superior frontal gyrus 8 5.41 33 17 52 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 5.04 27 2 50 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.93 27 17 41 
41 R Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.4 53 21 15 
25 R Postcentral gyrus 2 5.14 62 -19 31 
29 L Inferior frontal gyrus 47 5.53 
-33 23 -6 
7 L Middle frontal gyrus 9 4.93 
-53 16 32 
13 L Insula 5.16 -27 12 32 
Random> game 
Chess players no voxels showing contrast 
Non-chess players 
24 R Insula 5.4 41 -14 9 
10. 1.4. Discussion 
10.1.4.1. Game> dot contrast 
The game> dot contrast gave very clear results. In order to perform the 
same task chess players recruited less neurons than non-chess players. This is 
consistent with previous studies in which a reduction of activation was observed in 
experts or trained participants. For instance, Van Hom et al. (1998) showed a 
decrease in activation in the frontal lobes in subjects who learned a maze in 
comparison with the same participants when they were naIve. Krings et al (2000) 
showed that piano players recruited less motor areas than the non-piano players in a 
motor sequence task. Jansma (2001) also showed decreased activity in frontal areas 
in a practised task in comparison with a novel task. 
The network of areas recruited by chess players in the present experiment 
includes frontal areas BA46 (left middle frontal gyrus), and a cluster containing 
BA45 and BA9 (right middle and inferior frontal gyri). In a recent revie\y of the 
scanning literature, BA9 was shown to be bilaterally involved in all types of 
working memory and in sustained attention in the right, and BA46 was also 
bilaterally recruited by all kinds of working memory tasks, with emphasis on 
spatial working memory (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000 for a review of 275 flv1RI 
and PET studies). The pattern of activation seen in posterior areas is also very 
clear. A dorsal pattern including a cluster in the right hemisphere in BA 7 (superior 
parietal lobule and precuneus) and another in BA19 (superior occipital gyrus) 
emerged. The same was found in the left hemisphere. BAl9 has been involved 
bilaterally in perception of faces, objects and space; imagery of space and motion; 
spatial working memory; problem solving tasks; and spatial episodic memory 
encoding (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). 
Brodmann area 7 (especially the precuneus) has been shown to be involved 
in several tasks: visual imagery (Andreasen, et al., 1995), episodic memory 
retrieval (Henson et aI., 1999; Krause et aI., 1999), mental rotation (Richter, 2000), 
storage site for visual patterns (Roland and Gulyas, 1995) reactivation of engrams 
(Kapur et aI., 1995), successful retrieval (Wiser et aI., 2000), matching targets to 
templates (Herath et aI., 2001), shifting attention (Cohen et aI., 1996), and pursuit 
and generation of saccadic eye movements (Berman et aI., 1999). Hikosaka et al. 
(2000) found an increase in precunei at an intermediate level of practice of a motor 
sequence task followed by a decrease in this area in an advanced leyel of practice. 
In the maze learning task used by Van Hom et al. (1999) the participants did not 
have a memory of the path they were meant to learn. When this memory \\"as 
generated, the activation of the precunei emerged. 
Finally, a small number ofvoxels within BA37 was also active bilaterally: 
left occipital (28 voxels) and temporal (7 voxels) fusiform gyrus, and right 
temporal fusiform gyrus (6 voxels). The fusiform gyrus is activated by the 
presentation of faces (Kanwisher, 1998), and its activation increases by expe11ise 
(Gauthier 2000, Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). 
In this contrast, it was anticipated that activations would be found due to 
general memory processes. The activations triggered by the mere presentation of 
the chess positions in game were subtracted by the control task. I assume that 
participants engaged in additional perceptual processes to encode the sample 
stimulus (activation in visual area BA19 and dorsal (BA7) and ventral (BA37) 
pathways). As well as this, in order to match the sample to the incoming stimuli, 
subjects had to maintain the sample during the delay and during the set of test 
stimuli, which needs the activation of the visuo-spatial areas engaged in the 
perceptual processes of the image in combination with the activation in the frontal 
lobes. 
10.1.4.2 Game> scene contrast 
In the game> scene contrast, the chess players showed a pattern of brain 
activity that includes four main areas: a) BA 7 (bilateral precunei); 
b) Right posterior cingulate [BA30/31] (the cluster includes left lingual gyrus 
(BA 18)); c) BA39 (right posterior middle temporal gyrus); d) A set of areas in the 
temporal lobe: BA 37 (right temporal fusiform gyrus, right inferior temporal 
fusifonn gyrus, left parahippocampal gyrus), and BA36 (left parahippocampal 
gyrus). 
Two of those four areas were also activated in the non-chess players: BA 7 
(bilateral precunei) and BA39 (right posterior middle temporal gyrus). Moreover. 
the remaining two areas were almost exclusively activated by chess players: right 
posterior cingulate (B30/B31) and the temporal areas B36/B37 (left 
parahippocampal gyrus and right parahippocampal gyrus are the most important 
areas in this group). 
The right posterior cingulate was an area activated almost exclusively in 
chess players. This area was not active in the game> dot contrast. Therefore, it is 
not an area involved in general memory processes. Maguire et al (1999) showed 
activation in the posterior cingulate when participants attempted to link what they 
were hearing with the prior knowledge that they brought to bear on a text 
comprehension task. Maguire et aI. suggested that the role of the posterior 
cingulate in this comprehension-memory process is the linking of incoming 
infonnation with a repository of activated knowledge to fonn a coherent 
representation of discourse. The posterior cingulate cortex was also activated in 
topographicalleaming tasks (e.g. Aguirre et aI., 1996), which necessitate the 
integration of incoming infonnation to fonn a coherent representation of a route. 
Maguire et al (1999) suggested that the posterior cingulate cortex is involved in the 
incorporation online of infonnation into an accumulating structure of which 
background or prior knowledge is a fundamental component. 
How can we relate the Maguire et al (1999) study to the present study? At 
first sight, it seems that the tasks are completely dissimilar. and no transfer of 
infonnation between these two studies is possible. However, I propose that chess 
players indeed used their prior knowledge when performing the task. A counter-
argument is that the use of prior knowledge is not necessary in order to perform the 
task. In fact, no prior knowledge whatsoever is required and the chess players' 
prior knowledge did not help them in their performance (they performed more 
slowly in all the conditions, and were less accurate in the condition in which their 
prior knowledge might have been involved). This is true, but CHREST (De Groot 
& Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 2000), showed that the mere perception of a 
stimulus specific to the domain of expertise automatically activates long-tenn 
memory storages of familiar patterns. Therefore, I suggest that the activation in 
right posterior cingulate in game> scene contrast is related with the link between 
incoming information (the series of 7 test stimuli) with prior knowledge (i.e. the 
storage of familiar chess patterns in the temporal lobe ) activated by the sample. 
Additional evidence comes from a study of Wiser et al. (2000), who 
compared a group of participants who had learnt a set of faces one week before the 
experiment (and they refreshed it one day before the experiment) with another 
group who was presented with the set of faces one minute before the study. 
Posterior cingulate were bilaterally activated in the contrast between the two 
groups. This supports the idea that the posterior cingulate plays a role when prior 
knowledge is involved. 
Finally, I suggest that the activations in the bilateral parahippocampal gyri 
(more prominent on the left hemisphere) reflect the existence of a long-term 
memory storage of familiar chess patterns. There are several studies showing that 
the inferior temporal lobe is related to the activation of visual long-term memories 
(e.g. Desimone, et. aI, 1984; Tanaka, 1993). In the present study, the 
parahippocampal gyri were activated in the game> scene contrast only by chess 
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players, and it was not activated by the same group in the game> dot contrast, 
showing that it is not due to a general memory processing. This is an area acti\'ated 
by the mere presentation of the chess positions. As pointed out in the previous 
paragraph, CHREST (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 2000) assumes an 
automatic activation of long-term memory storages. The activation in more 
posterior areas of the inferior temporal lobe (e.g. fusiform gyrus) has also been 
seen on the game> dot contrast. As I proposed earlier, this might be due to 
increasing perceptual processes of the chess positions in game. Interestingly, non-
chess players displayed activation in an even more posterior part of the fusiform 
gyrus (occipital fusiform gyrus). It might be the case that in experts - as shown by 
Gauthier et al (2000) and Tarr & Gauthier (2000) - the increase in perceptual 
demands uses more anterior areas of the fusiform gyrus than those of the non-chess 
players. 
10.1.4.3. Game> random contrast 
The small cluster activated in chess players in the contrast game> random 
supports the proposed role of the parahippocampal gyrus in storage of familiar 
patterns. On the other hand, it also indicates the relevance of the visual aspects of 
the display of chess positions. Ifnon-visual information were important, many 
more differences in this contrast would have appeared. However, behavioural 
experiments clearly showed a difference in memory performance in game positions 
compared to random positions (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973, Gobet & Simon, 2000). 
This issue was the key aspect of the second experiment 
10.1.5. Conclusion 
To summarise, this study uncovered a network of areas used by experts 
related to different aspects of expertise. There is a long-term memory storage of 
chess visual patterns in anterior parts of the inferior temporal lobe (e.g. 
parahippocampal gyrus, BA36). Interestingly, the pattern of activations is bilateral 
but with emphasis on the left hemisphere. The right posterior cingulate cortex is 
thought to be involved in the link between incoming information with prior 
knowledge (in this case, long-term memory storages of chess patterns). Schlaug et 
al. (1995) found an increased corpus callosum size in musicians. This is expected if 
a rapid link between the right posterior cingulate and the left temporal lobe is used, 
as seems to be the case in chess players. Areas related to working memory 
processes, i.e., frontal lobes in combination with areas involved in the sensory 
processing of the same modality (see Fuster, 1998,2000) were necessary for 
experts to perform this task. However, non-experts used the frontal areas to a 
greater degree. 
It was shown that both the reduction of activation due to increased 
efficiency of experts, and the increasing of activation due to the experience in the 
field, have indeed happened in this study as well. The reduction of activation 
occurs in areas not related to permanent storages. That means that the working 
memory network that activates frontal areas and long-term memory areas 
diminishes its activation only in the frontal lobes, but not in the inferior temporal 
lobes. The increase of activation occurs in areas related to permanent storages (i.e. 
inferior temporal lobes) and areas that deal with the link between the long-term 
memory store and incoming information (right posterior cingulate). 
10.2. Experiment 2. Role of semantic information in brain 
activity 
In the previous experiment a clear pattern of activation was found in the 
contrast that assessed the chess specific components of the task (game> scene). 
However, the contrast that considered the differences due to the chess game pattern 
(i.e., chess> random) showed only sixteen voxels activated in the left 
parahippocampal gyrus. If this finding were robust, it would mean that the 
perceptual aspects of the game stimuli account for most of the brain activity in 
long-term memory areas. In the second experiment this issue is investigated more 
deeply. Two factors were manipulated-structural and perceptual. The structural 
factor consisted of two levels, game positions and random positions; the perceptual 
factor had also two levels, chess board with chess pieces and grey-scale scene 
board with shapes. 
Chess-game> chess-random and scene-game> scene-random contrasts 
assess brain activity due to the structural component. This is the case because in 
both the chess-game and the scene-game conditions, the stimuli displayed a chess 
game position; and in both the chess-random and the scene-random, the stimuli 
displayed a random position. The subtraction of the latter conditions from the 
former conditions would show the brain activity due to the typical chess patterns 
(i.e., typical chess structure). On the other hand, the chess-game> scene-game and 
the chess-random> scene-random contrasts show brain activity due to the 
perceptual component of the chess game position. That is the case because both the 
chess-game and chess-random conditions use a chessboard with chess pieces and 
both the scene-game and scene-random conditions use a grey-scale background 
with black and white shapes. Thus, the subtraction of the latter conditions from the 
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former conditions would show brain activity due to the perceptual aspects of the 
chess stimuli. 
10.2. 1. Methods 
10.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen right-handed healthy volunteers with normal vision signed a 
consent form and participated in the experiment. Two of them were chess players 
(one grandmaster of ELO 2550, age 18, and one international master of ELO 2'+50, 
age 20) and twelve were university students who knew how to play chess but had 
never engaged in the game seriously (mean age = 21.42, sd = 1.39). It is worth 
noting that originally 19 non-players were scanned and five were discarded because 
of failure to fulfil the criterion of motion explained in chapter 3). Ethical 
regulations of the School of Psychology, University of Nottingham ethics 
committee were followed in the experiment. 
10.2.1.2. Procedure 
All the blocks of all the conditions had the same structure (see figure x). 
Each block started with a fixation cross, which appeared on the screen for 13 
seconds. Following the fixation cross, a sample stimulus was presented for 5 
seconds. After a 5 second's delay a target stimulus was presented for 3 seconds and 
the participants had to decide whether the test stimulus matched the sample 
stimulus or not. To indicate that choice, they pressed the right button for 'yes' and 
the left button for 'no'. They had to react w ithin the 3 seconds durin g which the 
stimuli were on the screen. 
<-'---, '-" --' 
13 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 3 seconds 
Figure 10.7. Block structure. Details in text. 
There were 4 conditions: chess-game, chess-random, scene-game and 
scene-random (see figure 10.7). In the chess-game condition the stimuli were the 
right half of a grey-scale chessboard (4 x 8 squares) with black and white chess 
pieces resembling a chess game position. The chess-random conditi on was the 
same, but the pieces were randomly distributed throughout the board. A ll the 
positions in both conditions contained 10 pieces (5 white pieces and 5 bl ack 
pieces). In the scene-game and the scene-random conditions the stimuli consisted 
of a grey-scale background containing an ilTegular rectangular design and di ffe rent 
types of black and white shapes that matched chess pieces (a cross matched the 
king, a hexagon matched the queen, a square the rook, a rectangle tri angle the 
bishop, a L-shape the knight and a rectangle the pawn). The positions were 
generated as follows . A chess game position was generated by me (2200 ELO 
player) with 5 white and 5 black pieces, always with 3 pawns, a king and the fifth 
piece was one of the queen, rook, bishop or knight. In the random positions the 
chess pieces that belong to each of the game positions were randoml y distributed 
throughout the board. For the scene positions, first , different chess positions \\ 'ere 
generated, second, the chess pieces were replaced by the corresponding shapes. 
After this , the chessboard was replaced by the irregular-rectangular-design board. 
Fifty per cent of the times the target matched the sample; when it did not match the 
sample the test stimulus differed from the sample in that two pieces or shapes of 
the same colour had changed location . In the case of the game positions the change 
consisted on two legal moves, in the case of the random positions the change 
consisted of two illegal moves . 
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Figure 10.S. Stimuli used in experiment 2. Top left = chess-game, bottom left 
= chess-random, top right = scene-game, bottom right = scene-rando11l. 
It is worth noting that other manipulations were possible . An altem at ive 
could have been the use of shapes that do not match the chess pieces (like the ones 
used in the preceding fMRI experiment and in some experiments in chapters 7 and 
8). FUlihel1l10re, both types of shapes could have been displayed on a normal chess 
board. However, it is quite problematic to use several conditions within the same 
experiment in fMRI studies. Taking this into account, I decided to manipulate the 
perceptual aspects of both the chessboard and the chess pieces in order to 
differentiate the perceptual aspects as much as possible, keeping the semantics (i.e .. 
the identity of the pieces) constant. 
10.2.1.3. Design 
Seventy two blocks (18 blocks per condition) were pseudo-randomly 
presented (i.e., there were 18 sets of 4 blocks, in which each condition was 
presented once. The order of the conditions within the set was randomly assigned.). 
Fifty per cent of the test stimuli matched the sample. A different stimulus was used 
for each block with the respective transformed stimulus (two pieces or shapes 
changing location) in the case of non-matching trials. 
10.2.1.4. Statistical analysis 
Regarding the behavioural data, only descriptive statistics were carried out 
due to the low number of masters. In terms of the brain imaging data, the statistical 
model used was a box-car function convolved with a hemodynamic response 
function. Three planned contrasts were carried out in the group of non-players and 
individually in each chess master: Chess-game> chess-random, chess-game> 
scene-game, and chess-random> scene-random. SPM maps of t values were 
obtained after correction ofp values, showing p < 0.05. Only the clusters of more 
than 5 voxels are reported. 
10.2.2. Hypotheses 
There are four possible outcomes in terms of brain activity on the chess 
players' contrasts. First, 'the structural hypothesis' in which differences between 
chess-game and chess-random would be important. This result would support the 
idea that the differences between game and scene in the first experiment were 
related to the lack of structure in the scene display. However, this outcome would 
be in contradiction with the small activity in chess> random in experiment 1, 
which showed only 16 voxels activated. Second, 'the perceptual hypothesis', which 
predicts differences between chess-game and scene-game and between chess-
random and scene-random, suggesting that the differences in game> scene in 
experiment 1 were due to the perceptual aspects of the stimuli (chess pieces and 
chess board vs scene and shapes), regardless of the structure. 
Third, 'the dual hypothesis' in which differences in all the contrasts alluded 
to above would be found and in different brain areas; hence, there would be a 
'structural area' and a 'perceptual area'. Fourth, 'the semantic hypothesis', which 
predicts lack of differences in all the contrasts. In this case, the differences 
observed in game> scene in the first experiment are neither related to the 
perceptual aspects, nor to the structure of the stimulus, but to the semantics 
activated by the presentation of any kind of stimulus that represents a chessboard 
with chess pieces. The last pattern was what was found. 
Regarding differences between chess players and non-chess players, since 
in the first experiment non-players showed a differential pattern of activations in 
game> scene and game> random, it is expected that the same would happen here, 
whereas in chess players if any difference in brain activity is found it would be 
rather small. 
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10.2.3. Results 
10.2.3.1. Behavioural data 
Figure 10.9 depicts the percentage of correct responses in chess masters and 
non-players. Overall, all the subjects performed quite well. The grandmaster 
performed above 90% in all of the conditions, the international master performed 
between 80% and 90%, except from scene-random. Non-players performed 
between 75% and 85%. 
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Figure 10.9. Percentage of correct trials in masters and non-players. 
Figure 10.10 plots the response times of the masters and non-players. The 
grandmaster was much faster than all the other participants in all the conditions. 
Conversely, the international master was slower than the group of non-players. 
This result shows that response times in this task is not related to chess skill, at 
least up to international master level (2450 ELO in this sample) (speed of 
processing is fmiher investigated in chapter 8). In comparison with experiment 1 of 
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this chapter, this result illustrates the variability in response times within chess 
players, one of them being by far the fastest in this experiment, while the mean of 
chess players was slower than that of the non-players in the previous experiment. 
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Figure 10.10. Percentage of correct trials in masters and non-players. 
10.2.3.2. Brain imaging data 
Table 10.4 shows the areas of activation in the three planned contrasts. 
Only the non-chess players' data are displayed because both the grandmaster and 
the international master showed no differences in any of the contrasts. This result 
supports the fourth hypothesis - the 'semantic hypothesis'. 
The chess-game> chess-random contrast in the non-players' data showed a 
very small number of voxels activated. Unlike the same contrast in the first 
experiment, the pattern is left lateralised, though similar areas are actiye. The 
chess-game> scene-game contrast is consistent with game> 
Table 10.4. Non-players. All contrasts. 
Contrast Vox. Hem. Brain region BA t-value Z-value Talairach 
x y z 
chess-aame 8 L Suoerior temooral avrus 38 4.89 488 
-47 17 
-8 
> 21 L Inferior frontal gyrus 44 5.05 5.04 
-56 15 13 
chess-random 6 L Middle frontal gyrus 46 4.72 4.72 -44 30 20 
6 L Inferior frontal gyrus 47 4.69 4.69 
-47 32 -2 
chess-game 12 L Cuneus 19 4.97 4.96 -3 -77 37 
> 15 R Precuneus 7 4.67 4.67 9 -68 34 
scene-game 7 R Inferior parietal lobule 40 4.68 4.67 62 -33 29 
R Inferior parietal lobule 40 4.5 4.49 59 -40 24 
276 R Posterior cingulate 29 5.73 5.72 3 -46 8 
UR Posterior cingulate 23 5.14 5.13 0 -22 29 
UR Posterior cingulate 29 5.13 5.12 0 -46 19 
1233 UR Anterior cingulate 32 6.29 6.28 0 33 26 
R Superior frontal gyrus 8 6.1 6.09 6 35 53 
L Superior frontal gyrus 8 5.74 5.73 -3 17 52 
35 L Insula 13 5.11 5.1 -42 3 -5 
L Superior temporal gyrus 22 5.01 5.01 -53 0 0 
68 L Middle frontal gyrus 10 5.98 5.97 -24 62 8 
L Superior frontal gyrus 10 5.19 5.19 -24 52 0 
59 R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.88 4.87 27 20 54 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.83 4.82 24 5 49 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 4.76 4.76 36 0 58 
6 L Middle frontal gyrus 46 4.71 4.7 -48 33 20 
64 L Inferior frontal gyrus 45 5.42 5.41 -53 21 7 
167 R Cerebellum 6.19 6.18 30 -59 -12 
R Cerebellum 5.18 5.18 36 -45 -20 
R Cerebellum 4.59 4.59 45 -63 -27 
30 L Cerebellum 5.57 5.56 -42 -51 -28 
117 R Thalamus 5.52 5.51 6 -23 4 
R Amigdala 5.44 5.43 18 -9 -10 
R Brainstem 4.84 4.83 12 -21 -4 
chess-random 
> 6 L Posterior cingulate 31 4.91 4.91 -24 -66 17 
scene-random 
scene in the first experiment. A large frontal area was active in the present study, 
and to a lesser extent, a group of posterior parieto-occipital areas (see figure 10.11). 
Interestingly, when there is no game structure the differences between chess and 
scene (i.e., chess-random> scene-random) almost disappeared. 
The lack of activation in any of the contrasts in both chess players could be 
interpreted in terms of the 'semantic hypothesis'; alternatively, it is possible that 
there was a problem with the scanner or that the paradigm was not sensitive enough 
to find differences. In order to rule out these possibilities I proceeded to an analysis 
subtracting the brain activation during the fixation cross from that of the periods of 
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the p r e ~ e n t a t t o n n of the target and the de lay (the period of thc tc"t ..,timulLh \\ ,1\ not 
used in order to excl ude ac ti vati on due to the motor r e ~ p o n . . . , e ) . . Table 10 .. - and 
figures 10. 12 and 10. 13 depict the brain a r e a ~ ~ acti \'ared in thi" contra\t. The e 
results show that the lack of differences cannot be explained b ~ ~ a "canner problem 
or by a low sensiti vity of the paradigm, Therdore. the 'se man ti c hypothe"i.., ' \\ ill be 
discussed in the next session . 
Figure 10.11. N011-players, chess-game> scelle-ga111e cOlltrast. FOllr axial 
i111 ages fro 111 top to bo tto 111 of the bra ill , d i sp 10 yi llg b fa i 11 acti () 11 ti 0 11 . 
The brain areas acti vated in thi s anal ys is are beyond the ..,cope or thi.., " ' l L i d d . .
since all the conditions were grouped together. Suffice it to \ay that the pattern l)r 
brain activity di splayed is consistent with the first experiment regarding the 
activation of working memory areas . Howe \'er. no acti \ ation \\ ,1\ round in thc 
temporal lobe. 
Table 10.5. Brain areas activated in the grandmaster and international 
master, target +delay > fixation cross. 
Contrast Vox. Hem . Brain region BA t-value Z-value Ta lairach 
arandmaster 116 
target+ delay 705 
> 
fi xation cross 
international 
982 
208 
229 
92 
36 
75 
23 
14 
6 
11 
6 
master 1844 
target+ delay 
> 
fi xa tion cross 527 
214 
288 
67 
56 
25 
7 
7 
9 
L Middle frontal avrus 6::1 q3 
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 3.89 
L Middle occipital gyrus 19 2.81 
L Precuneus 7 2.35 
R Superior parietal lobule 7 3. 51 
R Middle occipital gyrus 19 3.26 
R Middle occipital gyrus 19 2.92 
R Cerebellum 2.97 
R Cerebellum 2.49 
R Cerebellum 1.96 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 44 2.95 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 9 2.42 
L Inferior frontal gyrus 9 1.4 7 
R Anterior cingu late 32 2.29 
R Midd le frontal gyrus 6 2.01 
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 1.78 
L Postcentral gyrus 40 1.34 
R Middle frontal gyrus 46 1.53 
R Brainstem 1.28 
R Cerebellum 1.22 
L Thalamus 1.2 
R Middle occipital gyrus 18 6.52 
R Middle occipital gyrus 18 5.85 
R Precuneus 7 4.74 
L Middle occipital gyrus 18 5.11 
L Cuneus 19 4.12 
L I nferior occipital gyrus 18 2.46 
L Cerebellum 3.84 
L Cerebellum 2.55 
L Occipital fusiform gyrus 18 1.93 
R Medial frontal lobe 6 2.91 
R Medial frontal lobe 6 2.91 
L Medial frontal lobe 6 1.46 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 202 
R Precentral gyrus 4 1.94 
R Middle frontal gyrus 9 1.6 
R Middle frontal gyrus 8 1.76 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 1.69 
L Precentral gyrus 6 1.66 
R Caudate nucleus 1.63 
L Superior parietal lobule 7 1.46 
R Thalamus 1.27 
>7 R 
>7 .8 
>7.8 
>7 .8 
>7 .8 
>7 .8 
>7 .8 
>7 .8 
>7.8 
7.26 
>7 .8 
>7.8 
606 
>7.8 
7.4 
6.83 
5.75 
6.2 
5.59 
5.46 
5.4 1 
>7.8 
>7.8 
>7.8 
>7.8 
>7.8 
>7.8 
>7 .8 
>7.8 
7.19 
>7.8 
>7.8 
605 
7.41 
7.22 
6.39 
6.78 
6.6 
6.52 
6.44 
6.05 
5.59 
x y z 
-::If) 0 'iO 
-30 -56 42 
-27 -87 7 
-9 -79 43 
30 -62 50 
30 -72 15 
30 -90 16 
27 -68 -19 
24 -80 -1 9 
45 -60 -27 
36 7 25 
-39 10 24 
-50 7 30 
6 14 41 
33 -3 50 
-48 -35 49 
-53 -29 51 
45 30 15 
6 -27 -6 
24 -48 -23 
-18 -20 15 
27 -93 
27 -90 
24 -70 
-24 -96 
-15 -86 
7 
16 
48 
5 
35 
-42 -87 -1 
-21 -83 -26 
-33 -77 -21 
-21 -91 -1 3 
3 5 47 
3 0 53 
-21 0 50 
53 5 44 
48 -4 44 
50 5 36 
27 11 38 
30 8 49 
-48 -7 39 
12 1 17 
-33 -58 55 
3 -17 4 
Fi:?ure 1.0.12. Target + delay> fixation cross contrast (gralZd111aster) . FOllr 
aXIal slIces from top to bottom of the brailz disp/ayilzg bra ill acti-uittj. 
Figure 10.13. Target + delay> fixatioll cross cOlltrast (illtenll1tiolla/ 
master). Four axial slices from top to botto111 of the braill disp!t1yillg In'nill 
activity. 
10.2.4 Discussion 
Three main results were uncO\"ered in the prese nt study" Fir '-. t. neither the 
grandmaster nor the international master show differences in brain acti\ it: in a l 1 ~ ~
of the contrasts. Second, this lack of effect is not an artifact of the apparatus or due 
to the lack of sensitivity of the paradigm. Third, non-chess players displayed the 
largest pattern of brain activity in the chess-game> scene-game contrast, but this 
pattern disappeared in the chess-random> scene-random contrast. 
10.2.4.1. Semantic hypothesis 
I suggested that a 'semantic hypothesis' predicted the lack of effect in all of 
the contrasts. This hypothesis is based in previous studies (for example, Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997) that showed that the presentation of 
a symbol instead of the actual chess piece allowed the chess players to access the 
identity of the piece, and the performance was not diminished in comparison with a 
condition with the presentation of the actual pieces. Therefore, it is proposed that 
the perceptual aspect of the piece is not the one encoded in long-term memory but 
the semantics of the chess pieces are. There are different types of chess sets, and it 
would be overloading and inefficient to encode in long-term memory the 
perceptual aspects of the pieces; instead, an abstract way of encoding would be 
more efficient. 
In order to support this proposal, a direct test could be carried out using the 
scene condition of experiment 1 (in which it is not possible to establish a match of 
the shapes with the chess pieces) and the scenes of experiment 2 (in which a match 
is possible) with the same number of shapes. Brain acti\'ity in the parahippocampaJ 
gyri should be found in the contrast game> experiment I-scene, but not in the 
contrast game> experiment 2-scene. 
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10.2.4.2. 'On line' chunking in non-chess players? 
In the contrast chess-game> scene-game the non-chess players displayed a 
large pattern of brain activity. This is consistent with the contrast game> scene in 
the first experiment. Therefore, non-chess players process a chess position in a 
different manner from a scene with shapes (at least, when performing a memory 
task). If what they process differently is the perceptual aspect of the stimulus, then 
the difference should have been the same in the chess-random> scene-random 
contrast. However, in this contrast there were only 6 voxels activated. 
All the non-chess players in both experiments reported that they knew the 
rules of chess. One possibility is that when they perceive chess pieces in a 
chessboard they try to do 'on-line' what the chess players have been doing in their 
chess career: chunking. They may try to group together clusters of pieces; on the 
other hand, they might not do the same with shapes. It is worth noting that when 
presented with a sheet depicting the matching between shapes and chess pieces 
before the scanning session, the non-chess players did not pay attention to it. On 
the other hand, chess players took their time with this sheet, and when asked-after 
the scanning session- if they had matched the shapes to the chess pieces they 
answered affirmatively. 
The idea of chunking in non-experts participants was recently investigated 
by Bor et al. (2003), who explored the chunking theory in a sequential memory 
task. Participants had to remember a sequence of movements on a blank grid. In a 
condition where the movements were either in the same column, or in the same 
row, or in the same diagonal, participants displayed activity in frontal areas in 
comparison with a condition in which the movements did not follow a regular 
patten1. Bor et al. (2003) interpreted these findings in terms of chunking, that is, 
participants in the regular condition were able to perform a chunking of sequences, 
which was not possible in the non-regular condition. 
An argument against the 'on-line' chunking hypothesis in the present 
experiment could be that in the contrast chess-game> chess-random the differences 
were negligible. However, this argument applies to chess players who treat chess 
positions in a different way from the random positions, but not from the non-chess 
players who perform almost equally with chess game positions and random 
positions in reconstruction tasks (see Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998). Hence, 
it is proposed that non-chess players try to perform chunking when presented with 
a chessboard with chess pieces regardless of the structure of the position. 
10.2.5. Conclusion 
The brain activity of high-level chess players (grandmaster and 
international master) performing a delayed response task is homogeneous in 
several conditions varying the structure (game vs random) and the perceptual 
aspect (chess vs scene) of the stimulus. It is suggested that this uniformity is due to 
the fact that all the conditions gave a cue that automatically activated the semantics 
of the display of chess pieces on a chessboard. 
It was also proposed that non-chess players -knowledgeable of the chess 
rules-engaged themselves on 'on-line' chunking when presented with a 
chessboard with chess pieces regardless of the structure of the display. 
However, these proposals should be taken cautiously and more experiments should 
be calTied out in order to rule out alternative explanations. 
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Having presented all the empirical studies, next chapter will address the 
theoretical implications of the thesis. The results obtained will be used in order to 
estimate the values for some parameters of a general theory of expertise, taking the 
template/CHREST theory as a starting point. 
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